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LEAD ARTICLE
“NO ORDINARY LAWSUIT”:
CLIMATE CHANGE, DUE PROCESS, AND
THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
MICHAEL C. BLUMM* & MARY CHRISTINA WOOD**
On November 10, 2016, just two days after the election of President Donald
Trump, the federal district court in Oregon handed down Juliana v. United
States. This remarkable decision refused to dismiss a lawsuit brought by youth
plaintiffs who claimed that the federal government’s fossil fuel policies over the
years, which have produced an atmosphere with dangerous levels of greenhouse
gases (GHGs), violated the federal public trust doctrine (PTD) and their federal
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. The court found a
constitutional right to a stable climate system, determining that the PTD was an
implicit part of due process and enforceable through the Constitution’s due
process clause. At trial, if the youth plaintiffs are able to prove that for decades
the government willfully disregarded information about the potential
catastrophic effects of GHG pollution, or abdicated its public trust duties, the
decision could be transformative in global efforts to shift to an energy policy that
does not threaten young people and future generations.
This Article examines Juliana, its context as part of a worldwide campaign
of “atmospheric trust” litigation, its path-breaking reasoning, and its
implications in the United States and abroad. The case has been described as
“the case of the century” and, because of the harm it aims to address and the
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fundamental rights approach endorsed by the court, it just may be that. Pending
the forthcoming trial and almost certain appeals, we think the case is, as the
trial judge accurately recognized, “no ordinary lawsuit.”
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“I have no doubt that the right to a climate system capable of sustaining
human life is fundamental to a free and ordered society.”
—Judge Ann Aiken1
INTRODUCTION
With no little irony, as humanity attempts to reverse course before
plunging over a climate cliff, the American public elected a president
apparently bent on accelerating fossil fuel production. The year 2016
closed as the hottest year on record.2 Heated ocean waters threaten
vast marine ecosystems worldwide.3 The Arctic sea ice hit its lowest
recorded level.4 Scientists have warned that the massive West Antarctic
ice sheet may now be in a process of “unstoppable” disintegration that
could ultimately cause ten feet of sea level rise, enough to inundate
coastal cities worldwide.5 The unprecedented urgency of greenhouse

1. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1250 (D. Or. 2016).
2. NASA, NOAA Data Show 2016 Warmest Year on Record Globally, NASA (Jan 18,
2017), https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-noaa-data-show-2016-warmest-yearon-record-globally.
3. See LuAnn Dahlman, Climate Change: Ocean Heat Content, NAT’L OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC
ADMIN.
(July
14,
2015),
https://www.climate.gov/newsfeatures/understanding-climate/climate-change-ocean-heat-content (noting that
warming ocean waters threaten both human and marine life).
4. See Phil Plait, What the Heck Is Going on at the North Pole?, SLATE: BAD ASTRONOMY
(Nov. 21, 2016, 8:45 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/bad_astronomy/2016/
11/21/arctic_sea_ice_is_declining_when_it_should_be_growing.html (describing the
fluctuating levels of Artic sea ice but noting that the 2016 maximum ice extent was the
lowest maximum extent on record).
5. See Brenda Ekwurzel, “Unstoppable” Destabilization of West Antarctic Ice Sheet:
Threshold May Have Been Crossed, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC: VOICES (Nov. 3, 2016),
http://voices.nationalgeographic.org/2016/11/03/unstoppable-destabilization-ofwest-antarctic-ice-sheet-threshold-may-have-been-crossed; Douglas Fox, The Larsen C Ice
Shelf Collapse Is Just the Beginning—Antarctica Is Melting, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (July 12,
2017), http://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2017/07/antarctica-sea-levelrise-climate-change (reporting that a “Delaware-size ice sheet” recently broke away
from the Larsen C Ice Shelf in Antarctica, likely the result of increased global
temperatures); Justin Gillis, Miles of Ice Collapsing into the Sea, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2017),
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gas emission reduction arises out of nature’s “tipping points”—
thresholds that can trigger dangerous feedback processes, which
would unleash irreversible, “runaway” heating capable of destroying
the balance of the planet’s climate system.6
In what scientists warn is a last opportunity to avert such climate
tipping points, the world must rapidly restrict fossil fuel production
and switch to safe, renewable energy.7 Instead, President Trump, who
claimed that climate change was a hoax perpetrated by the Chinese,8
intends to spur production of $50 trillion worth of shale, oil, coal, and
natural gas.9 He ordered agencies to resurrect the Keystone and Dakota
Access Pipelines.10 He aims to open public land to increased oil and gas
drilling and coal production,11 rescind the Obama Administration’s
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/05/18/climate/antarctica-ice-meltclimate-change.html (warning that, in a worst-case scenario, millions of coastal
dwellers would have to flee inland if the “disintegration of Antarctica” continues).
6. See generally FRED PEARCE, WITH SPEED AND VIOLENCE: WHY SCIENTISTS FEAR
TIPPING POINTS IN CLIMATE CHANGE xxiv–v (2007) (describing “unstoppable planetary
forces” beyond tipping points and the end of climatic stability).
7. See, e.g., JAMES HANSEN ET AL., THE CASE FOR YOUNG PEOPLE AND NATURE: A PATH
TO A HEALTHY, NATURAL, PROSPEROUS FUTURE 1–2 (2011), http://www.columbia.edu/
~jeh1/mailings/2011/20110505_CaseForYoungPeople.pdf (advocating for a transition
to clean energy to avoid the consequences of continued reliance on fossil fuels).
8. See Edward Wong, Trump Has Called Climate Change a Chinese Hoax. Beijing Says
It
Is
Anything
But.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
18,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/19/world/asia/china-trump-climate-change.html
(noting that President Trump tweeted that climate change was a “hoax” created by
China to secure more favorable trade endeavors).
9. See Michael Bastasch, ‘Untapped Energy:’ Trump Promises a $50 Trillion Economic
Stimulus,
DAILY
CALLER
(Sept.
23,
2016,
9:59
AM),
http://dailycaller.com/2016/09/23/untapped-energy-trump-promises-a-50-trillioneconomic-stimulus (highlighting then-candidate Donald Trump’s plan to open
federal lands to energy production).
10. See Steven Mufson & Juliet Eilperin, Trump Seeks to Revive Dakota Access, Keystone
XL Oil Pipelines, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
energy-environment/wp/2017/01/24/trump-gives-green-light-to-dakota-accesskeystone-xl-oil-pipelines; see also Zinke Signs Secretarial Order to Streamline Process for
Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Permits, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR (July 6, 2017),
https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/zinke-signs-secretarial-order-streamline-processfederal-onshore-oil-and-gas-leasing (quoting Secretary Zinke as stating that increasing
lease sales for oil and gas production “is just good government and will further support
the President’s goal of American energy dominance”).
11. See David Roberts & Brad Plumer, Most People Are Wildly Underestimating What
Trump’s Win Will Mean for the Environment, VOX (Nov. 14, 2016, 9:21 AM),
http://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2016/11/14/13582562/trump-gopclimate-environmental-policy (commenting that the GOP previously tried to push
similar legislation through Congress and attempted to decrease funding for the EPA).
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Clean Power Plan,12 and resume oil and gas leasing on the Arctic and
mid-Atlantic continental shelves.13 Trump also announced American
withdrawal from the Paris climate agreement.14 He selected the CEO
of ExxonMobil, Rex Tillerson, as Secretary of State and a known
climate-change denier, Scott Pruitt, to head the EPA.15
The cruel circumstance for young people is that actions taken
during President Trump’s time in office may lock in a future of grave
climate disruption within their projected lifetimes. The scientific
community has clearly warned that continued greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions threaten irreversible atmospheric calamity. As author Fred
Pearce stated, “Humanity faces a genuinely new situation . . . a crisis
for the entire life-support system of our civilization and our species.”16
12. See Chelsea Harvey, Trump Has Vowed to Kill the Clean Power Plan. Here’s How He
Might—and
Might
Not—Succeed,
WASH.
POST
(Nov.
11,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/11/11/
trump-has-vowed-to-kill-the-clean-power-plan-heres-how-he-might-and-might-notsucceed (noting that the proposed rule, which would cut carbon emissions from power
plants, is being challenged in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit).
13. See Juliet Eilperin, Trump Signs Executive Order to Expand Drilling off America’s
Coasts:
“We’re
Opening
It
Up.,”
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
28,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/04/28/
trump-signs-executive-order-to-expand-offshore-drilling-and-analyze-marinesanctuaries-oil-and-gas-potential (reporting that an executive order signed by
President Trump aimed to make federal waters open to drilling just months after
President Obama withdrew such areas from possible development).
14. See Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. from Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y.
TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-parisclimate-agreement.html. One hundred ninety-five countries signed the 2015 Paris
Agreement at the United Nations Conference on Climate Change. Id.
15. See Tom DiChristopher, EPA Chief Scott Pruitt Says Carbon Dioxide Is Not a Primary
Contributor to Global Warming, CNBC (Mar. 9, 2017, 11:19 AM),
http://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/09/epa-chief-scott-pruitt.html (stating that Pruitt
“does not believe carbon dioxide is a primary contributor to global warming,” which
is a direct contradiction of the EPA website, because “measuring with precision human
activity on the climate is something very challenging”); John Nichols, For Scott Pruitt’s
EPA, Climate Change Denial Is Mission Critical, NATION (Aug. 30, 2017),
https://www.thenation.com/article/for-scott-pruitts-epa-climate-change-denial-ismission-critical (charging that Pruitt is characterizing events such as Hurricane
Harvey, the 2017 category four storm that killed more than fifty people and caused
estimated damages of $80–200 million, “to make them fit within the narrow confines
of his climate-science denial”).
16. See PEARCE, supra note 6, at 239; see also Brief for Dr. James Hansen as Amicus
Curiae at 5, Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 4:11-cv-02203
EMC), ECF No. 108 [hereinafter Hansen, Amicus Curiae Brief] (arguing that
maintaining a stable climate requires “rapid reduction of fossil fuel [carbon dioxide]
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Sea levels could rise and inundate coastal cities around the globe,
creating a fundamentally “different planet”—one not hospitable to
human survival.17 Dr. James Hansen, formerly the nation’s chief
climate scientist at NASA, has warned, “[F]ailure to act with all
deliberate speed . . . functionally becomes a decision to eliminate the
option of preserving a habitable climate system.”18
Into this bleak and dangerous picture, groups of youth stepped
forward to defend the atmosphere from dangerous GHG emissions. In
cases filed throughout the world over the past few years,19 they have
asked courts to force a government response to the climate crisis and
reduce GHG emissions.20 In late 2016, only two days after the election

emissions”);
Al Gore, Moving Beyond Kyoto, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/01/opinion/01gore.html (“This is a moral issue,
one that affects the survival of human civilization. . . . Put simply, it is wrong to destroy
the habitability of our planet and ruin the prospects of every generation that follows
ours.”). For a graphic description of a worst-case climate scenario, see David WallaceWells,
The
Uninhabitable
Earth,
N.Y.
MAG.
(July
9,
2017),
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/07/climate-change-earth-too-hot-forhumans.html. In response to criticism that the article was alarmist, the magazine
published an annotated version with supporting interviews and facts. See David
Wallace-Wells, The Uninhabitable Earth, Annotated Edition, N.Y. MAG. (July 14, 2017),
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/07/climate-change-earth-too-hot-forhumans-annotated.html. For commentary addressing the criticism, see Joe Romm, We
Aren’t Doomed by Climate Change. Right Now We Are Choosing to Be Doomed, THINK PROGRESS
(July 11, 2017, 7:57 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/climate-change-doomsdayscenario-80d28affef2e.
17. See HANSEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 10 (“We cannot burn all of the fossil fuels
without producing a different planet, with changes occurring with a rapidity that will
make Earth far less hospitable for young people, future generations, and most other
species.”); see also Joby Warrick & Chris Mooney, Effects of Climate Change “Irreversible,”
U.N.
Panel
Warns
in
Report,
WASH.
POST
(Nov.
2,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/effects-of-climatechange-irreversible-un-panel-warns-in-report/2014/11/01/2d49aeec-6142-11e4-8b9e2ccdac31a031_story.html (noting that a United Nation’s panel predicted extreme
weather, rising sea levels, and melting polar ice due to soaring levels of [carbon
dioxide] and other gases).
18. Hansen, Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 16, at 7.
CHILDREN’S
TRUST
19. See
Global
Legal
Actions,
OUR
https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/global-legal-actions (last visited Oct. 23, 2017)
(listing countries in which Our Children’s Trust has partners filing legal actions to
hold governments responsible for climate change).
20. See, e.g., Arthur Neslen, Dutch Government Ordered to Cut Carbon Emissions in
Landmark
Ruling,
GUARDIAN
(June
24,
2015,
6:04
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jun/24/dutch-governmentordered-cut-carbon-emissions-landmark-ruling (referencing a 2015 case in the

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2954661

2017]

NO ORDINARY LAWSUIT

7

of President Trump, the children gained a remarkable victory in
Juliana v. United States21 when the U.S. District Court for the District of
Oregon issued a landmark opinion underscoring the validity of their
claims, denying the government’s motion to dismiss and allowing the
case to go forward to trial.22
As the court recognized at the outset of its opinion, this was “no
ordinary lawsuit.”23 For the past several decades, environmental
lawsuits have relied largely on statutes or regulations. Juliana is instead
a human rights case, challenging the government’s entire fossil fuel
policy based on asserted constitutional rights to inherit a stable climate
system.24 At a time of unprecedented climatic danger, the children
pursued a litigation strategy born from matching the law with the
existential threat they face.
The Juliana plaintiffs charged that the government’s fossil fuel policies
violated their fundamental constitutional rights to life, liberty, and
property, breached the government’s constitutional public trust
obligations, violated due process guarantees, and discriminated against
them in violation of equal protection principles.25 The court aptly
recognized the case as a “civil rights action”26—an action “of a different
order than the typical environmental case”27—because it alleged that
federal actions “have so profoundly damaged our home planet that they
threaten plaintiffs’ fundamental constitutional rights to life and liberty.”28
Judge Ann Aiken’s decision broke new legal ground, deciding that
the children have a fundamental right to a climate system capable of
sustaining human life.29 Judge Aiken concluded that the right to a
climate system capable of sustaining human life is protected against

Netherlands, which held that the Dutch government was obligated to reduce carbon
emissions under international pacts).
21. 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016).
22. See id. at 1263. At the time of publication, this case was subject to a temporary
stay issued by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals pending briefing on issues
surrounding a petition for writ of mandamus filed by the government defendants. See
Order Granting Temporary Stay, United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Or.,
No. 17-71692, 2017 WL 2537433 (June 9, 2017); see also infra note 144 and
accompanying text.
23. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1234.
24. Id. at 1234, 1261.
25. Id. at 1239–40, 1253.
26. Id. at 1233.
27. Id. at 1261.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1250.
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federal government interference by both the due process and equal
protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution30 as well as the public trust
doctrine, which she found implicit in the due process clause and,
indeed, implicit in sovereignty.31 The trial will focus on the issue of
whether the government actually breached these constitutional rights.32
At a time when the political system seems prepared to shun
responsible climate action, the lawsuit may be the only legal
mechanism that can “trump” the incumbent administration. If upheld
on appeal, the case could be a legal game-changer for climate crisis
and, perhaps, for environmental law as a whole.

30. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or [shall any person] be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation”). Due process is also applicable to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. While discussing the
constitutional claims, Judge Aiken referred to them collectively as “due process
claims.” Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1248. Her ruling, which upheld the constitutional
claims of plaintiffs, seemingly encompasses the various grounds of due process, equal
protection, and unenumerated rights reserved by the Ninth Amendment to the
Constitution, which were all pled separately by plaintiffs. See Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 92–93, Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016)
(No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC), 2015 WL 4747094, *92–93 [hereinafter Juliana Complaint].
One exception, however, concerned the equal protection argument asserted by the
plaintiffs that future generations constituted a suspect class. To that claim, Judge
Aiken responded, “The court should decline to create a new separate suspect class
based on posterity. Nonetheless, the complaint does allege discrimination against a
class of younger individuals with respect to a fundamental right protected by
substantive due process.” Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1271 n.8. In subsequent Findings
and Recommendations issued by Magistrate Judge Coffin recommending denial of the
motion to certify an appeal, Magistrate Coffin called attention to the equal protection
argument by noting,
The plaintiffs contend that the federal defendants are denying their basic
right to a habitable climate system so that the current generation can reap the
economic benefits from energy production levels which exacerbate global
warming while transferring the most harmful consequences of these actions
to their generation and future generations.
Findings & Recommendation at 10, Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016) (No.
6:15-cv-1517-TC), ECF No. 146 [hereinafter Juliana Findings II].
31. See Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1252, 1260–61; see also Robinson Twp. v.
Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 956 (Pa. 2013) (plurality opinion) (“The trust relationship
does not contemplate a settlor placing blind faith in the uncontrolled discretion of a
trustee; the settlor is entitled to maintain some control and flexibility, exercised by
granting the trustee considerable discretion to accomplish the purposes of the trust.”);
infra notes 224–34, 254–66 (describing the PTD as a sovereign obligation, enforceable
as a fundamental constitutional right under the Due Process Clause).
32. See infra Section VI.A.
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This Article considers Juliana and its implications. Part I briefly
describes the current climate crisis and the fossil-fuel production
policies that drive it. Part II explains the wave of atmospheric trust
litigation of which this lawsuit is a part. Part III proceeds to examine
Judge Aiken’s preliminary rulings on procedural issues that required
resolution before moving to the substantive claims. These issues,
involving the political question doctrine and the young plaintiffs’
standing, concern the proper role of courts in the climate crisis. Part
IV explores the court’s due process ruling and the concept of
fundamental rights in American constitutional law, describing the
Juliana decision as a logical extension of existing jurisprudence.
Part V proceeds to consider the public trust doctrine (PTD), which
Judge Aiken decided was implicit in due process, and contends that
the court’s application of this ancient principle to the federal
government was both well-founded and consistent with case law. Part
VI explains the road ahead in Juliana by anticipating the trial phase of
the litigation. Part VII examines the international march of
atmospheric trust litigation, of which the Juliana case is a part. Several
international cases have recognized fundamental environmental rights
embedded in the PTD and expressed in the “right to life” provisions
of national constitutions.33 The Article concludes that Juliana could—
and should—signal a significant change to environmental law at the
outset of an era in which the federal government seems quite prepared
to wage a potentially deadly gamble with the future of young people.
I.

THE CLIMATE CRISIS34

Despite climate denial in the halls of Congress,35 there is little or no
scientific question that the world has entered an era of climate
instability, if not imminent catastrophe.36 The planet recently
33. See infra Section VII.B.
34. Parts of this Section are adapted from Mary Wood, Charles W. Woodward, IV
& Michael C. Blumm, Earth on the Docket: Why Obama Can’t Ignore This Climate Lawsuit
by
America’s
Youth,
CONVERSATION
(Dec.
15,
2016,
10:20
PM),
http://theconversation.com/earth-on-the-docket-why-obama-cant-ignore-thisclimate-lawsuit-by-americas-youth-69193. Some of the supporting footnote material is
drawn from prior works of the authors in the area of climate litigation.
35. See, e.g., Sean Reilly, Freedom Caucus Would Scrap More than 200 Obama Rules,
E&E NEWS (Dec. 15, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/2016/12/15/
stories/1060047290 (discussing a report by some House Republicans calling for
revocation of numerous climate rules and green energy initiatives).
36. See, e.g., Paul Brown, Climate Warnings Masked by Propaganda, CLIMATE NEWS
NETWORK (Sept. 30, 2016), http://climatenewsnetwork.net/climate-warnings-
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surpassed 400 parts per million (ppm) of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the
atmosphere, “never to return below it in our lifetimes.”37 Fifteen of the
sixteen hottest years on record have occurred since 2001.38
While the planet has heated roughly 2.4 degrees Fahrenheit since
the Industrial Revolution,39 warming at the poles is more extreme, with
winter month temperatures near the North Pole at times soaring
between 36 to 50 degrees Fahrenheit above average.40 Ocean warming
is melting ice masses across the Arctic, Antarctica, and Greenland,
setting record lows in ice measurements.41 Warmer water temperatures
combined with planetary ice melt cause sea levels to rise.42 In a recent
study, Dr. James Hansen, the former chief climate scientist at NASA,
observed that continued heating will make it “impossible to avoid
propaganda (noting that Sir Robert Watson, former chairman of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and other scientists believe that many
people have “misunderstood the imminent dangers of climate change”).
37. Brian Kahn, Earth’s CO2 Passes the 400 PPM Threshold—Maybe Permanently, SCI.
AM. (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/earth-s-co2-passesthe-400-ppm-threshold-maybe-permanently.
38. See NAT’L CTRS. FOR ENVTL. INFO., STATE OF THE CLIMATE: GLOBAL CLIMATE
REPORT FOR ANNUAL 2015 (2016), https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/global/201513
(reporting that 1998 was the outlying year).
39. See Patrick Lynch, 2016 Climate Trends Continue to Break Records, NASA (July 18,
2016), https://climate.nasa.gov/news/2465/2016-climate-trends-continue-to-breakrecords (recognizing that the global warming trend is driven by the higher
concentrations of GHGs, including CO2, in the atmosphere).
40. See Andrew Freedman, North Pole to Warm to near Melting Point This Week: 50
Degrees Above Normal, MASHABLE (Dec. 20, 2016), http://mashable.com/2016/12/20/
north-pole-to-warm-to-near-melting-point-this-week; Chris Mooney & Jason Samenow,
The North Pole Is an Insane 36 Degrees Warmer than Normal as Winter Descends, WASH. POST
(Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/
2016/11/17/the-north-pole-is-an-insane-36-degrees-warmer-than-normal-as-winter-descends.
41. See Plait, supra note 4 (reporting on the historically low ice levels in at the North
Pole); see also Curt Mills, Troubling Signs in Antarctic and Arctic Sea Levels, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Nov. 21, 2016, 11:07 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/world/
articles/2016-11-21/antarctic-and-arctic-sea-ice-levels-at-record-lows (noting that
record low sea ice levels in “[t]he Antarctic is of particular concern because for years
ice levels there were actually expanding, even in the face of global climate change”).
42. See ’John Abraham, Global Warming Is Melting the Greenland Ice Sheet, Fast,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 25, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/
climate-consensus-97-per-cent/2016/aug/25/global-warming-is-melting-thegreenland-ice-sheet-fast (reporting that researchers believe the Greenland Ice Sheet is
losing the equivalent of 110 million Olympic-sized swimming pools of water every
year); Christopher Joyce, Antarctica’s Ice Sheets Are Melting Faster—And from Beneath, NPR
(Oct.
25,
216,
11:01
AM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2016/10/25/499206005/antarcticas-ice-sheets-are-melting-faster-and-from-beneath
(explaining that Antarctic ice shelves are melting at rates faster than previously thought).
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large-scale ice sheet disintegration with sea level rise of at least several
meters.”43 Such sea level rise would leave most coastal cities
uninhabitable.44 Dr. Hansen thought that the cost to society of
functionally losing all coastal cities was “practically incalculable.”45
Carbon emissions now devastate marine ecosystems. The oceans
have absorbed more than 90% of the excess heat energy generated by
fossil fuel consumption, causing massive coral reef bleaching and death,
as well as depleted oxygen levels in the ocean.46 Marine absorption of

43. James Hansen et al., Ice Melt, Sea Level Rise and Superstorms: Evidence from
Paleoclimate Data, Climate Modeling, and Modern Observations that 2ºC Global Warming
Could Be Dangerous, 16 ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY & PHYSICS 3761, 3762 (2016)
[hereinafter Hansen et al., Sea Level Rise], https://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/
16/3761/2016/acp-16-3761-2016.pdf.
44. See Oliver Milman, Climate Guru James Hansen Warns of Much Worse than Expected
Sea Level Rise, GUARDIAN (Mar. 22, 2016, 12:01 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
science/2016/mar/22/sea-level-rise-james-hansen-climate-change-scientist (reporting
that “[t]he current rate of global warming could raise sea levels by ‘several meters’ over
the coming century”).
45. Hansen et al., Sea Level Rise, supra note 43, at 3762; see R. Henry Weaver &
Douglas A. Kysar, Courting Disaster: Climate Change and the Adjudication of Catastrophe,
(manuscript at 4), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2965084 (“Indeed, climate change may
routinize catastrophe itself.”).
46. See Michelle Innis, Great Barrier Reef Hit by Worst Coral Die-Off on Record, Scientists
Say, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/29/world/
australia/great-barrier-reef-coral-bleaching.html (reporting that two-thirds of the
Great Barrier Reef’s northern shallow-water coral died—the worst die-off recorded);
Latest Ocean Warming Review Reveals Extent of Impacts on Nature and Humans, INT’L UNION
FOR CONSERVATION NATURE (Sept. 5, 2016), https://www.iucn.org/news/latest-oceanwarming-review-reveals-extent-impacts-nature-and-humans (explaining that 93% of
the heat from human-induced warming has been absorbed by oceans); Karin Limburg,
The Oceans are Suffocating: Climate Change Is Causing Low Oxygen Levels, SALON (Nov. 3,
2016, 8:43 AM), http://www.salon.com/2016/11/03/the-oceans-are-suffocatingclimate-change-is-causing-low-oxygen-levels_partner (commenting that lowered levels
of dissolved oxygen “will result in losses of fisheries and biodiversity, poorer water
quality, and knock-on effects ranging from falling tourism to reduced marine
ecosystem services”); Karl Mathiesen, 15,000 Sq Km of Coral Reef Could be Lost in Current
Mass Bleaching, Say Scientists, GUARDIAN (July 7, 2015, 12:21 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jul/07/six-percent-of-worldscoral-could-be-lost-in-current-mass-bleaching-say-scientists (opining that the massive
coral bleaching was most likely caused by global warming); see also Seth Borenstein,
The Amount of Man-Made Heat Energy Absorbed by the Seas Has Doubled Since 1997, a Study
Released Showed, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 19, 2016, 3:59 AM),
http://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2016-01-19/study-man-made-heatput-in-oceans-has-doubled-since-1997 (noting that as ocean temperatures increase, the
less heat oceans are able to absorb, thus leading to warmer land and air temperatures).
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CO2 from human emissions has made the oceans 30% more acidic
than before the Industrial Revolution, jeopardizing shellfish survival.47
Scientists warn that the world faces dangerous “tipping points,”
which are capable of triggering irreversible and uncontrollable
heating that would destroy the planet’s climate system.48 Almost ten
years ago, the Ninth Circuit recognized this threat, stating that “climate
change may be non-linear, meaning that there are positive feedback
mechanisms that may push global warming past a dangerous threshold
(the ‘tipping point’).”49 As an example of just one such process, vast
areas of melting permafrost now release large amounts of CO2 and
methane (both GHGs) into the atmosphere, causing a feedback loop
that further increases the temperature on Earth and, in turn, melts
more permafrost, causing an even greater release of GHGs.50 Melting

47. See Oliver Milman, World’s Oceans Warming at Increasingly Faster Rate, New Study
Finds, GUARDIAN (Jan. 18, 2016, 11:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/
2016/jan/18/world-oceans-warming-faster-rate-new-study-fossil-fuels (noting that
raised acidity levels makes it more difficult for shellfish to form and sustain their
shells); see also Ocean Warming Doubles in Recent Decades, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC
ADMIN. (Jan. 18, 2016), http://research.noaa.gov/News/NewsArchive/LatestNews/
TabId/684/ArtMID/1768/ArticleID/11572/Ocean-warming-doubles-in-recentdecades.aspx (indicating that “half of the accumulated heat during the industrial era
has occurred in recent decades, with about a third residing in the deeper oceans”).
48. See Leslie McCarthy, Research Finds that Earth’s Climate is Approaching “Dangerous”
Point, NASA (MAY 30, 2017), http://www.nasa.gov/centers/goddard/news/
topstory/2007/danger_point.html (discussing thresholds of global temperatures and
atmospheric CO2 that trigger dangerous interference with the climate system). See
generally PEARCE, supra note 6, at xxiv–vi (explaining the severity of climate change and
how the “tipping points” for permanent climate instability are closer than they appear).
49. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 508 F.3d
508, 523 (9th Cir. 2007) (declaring the agency’s rule on fuel-economy standards was
arbitrary for failing to monetize benefits of greenhouse gas emissions reductions in
setting overall fleet-wide averages for light trucks and finding a National
Environmental Policy Act violation), vacated, 538 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2008).
50. See Nafeez Ahmed, Seven Facts You Need to Know About the Arctic Methane Timebomb,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 5, 2013, 1:01 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/ earthinsight/2013/aug/05/7-facts-need-to-know-arctic-methane-time-bomb
(examining
the feasibility of the methane-permafrost-temperature feedback loop and concluding
that such theories “should be taken seriously”); Martha Henriques, 40% of World’s
Permafrost Set to Thaw by 2100, Unlocking Billions of Tonnes of Carbon and Methane, INT’L
BUS. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2017, 4:12 PM), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/40-worlds-permafrostset-thaw-by-2100-unlocking-billions-tonnes-carbon-methane-1616356 (discussing the
potential dangers associated with thawing permafrost, such as infrastructure collapse
and the alteration of Arctic coastlines).
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ice sheets create a similar feedback loop, known as the albedo effect,
as less ice remains to reflect heat away from Earth.51
Delay in mounting an effective climate response allows tipping
points—both known and unknown—to compound, necessitating further
drastic and severe countermeasures to prevent runaway heating. As the
trial court judge in the Washington atmospheric trust case starkly put
it, “[The younger generations’] very survival depends upon the will of
their elders to act now, decisively and unequivocally, to stem the tide
of global warming by accelerating the reduction of emissions of GHGs
before doing so becomes first too costly and then too late.”52 In June
2017, former UN climate chief Christiana Figueres, along with several
climate analysts, announced that it was still possible, though barely, to
avoid runaway climate change, but the effort requires a massive global
project to bend down the CO2 emissions curve by 2020, and to sustain
rapid de-carbonization thereafter.53 Stemming the tide of global warming
will require a drastic departure from existing fossil-fuel policies.
A.

Promoting Fossil-Fuel Policy with Little Regard for the Consequences

The combustion of fossil fuels accompanying the Industrial
Revolution has led to a significant increase of CO2 in the atmosphere
over the last 150 years.54 Although China surpassed the United States

51. See James Hansen et al., Climate Change and Trace Gases, 365 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS
ROYAL SOC’Y 1925, 1928–29, 1935 (2007) (“A climate forcing that ‘flips’ the albedo of
a sufficient portion of an ice sheet can spark a cataclysm.”); Mark Kinver, Earth Warming
to Climate Tipping Point, Warns Study, BBC NEWS (Nov. 30, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-38146248 (discussing how warming
causes more organism activity under soil, resulting in increased carbon being released
from the soil into the atmosphere).
52. Foster v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA, 2015 WL 7721362, at
*2 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2015).
53. See Fiona Harvey, World Has Three Years Left to Stop Dangerous Climate Change,
Warn Experts, GUARDIAN (June 28, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2017/jun/28/world-has-three-years-left-to-stop-dangerous-climatechange-warn-experts (alteration in original) (quoting Hans Joachim Schellnhuber,
Director of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research) (“The math is brutally
clear: while the world can’t be healed within the next few years, it may be fatally
wounded by negligence [before] 2020.”).
54. See Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (2017),
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions
(blaming
human activity for the increase in GHGs in the atmosphere). CO2 makes up the
greatest portion—about 82%—of total GHG emissions. See Overview of Greenhouse
Gases:
Carbon Dioxide Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (2017),
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/overview-greenhouse-gases#carbon-dioxide.
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as the highest annual CO2 emitter in 2005, the United States remains
the world’s largest cumulative emitter of CO2.55 This responsibility for
the lion’s share of emissions is hardly surprising given the U.S.
government’s inexorable promotion of fossil fuels as the nation’s
primary energy policy.
For more than a century, three fossil fuels—petroleum, coal, and
natural gas—have accounted for over 80% of the total energy
consumption in the country.56 Federal energy policy includes leasing
of public lands for fossil fuel development, undervaluing of royalty
rates for the leased lands,57 near automatic permitting approval for
extraction,58 continued underwriting of the fossil fuel sector
(including subsidies for exploration, consumption, and exportation),
and extensive financing of international fossil fuel projects.59
Public records reveal that the federal government knew for decades
of the danger these fossil fuel-promoting policies pose to the planetary
climate system that underpins human survival. For example, a 1965
report by President Lyndon Johnson’s Scientific Advisory Committee
acknowledged that human-caused CO2 emissions risk “the health,
longevity, livelihood, recreation, cleanliness and happiness of citizens
who have no direct stake in their production, but cannot escape their

55. See Supplemental Declaration of Dr. James E. Hansen in Support of Plaintiffs’
Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 4–5, Juliana v. United States, 217 F.
Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016) (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC) (describing how, despite China’s
higher annual GHG emission levels, the United States still leads in all-time GHG
emissions); John Vidal & David Adam, China Overtakes US as World’s Biggest CO2 Emitter,
GUARDIAN (June 19, 2007, 1:23 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/
2007/jun/19/china.usnews (explaining that China’s lead in GHG emissions was
caused by increased energy production from coal).
56. Fossil Fuels Still Dominate U.S. Energy Consumption Despite Recent Market Share
Decline, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 1, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/
detail.php?id=26912.
57. See Juliana Complaint, supra note 30, at 61 (alleging that federal royalty rates
are “consistently less” than state rates).
58. See id. at 60 (stating that 99% of drilling permit applications since 1985 have
been approved).
59. See Sonali Prasad et al., Obama’s Dirty Secret: The Fossil Fuel Projects the US Littered
Around the World, GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2016/dec/01/obama-fossil-fuels-us-export-import-bank-energy-projects
(explaining how “[t]hrough the [U.S.] Export-Import Bank, Barack Obama’s
administration [had] spent nearly $34 [billion] supporting [seventy] fossil fuel
projects around the world”); see also Juliana Complaint, supra note 30, at 61–62
(claiming that the United States used the Export-Import bank to finance fossil fuel
development overseas).
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influence.”60 In a 1990 report entitled, “Policy Options for Stabilizing
Global Climate,” the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
reiterated the 1965 report’s conclusion that CO2 was a dangerous
anthropogenic pollutant.61 The 1990 report called for a 50% to 80%
reduction in total U.S. CO2 emissions by 2025, and it set a goal of
stabilizing atmospheric CO2 concentrations at 350 ppm to ensure
global warming did not exceed 1.5 degrees Celsius above the
preindustrial level.62 The 1.5 degrees Celsius heating limit was believed
then—and is still widely viewed—to be the line beyond which
irrevocable climate disruption lies. The 2015 Paris climate agreement
defined the 1.5 degrees C limit as an aspirational world-wide goal.63
For decades, a wide spectrum of government agencies published
reports, studies, and recommendations exposing the dangers of
continued fossil fuel combustion.64 Instead of responding to these
warnings with decisive actions, U.S. energy policy remains centered on
promoting fossil fuels. Indeed, over the course of several decades, the
fossil fuel industry contributed hundreds of millions of dollars to
60. ENVTL. POLLUTION PANEL PRESIDENT’S SCI. ADVISORY COMM., RESTORING THE
QUALITY OF OUR ENVIRONMENT 1 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 SAC REPORT],
https://dge.carnegiescience.edu/labs/caldeiralab/Caldeira%20downloads/PSAC,%
201965,%20Restoring%20the%20Quality%20of%20Our%20Environment.pdf.
61. See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, POLICY OPTIONS FOR STABILIZING GLOBAL
CLIMATE
5–8
(Dec.
1990)
[hereinafter
1990
EPA
REPORT],
nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPURL.cgi?Dockey=91014BJ0.TXT (discussing the impacts of
global warming and how CO2 contributes to global warming).
62. See id. at 8.
63. See generally Adam Vaughan, Paris Climate Deal: Key Points at a Glance, GUARDIAN
(Dec. 12, 2015, 11:56 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/
2015/dec/12/paris-climate-deal-key-points (noting that the 1.5 degrees Celsius as an
aspiration is meaningless without mechanisms in place to achieve that goal); see also
Michael Le Page, Paris Climate Deal is Agreed—But Is It Really Good Enough?, NEW
SCIENTIST (Dec. 12, 2015), https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn28663-paris-climatedeal-is-agreed-but-is-it-really-good-enough (arguing that countries are not willing to do
enough to stop climate change, so the Paris Climate Deal will likely be a failure).
64. See, e.g., 1965 SAC REPORT, supra note 60, at 1; 1990 EPA REPORT, supra note 61
(discussing the pervasive effect of pollutants on the “health, longevity, livelihood,
recreation, cleanliness, and happiness of citizens”); TERRY P. KELLEY, U.S. NAVAL WAR
COLL., GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES NAVY 9–12
(1990), http://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/weather/climatechange/
globalclimatechange-navy.pdf (arguing that human-caused global warming will have a
serious impact on U.S. Naval facilities); Jason Plautz, CIA Shuts down Climate Research
Program, ATLANTIC (May 21, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2015/05/cia-shuts-down-climate-research-program/452502 (commenting that a
government program, which allowed scientists access to intelligence information to
study climate change, was shut down in 2015 after its resurgence in 2010).
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political campaigns to purchase influence and thereby forestall
regulation.65 Consequently, there is still no comprehensive regulation
or pricing of CO2 emissions in the United States. The top fossil-fuel
producers have collectively reaped more than $1 trillion in profits
since the new millennium, while the global damage and human death
toll from climate chaos escalates worldwide.66
B.

Restoring Climate Stability: The Scientific Prescription

Although considerable climate harm is irrevocably underway, many
leading scientists say it is still possible (albeit barely so) to restore
climate equilibrium over the long term.67 Such an effort would require
reducing atmospheric CO2 levels to 350 ppm, the limit at which the
planet can head off warming in excess of 1.5 degrees Celsius.68 In 2010,
recognizing the need to quantify the emissions reduction necessary to
stay within this safe zone, Dr. Hansen convened an international team
of scientists to formulate a climate “prescription” for the planet.69 This
prescription remains a fulcrum for atmospheric trust litigation,
representing the best available science concerning actions necessary to
avert climate catastrophe.

65. See Fossil Fuel Funding to Congress: Industry Influence in the U.S., OIL CHANGE INT’L
(2017), http://priceofoil.org/fossil-fuel-industry-influence-in-the-u-s (noting that oil
and gas companies are one of the biggest political influencers, with over $42 million
dollars spent on Congressional campaigns in 2013 and 2014 alone).
66. See Bill McKibben, Global Warming’s Terrifying New Math, ROLLING STONE (July
19, 2012), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/global-warmings-terrifyingnew-math-20120719 (arguing that to slow climate change, there needs to be a carbon
tax because it would decrease profits for the fossil fuel industry, leading to increased
prices and, therefore, a decrease in consumer fossil fuel use).
67. See James Hansen et al., Assessing “Dangerous Climate Change”: Required Reduction
of Carbon Emissions to Protect Young People, Future Generations and Nature, 8 PLOS ONE,
Dec. 2013, at 1, 17 [hereinafter Hansen et al., Climate Prescription],
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0081648&ty
pe=printable (explaining that restoring climate balance is still conceivable on a
century time scale through technology advances and economic incentives); supra
note 53 and accompanying text (noting that drastic changes must be made by 2020 in
order to mitigate the worst effects of climate change).
68. See id.
69. See Suzanne Goldenberg, UN’s 2C Target Will Fail to Avoid a Climate Disaster,
Scientists Warn, GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2013, 6:28 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2013/dec/03/un-2c-global-warming-climate-change (reporting that
Hansen and his team offered prescriptions such as a carbon tax at the point of entry
and production and increased use of nuclear energy); see also Hansen et al., Climate
Prescription, supra note 67.
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The Hansen prescription addressed both carbon emissions and the
planet’s natural carbon absorption mechanisms, since they are
inextricably linked. The first part of the climate prescription presents
a trajectory—or “glidepath”—of annual emissions reduction towards
an ultimate goal of near-zero emissions.70 To reach 350 ppm by the
end of the century, the team prescribed a global emissions reduction
of 6% annually, beginning in 2013.71 However, delayed reduction of
carbon emissions sharply increases the level of necessary yearly
reductions, perhaps to a point at which the reductions ultimately
become too steep to plausibly salvage a habitable planet.72 For
example, the Hansen team estimated that if concerted climate-action
started in 2005—fifteen years after the 1990 EPA report
recommending taking action, emissions reductions of just 3.5% a year
could have restored climate equilibrium at 350 ppm by the end of the
century.73 But after years of inaction, that figure climbed to 6% per
year by 2013.74 The scientists projected that, if emissions reductions
are delayed until 2020, the necessary annual global emissions
reduction will rocket to 15% per year.75 At some point, the necessary
cuts will become too drastic for society to accomplish on a global scale.
As the Hansen team emphasized, “[I]t is urgent that large, long-term
emission reductions begin soon.”76
Reducing emissions alone, however, will not restore climate
equilibrium. Because approximately 40% of emissions persist in the
atmosphere for over a thousand years at present removal rates, any
climate restoration must also focus on removing much of the CO2 that
has already accumulated in the atmosphere.77 Accordingly, the second
70. Hansen et al., Climate Prescription, supra note 67, at 10.
71. Id.
72. See PAUL BAER ET AL., STOCKHOLM ENV’T INST., THE THREE SALIENT GLOBAL
MITIGATION PATHWAYS ASSESSED IN LIGHT OF THE IPCC CARBON BUDGETS 1 (2013),
http://sei-us.org/Publications_PDF/SEI-DB-2013-Climate-risk-emission-reductionpathways.pdf (“The 1.5 [degrees Celsius] marker pathway is defined as the most
challenging mitigation pathway that can still be defended as being technoeconomically achievable.” (citing NIKLAS HÖHNE ET AL., FEASIBILITY OF GHG EMISSIONS
PHASE-OUT BY MID-CENTURY 16 (2013), https://www.ecofys.com/files/files/ecofys2013-feasibility-ghg-phase-out-2050.pdf)).
73. Hansen et al., Climate Prescription, supra note 67, at 10.
74. See id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See William Moomaw, From Failure to Success: Reframing the Climate Treaty,
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.fletcherforum.org/home/
2016/8/22/from-failure-to-success-reframing-the-climate-treaty (examining how
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part of the scientific climate prescription addresses the “drawdown” of
CO2 through massive reforestation (because trees naturally absorb
CO2) and improved agricultural measures (because soil also absorbs
CO2).78 The Hansen team calculated that a full-scale massive restoration
program could draw down about 100 gigatons (GT) of CO2 from the
atmosphere, the amount in 2013 that was key to restoring atmospheric
carbon levels to 350 ppm.79 However, because emissions reduction did
not materialize at the projected rate in 2013 (emissions dropped only
by 0.6% a year during 2012–2015, rather than 6%),80 the drawdown
amount must increase to compensate. Dr. Hansen calculated that further
delay of emissions reduction for just three more years (until 2020) would
increase the total CO2 removal necessary by 50%, to 150 GT.81
These are the daunting effects of delay; metaphorically, they amount
to an exponential rise in interest on the mortgage humanity took out
on the planet through unrestricted use of fossil fuels. As one scholar
noted, limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius at this point will
take “a true world revolution.”82 A full and swift transition from fossil
fuels to renewable fuels83 will likely not be forthcoming without legal
pressure, given the political barriers.84
countries have failed to adequately address climate change and exploring solutions to
the problem, including carbon sequestration).
78. See Hansen et al., Climate Prescription, supra note 67, at 10 (noting that such
measures are necessary in conjunction with cutting emissions).
79. See id. (explaining that 100 GT storage will also benefit agricultural practices
through biological nutrient recycling).
80. See James Hansen, Rolling Stones, DR. JAMES E. HANSEN COMM. (Jan. 11, 2017),
http://www.columbia.edu/~jeh1/mailings/2017/20170111_RollingStones.pdf
(stating that global emissions are unlikely to slow for the next few years).
81. Id.; see also Mary Hoff, To Avoid Climate Catastrophe, We’ll Need to Remove CO2 from
the Air, TRUTHOUT (Aug. 25, 2017), http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/41718-toavoid-climate-catastrophe-we-ll-need-to-remove-co2-from-the-air (noting that while
most experts agree that emissions reduction should be the initial focus of climate
change mitigation strategies, these efforts alone will not be enough to reverse the
climate trend, and removal of CO2 will be necessary to restore atmospheric balance).
82. See Le Page, supra note 63 (quoting Piers Forster, University of Leeds).
83. For commentary on the transition, see Jeffrey D. Sachs, US Must Transition to
Low Carbon Energy, BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 20, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/
opinion/2016/11/20/must-transition-low-carbon-energy/fTMoMoFaNIFIYr4NBLYkhM/
story.html (noting that then-President-elect Donald Trump would “resist” the necessary
switch from fossil fuels to renewable energy).
84. See David Roberts, Donald Trump Is Handing the Federal Government Over to Fossil
Fuel Interests, VOX (June 14, 2017, 7:56 AM), https://www.vox.com/energy-andenvironment/2017/6/13/15681498/trump-government-fossil-fuels (“[T]he Trump
administration has been steady and true in its devotion to fossil fuel interests, giving
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Such a transition could produce enormous co-benefits, preventing
four to seven million deaths from pollution per year, creating some
twenty million more jobs than would be lost in the transition, and
stabilizing energy costs.85 Phasing out fossil fuels also would safeguard
society from the massive collateral damage that fossil fuel dependence
imposes, including pipeline leaks,86 exploding trains,87 marine oil spill
pollution,88 fracking-induced earthquakes,89 and groundwater pollution.90
There are clear signs that a transition is underway. As Richard
Heinberg and David Fridley of the Post Carbon Institute claimed,

them a greater presence inside executive agencies, stripping them of regulatory
restraints, and proposing to defund their competitors.”).
85. Mark Z. Jacobson et al., 100% Clean and Renewable Wind, Water, and Sunlight
All-Sector Energy Roadmaps for 129 Countries of the World, 1 JOULE 108, 108–10 (2017).
86. See George Joseph, 30 Years of Oil and Gas Pipeline Accidents, Mapped, CITY LAB
(Nov. 30, 2016), http://www.citylab.com/weather/2016/11/30-years-of-pipelineaccidents-mapped/509066 (noting that while pipeline accidents occur less frequently
than road and rail transportation, lack of state and federal regulation will lead to
difficulty in maintaining pipelines, thus causing more accidents).
87. See Kathryn A. Wolfe & Bob King, Oil Boom Downside: Exploding Trains, POLITICO
(June 18, 2014, 5:01 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/06/exploding-oiltrains-energy-environment-107966 (citing a spike in oil-train traffic and a lack of
governmental regulation for the train incidents occurring in nearly every region of the
United States); see also Eric de Place & Keiko Budech, Oil Train Explosions: A Timeline
in
Pictures,
SIGHTLINE
INST.
(last
updated
Apr.
30,
2017),
http://www.sightline.org/2015/05/06/oil-train-explosions-a-timeline-in-pictures
(chronicling oil train explosions in North America through photos).
88. See Carolyn Embach, Oil Spills: Impact on the Ocean, WATER ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.waterencyclopedia.com/Oc-Po/Oil-Spills-Impact-on-the-Ocean.html
(last visited Oct. 23, 2017) (explaining that oil spills have short- and long-term effects
on marine populations and also harm human activities on the coast).
89. See Matthew Philips, Why Oklahoma Can’t Turn Off Its Earthquakes, BLOOMBERG
(Nov. 8, 2016, 11:43 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-1108/why-oklahoma-can-t-turn-off-its-earthquakes (noting that even after Oklahoma put
restrictions on fracking wastewater disposal, the state is still experiencing earthquakes,
and likely will for many years to come).
90. See Laurel Peltier, Pennsylvania Fracking Water Contamination Much Higher than
Reported, ECOWATCH (Feb. 4, 2016, 9:42 AM) http://www.ecowatch.com/pennsylvaniafracking-water-contamination-much-higher-than-reported-1882166816.html (arguing
that water contamination rates from fracking are higher than the EPA’s reporting
suggests due to disorganization of reporting in the Pennsylvania’s Department of the
Environment); see also Sharon Kelly, BREAKING: $4.2 Million Jury Verdict Against Cabot
Oil & Gas in Dimock, PA Water Contamination Lawsuit, DESMOG (Mar. 10, 2016, 10:23
AM),
https://www.desmogblog.com/2016/03/10/breaking-news-4-2-million-juryverdict-dimock-pa-water-contamination-lawsuit-reported (reporting that most drilling
and fracking cases against fossil fuel companies are resolved with secret settlements,
hiding claims of accidents and misconduct).
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“Fossil fuels are on their way out one way or another. . . .”91 In fact,
renewable energy already employs more people than the oil and gas
industries,92 and global investment in solar and wind is double that of
fossil fuels.93 The reasons are simple: (1) easy sources of fossil fuels
have been tapped, so continuing to extract the remaining sources is
less economically feasible;94 and (2) the foundation of renewable
energy sources is technology, not fuel, so prices should fall as efficiency
increases.95 Despite these changes, however, the market is not
responsive to the urgency posed by climate crisis, and relying on a
market-driven transition is unrealistic. As one analytical team
observed, “[T]he shift to renewable energy isn’t happening fast
enough to avoid the catastrophic legacy of fossil-fuel
dependence . . . .”96
Consequently, a comprehensive response to the climate crisis will
require more than simply encouraging renewable energy investment
and development; it now will necessitate aggressive curtailment of
fossil-fuel extraction. Analysts warn that potential carbon emissions
from currently operating oil and gas fields in the world can cause
planetary heating greater than the 1.5 degrees Celsius increase
targeted in the Paris agreement.97 Operating coal mines alone could
cause the planet to surpass a two degrees Celsius temperature rise.98
91. RICHARD HEINBERG & DAVID FRIDLEY, OUR RENEWABLE FUTURE: LAYING THE PATH
3 (2016).
92. See Anna Hirtenstein, Clean-Energy Jobs Surpass Oil Drilling for First Time in U.S.,
BLOOMBERG (May 25, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2016-05-25/clean-energy-jobs-surpass-oil-drilling-for-first-time-in-u-s (reporting that
the clean energy industry employs about 8.1 million people).
93. See Tom Randall, Wind and Solar Are Crushing Fossil Fuels with Investment,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-0406/wind-and-solar-are-crushing-fossil-fuels.
94. See Richard Heinberg, Rising Cost of Fossil Fuels and the Coming Energy Crunch,
OILPRICE.COM (July 12, 2011, 11:32 AM), http://oilprice.com/Energy/EnergyGeneral/Rising-Cost-Of-Fossil-Fuels-And-The-Coming-Energy-Crunch.html
(explaining the significant increase in per-barrel oil prices needed to incentivize
companies to explore new oil sources).
95. See Randall, supra note 93 (arguing that solar power will ultimately overtake
fuel because of decreasing costs arising from technological advancement).
96. Id.
97. See GREG MUTTITT ET AL., OIL CHANGE INT’L, THE SKY’S LIMIT: WHY THE PARIS
CLIMATE GOALS REQUIRE A MANAGED DECLINE OF FOSSIL FUEL PRODUCTION 5 (2016),
http://priceofoil.org/content/uploads/2016/09/OCI_the_skys_limit_2016_FINAL_
2.pdf (examining the Paris agreement’s climate boundaries and the agreement’s
implications for the oil and gas industry).
98. Id.

FOR ONE HUNDRED PERCENT CLEAN ENERGY
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Quite simply, time is of the essence. As the Hansen team declared,
“[W]e have a global emergency.”99
II.

ATMOSPHERIC TRUST LITIGATION AND THE JULIANA CASE

The Juliana case is part of a wave of atmospheric trust litigation
launched by the non-profit organization, Our Children’s Trust.
Recognizing that looming tipping points necessitate a rapid and
decisive response to the planet’s atmospheric crisis—and that the crisis
only worsened over several decades while the political branches
indulged in climate-change denial—the Atmospheric Trust Litigation
(“ATL”) campaign has turned to the judiciary for eleventh-hour relief
to force worldwide emissions reductions.100
ATL is a full-scale, coordinated movement, with multiple suits
pending and others teed up in different forums, all connected by a
common template of science and law.101 As Professor Randall Abate
observed, “Within the past five years, ATL has been a primary focus of
climate justice litigation and it has made significant progress in
advancing its theory in U.S. and foreign domestic courts.”102 The
litigation campaign began in May 2011, when young people filed legal

99. Hansen et al., Sea Level Rise, supra note 43, at 3801.
100. See Matthew Brown, Climate Activists Target States with Lawsuits; Atmosphere as a
“Public Trust,” CNSNEWS.COM (May 4, 2011, 5:39 AM), http://www.cnsnews.com/
news/article/climate-activists-target-states-lawsuits-atmosphere-public-trust
(explaining that the goal of the lawsuits is for courts to declare that the atmosphere is
a public trust); Gabriel Nelson, Young Activists Sue U.S., States over Greenhouse Gas
Emissions, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2011) http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/05/05/
05greenwire-young-activists-sue-us-states-over-greenhouse-64366.html (reporting that
fifty-two ATL lawsuits were filed almost simultaneously across the country). On the
ATL campaign, see generally Mary Christina Wood, Atmospheric Trust Litigation, in
ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 99,
99 (William C. G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky eds., 2009), which “outlines the contours
of potential ‘atmospheric trust litigation,’” and Mary Christina Wood, Atmospheric Trust
Litigation Across the World, in FIDUCIARY DUTY AND THE ATMOSPHERIC TRUST 99, 102 (Ken
Coghill et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter Wood, ATL chapter], which explains the legal
strategy of ATL.
101. See Brown, supra note 100 (explaining ATL’s nationally coordinated efforts).
102. See Randall S. Abate, Atmospheric Trust Litigation in the United States: Pipe Dream
or Pipeline to Justice for Future Generations?, in CLIMATE JUSTICE: CASE STUDIES IN GLOBAL
AND REGIONAL GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES 542, 561 (Randall S. Abate ed., 2016); see also
id. at 557 (“[S]everal state courts have embraced the concept of ATL as a potential strategy
to address climate change regulation in the courts, and it is rapidly gaining support.”).
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processes in every state in the United States, launched a federal suit,103
and began plans for lawsuits in other countries as well.104
The suits and petitions were premised on the public trust doctrine,
an ancient principle dating back 1500 years to public rights articulated
in Roman law.105 The modernized principle characterizes essential natural
resources as part of an enduring ecological endowment—a “trust”—and
designates government actors as trustees over essential resources,
charging them with fiduciary duties of protection and restoration to
sustain these resources for the benefit of the present and future
public.106 The public trust principle exists in every state107 and is evident
in the legal systems of nations throughout the world.108 Professors
Gerald Torres and Nathan Bellinger aptly described the principle as
the “law’s DNA.”109 With constitutional underpinnings, the public trust
doctrine presents a fundamental-rights framework for articulating
climate obligations that transcend jurisdictions across the planet.110
103. The initial federal case, Alec L. v. Jackson, against the Obama administration,
was unsuccessful because the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed
the case, deciding that the public trust did not bind the federal government. 863 F.
Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d sub nom., Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 F.
App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (per curiam); see Abate, supra note 102, at 553 (discussing the
possible ATL strategies available after Alec L.).
104. For a comprehensive set of ATL updates and materials, consult Our Children’s
Trust, http://ourchildrenstrust.org (last visited Oct. 23, 2017).
105. See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 475 (1970) (outlining the history of the
public trust doctrine in Roman and English law).
106. For a discussion on the public trust framework, see Mary Christina Wood &
Charles W. Woodward, IV, Atmospheric Trust Litigation and the Constitutional Right to
a Healthy Climate System: Judicial Recognition at Last, 6 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 634,
648–55 (2016).
107. See MICHAEL C. BLUMM & MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
IN ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 29 (2d ed. 2015) (“First surfacing in
Roman law through the Justinian Code, [the public trust] . . . became entrenched in
American law in the nineteenth century through the process of statehood”); Michael
C. Blumm et al., The Public Trust Doctrine in 45 States, (Lewis & Clark Law School Legal
Studies Research Paper 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2235329 (surveying the
public trust doctrine across United States jurisdictions).
108. See Blumm & Wood, supra note 107, at 333–64 (surveying the jurisprudence,
constitutions, and statutes of India, the Philippines, Uganda, Kenya, Pakistan, South
Africa, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Canada, among other countries).
109. Gerald Torres & Nathan Bellinger, The Public Trust: The Law’s DNA, 4 WAKE
FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 281, 283–85 (2014).
110. Where specific constitutional or statutory provisions of a jurisdiction provide
trust protection, the youth plaintiffs often have asserted those as well in their ATL
complaints and administrative petitions. See, e.g., Petition for Original Jurisdiction at
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The basic ATL case applies public trust principles to the
atmosphere,111 making the following claims: (1) the air and
atmosphere, along with other vital natural resources, are within the res
of the public trust, and therefore subject to special sovereign
obligations; (2) the legislature and its implementing agencies are
public trustees; (3) both present and future generations of the public
are beneficiaries of the public trust; (4) the government trustees owe
a fiduciary duty of protection against “substantial impairment” of the
air, atmosphere, and climate system, which amounts to an affirmative
duty to restore its balance; and (5) courts have a duty to enforce these
trust obligations. Scores of cases make clear that the public trust
principle imposes obligations separate from statutory law.112
Throughout the course of the ATL campaign, law professors submitted
amicus briefs in key cases to explain the basis and scope of the public
trust, its constitutional character, and the crucial role of the judiciary
in enforcing the public trust in the present climate context.113
The ATL approach recognizes that, in order to curb global warming,
the law must reflect the actual physical, chemical, and biological
requirements of the planet. ATL petitions and lawsuits demand
enforceable climate recovery plans from government trustees to
reduce carbon emissions at the rate called for by the best available
science, epitomized by the scientific prescription described above.114

3, Barhaugh v. State, 264 P.3d 518 (Mont. 2011) (NO. OP 11-0258),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/571d109b04426270152febe0/t/5768120fe6f2
e19198908d2b/1466438160482/MT.Petition.pdf; Petition of Sherley et al. to the Mass.
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. at 6, (Nov. 1, 2012), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/
571d109b04426270152febe0/t/57609324356fb0f59a89b317/1465946918296/2012.1
0.31-FINAL+MA+Petition_0.pdf.
111. See Abate, supra note 102, at 552 (stating that ATL was developed in response
to climate change with the intent to include the atmosphere as part of the public trust).
112. See, e.g., Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823, 837 (S.D. 2004) (“The doctrine exists
independent of any statute.”); Kootenai Envtl. All., Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc.,
671 P.2d 1085, 1095 (Idaho 1983) (noting that compliance with legislative authority
alone is not sufficient to determine public trust compliance).
113. For links to law professors’ amicus briefs filed in Oregon, North Carolina, New
Mexico, Alaska, and the District of Columbia, see Law Library, OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST
https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/lawlibrary (last visited Oct. 23, 2017). The authors
are part of the law professors’ amicus group.
114. See supra Section I.B (discussing a climate “prescription” to reduce carbon
emissions for the planet). The initial prescription was developed by the scientific team
for the litigation and disseminated in May 2011. See MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, NATURE’S
TRUST: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR A NEW ECOLOGICAL AGE 221 (2014) [hereinafter
WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST] (explaining the Hansen team’s climate prescription).
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The campaign anticipates long-term implementation of climate
recovery plans under continuing court supervision, a remedy
characteristic of other types of institutional litigation.115 Although
conventional statutory approaches held promise when the world had
several decades to confront the growing climate crisis, the deadlines
imposed by nature’s tipping points now require a judicial remedy that
can deliver widespread relief tailored to the rapid carbon emissions
reduction necessary to avoid planetary calamity.116
Beyond its potential to offer relief on a macro-scale, the ATL
campaign brings a fundamental rights approach to climate crisis.
Statutory and regulatory law can be vulnerable to erratic political
whims of the legislative and executive branches, producing extreme
destabilization from one administration to the next—as evidenced by
President Trump’s changes to the Obama climate initiatives.117 The
climate crisis demands broad, enduring, system-changing solutions
that hold the promise of protecting life, liberty, and property. As a
complement to existing statutes, ATL aims to set firm boundaries on
political discretion through the assertion of fundamental rights of
constitutional character that cannot be ignored by the current
administration or any other.118

115. WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 114, at 240–47.
116. Statutory law fractures government’s overall climate responsibility into
isolated, disjointed parts falling to an array of separate agencies. Even when a statutory
lawsuit is successful, it narrowly focuses on one contentious permit, rule, program, or
other isolated action. Moreover, the remedies under statutory law are often procedural,
typically returning the process to a recalcitrant agency free of continuing judicial
supervision. Within the framework of a macro-remedy, however, statutory law provides
many of the tools for accomplishing emissions reduction. For example, the Clean Air
Act provides the EPA with authority to regulate emissions. See infra Section VII.A.3.
117. As Magistrate Coffin observed in Juliana, “[T]he intractability of the debates
before Congress and state legislatures and the alleged valuing of short term economic
interest despite the cost to human life, necessitates a need for the courts to evaluate
the constitutional parameters of the action or inaction taken by the government.”
Order and Findings & Recommendation at 8, Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d
1224 (D. Or. 2016) (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC), ECF No. 68 [hereinafter Juliana Findings
I]; see also Wood et al., supra note 34.
118. See Wood et al., supra note 34 (explaining how ATL may help “put the brakes
on dirty energy policy”); see also Order Denying Motion for Order of Contempt and
Granting Sua Sponte Leave to File Amended Pleading, Foster v. Wash. Dep’t of
Ecology at 4, 14-2-25295-1 SEA, 2015 WL 7721362 (Wash. Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2017)
[hereinafter Foster Order of Contempt Denial], https://static1.squarespace.com/static/
571d109b04426270152febe0/t/585979e1d1758ec9d1667705/1482343090836/Foster
vEcology-2016-12-19-141247 (noting with approval that “courts have recognized the
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The Juliana case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Oregon in September 2015, on behalf of twenty-one youth plaintiffs
from across the United States,119 challenging—quite literally—the
entire fossil-fuel policy of the United States. The suit named multiple
federal agencies with control over the United States’ fossil-fuel policies
as defendants.120 Early in the Juliana litigation, the fossil-fuel industry
intervened through trade associations, siding with the federal
government in defending U.S. fossil-fuel practices.121
The Juliana complaint asserted that, by promoting the development
of fossil fuels, the federal government violated the youngest
generation’s constitutional rights and both caused and allowed
substantial impairment of essential natural resources protected by the
public trust.122 The complaint described the entire fossil-fuel regime
and chronicled its governmental support over decades through
massive subsidies, regulatory permits, leasing, exploration, drilling and
mining public lands and offshore areas, and approving export
proposals.123 Describing a pattern that “shock[s] the conscience,”124
the youth plaintiffs alleged:
For over fifty years, the United States of America has known that
[CO2] pollution from burning fossil fuels was causing global
warming and dangerous climate change, and that continuing to
burn fossil fuels would destabilize the climate system on which
present and future generations of our nation depend for their
role of the third branch of government in protecting the earth’s resources that it holds
in trust”).
119. See Juliana Complaint, supra note 30, at 8–38.
120. In addition to President Obama, the defendants included the EPA and the
Departments of Transportation, Energy, Interior, State, Commerce, Defense,
Agriculture, the Council on Environmental Quality, the Office of Management and
Budget, and the Office of Science and Technology Policy. Id. at 38–51. The case also
challenged a contested fossil fuel export project, the Jordan Cove Liquefied Natural
Gas Terminal, and its associated proposed pipeline, which would cross the state of
Oregon. Id. at 3.
121. See Order at 3, Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016)
(No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC), ECF No. 50 (listing as interveners the National Association of
Manufacturers, the American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers, and the American
Petroleum Institute).
122. See Juliana Complaint, supra note 30, at 3–5. The U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia dismissed an earlier case based on a similar argument, Alec L. v.
Jackson, in part on displacement grounds. 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 17 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d
sub nom., Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (per curiam)
(deciding that the Clean Air Act displaced the public trust claim).
123. See Juliana Complaint, supra note 30, at 51–63.
124. See id. at 86.
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wellbeing and survival. Defendants also knew the harmful impacts
of their actions would significantly endanger Plaintiffs, with the
damage persisting for millennia.
Despite this knowledge,
Defendants continued their policies and practices of allowing the
exploitation of fossil fuels . . . .
....
. . . Defendants have acted with deliberate indifference to the peril they
knowingly created.125

The Juliana plaintiffs also charged that “[t]he present level of [GHG
emissions] and [associated] warming, both realized and latent, are
already in the zone of danger,” asserting that “our country is now in a
period of ‘carbon overshoot,’ with early consequences that are already
threatening and that will, in the short term, rise to unbearable unless
[the government] take[s] immediate action.”126 They pointed out that
the harm is likely to continue into the foreseeable future, particularly
from ocean acidification, rising sea levels, damaged fresh water
resources, and other irretrievable impacts.127 Moreover, the youths
alleged that the federal government—controlling over a quarter of the
planet’s GHG emissions—has no plan to constrain those emissions to
levels that do not threaten the ecological functions of the planet.128
Through detailed allegations, the complaint portrayed the potential
irreparable harm of a most grave and unrelenting kind. Unlike many
forms of harm addressed routinely by the legal system, climate
disruption cannot be corrected by monetary compensation, for the
conditions supporting life cannot be readily restored once lost.
Moreover, the magnitude of harm alleged by plaintiffs falls into an
unprecedented category, as it hovers inexorably—and in nearly
unfathomable variations—not only over the plaintiffs’ entire
generation, but over all foreseeable future generations as well. The
haunting prospect of such irreparable harm both brings this case into
the protective tradition of civil law but also sets it apart from any other
precedent in terms of the human interests at stake and the expediency
with which court rulings must issue in a time of urgency. Such
irreparable harm forms the cornerstone of not just the Juliana case but
of all other atmospheric trust cases brought on the state and global
level—reflecting the core human rights struggle in resisting fossil fuels.

125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 3, 5 (emphasis added).
Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 74–76.
Id. at 3, 6.
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As for a remedy, the Juliana plaintiffs sought a judicial order
requiring government defendants “to prepare and implement an
enforceable national remedial plan” to stabilize the climate system in
accordance with the best available science.129 As reflected in the
Hansen team’s prescription described above,130 the plan must
comprise both (1) a de-carbonization project to fully phase out fossilfuel emissions; and (2) a draw-down project to naturally extract
existing excess atmospheric CO2.131 The plaintiffs seek continuing
court jurisdiction to monitor and enforce implementation of the
national remedial plan.132
The youth plaintiffs gained an initial victory in the litigation in April
2016 when Magistrate Judge Thomas Coffin recommended denial of
the government’s and fossil-fuel interveners’ motions to dismiss in all
aspects.133 Magistrate Coffin also found that the plaintiffs’ stated claims
for relief were grounded in the due process and equal protection
guarantees as well as the federal public trust principle, implicit in the
constitution.134 On the youths’ standing, Coffin stated, “Given the
allegations of direct or threatened direct harm, albeit shared by most
of the population or future population, the court should be loath to
decline standing to persons suffering an alleged concrete injury of a
constitutional magnitude.”135
Magistrate Coffin’s findings were then reviewed by Judge Ann Aiken,
U.S. District Judge for the District of Oregon. Oral argument took
place in September 2016, drawing hundreds of school children to the
federal courthouse.136 In November 2016, Judge Aiken issued a

129. Id. at 95.
130. See supra notes 55–66 and accompanying text.
131. See Juliana Complaint, supra note 30, at 95.
132. Id.
133. Juliana Findings I, supra note 117, at 24.
134. Id. at 17.
135. Id. at 7. For coverage of the case, see James Conca, Federal Court Rules on Climate
Change in Favor of Today’s Children, FORBES (Apr. 10, 2016, 6:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2016/04/10/federal-court-rules-onclimate-change-in-favor-of-todays-children/#273936b06219, and John Schwartz, In
Novel Tactic on Climate Change, Citizens Sue Their Governments, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/11/science/climate-change-citizen-lawsuits.html.
136. Rachael McDonald, Federal Judge in Oregon Weighs Dismissal of Youths’ Climate
Suit, OPB (Sept. 13, 2016, 4:10 PM), http://www.opb.org/news/article/federal-judgeweighs-youth-climate-suit-dismissal; see also Our Children’s Trust, Aiken to Hear Youth v.
United States Climate Case #KidsvGov, EVENSI, https://www.evensi.us/aiken-to-hearyouth-v-united-states-climate-case-wayne/180137962 (last visited Oct. 23, 2017)
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groundbreaking opinion affirming Magistrate Coffin, validating the
youth’s claims, and denying the defendants’ motions to dismiss.137
The case proceeded to the discovery phase with a trial expected in
early 2018.138 In May 2017, in a stunning development, the industry
interveners moved to withdraw from the case.139 The motion was
granted by the court on June 28, 2017.140 Meanwhile, the federal
defendants embarked on a strategy to delay the discovery and filed an
interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit.141 On June 8, 2017, Judge
Ann Aiken affirmed Magistrate Coffin’s recommendations to deny
defendants’ motion to certify an appeal to the Ninth Circuit.142 Judge
Aiken’s order thereby ended the defendants’ pursuit of an
interlocutory appeal through normal processes, but the Trump
administration responded by filing a motion for a writ of mandamus
(inviting the public to attend a march from a Eugene, Oregon high school to the
courthouse for oral arguments).
137. See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1263 (D. Or. 2016); see also
John Blackstone, “Bring It On”: Students Sue Trump Administration over Climate Change,
CBS NEWS (Apr. 21, 2017, 7:20 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/our-childrenstrust-students-sue-trump-administration-over-climate-change (reporting that the case
was allowed to proceed and that it was likely to start in late 2017).
138. See Chelsea Harvey, This Climate Lawsuit Could Change Everything. No Wonder the
Trump Administration Doesn’t Want It Going to Trial, WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/03/09/thisclimate-lawsuit-could-change-everything-no-wonder-the-trump-administration-doesntwant-it-going-to-trial [hereinafter Harvey, Climate Lawsuit] (stating that the case
cleared early procedural hurdles and will proceed to trial).
139. See Chelsea Harvey, These Fossil-Fuel Groups Joined a Historic Climate Lawsuit. Now,
They Want to Get out of It, WASH. POST (May 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/energy-environment/wp/2017/05/26/three-fossil-fuel-groups-joined-a-historicclimate-lawsuit-now-they-want-to-get-out-of-it (suggesting that the interveners may wish to
withdraw from the case in order to avoid responding to the plaintiffs’ requests for admissions).
140. Order at 5, Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC), ECF No. 182.
141. See Harvey, Climate Lawsuit, supra note 138 (reporting that the defendants
claimed that they would be “irreparably injured” if they had to go through discovery).
On March 7, 2017, federal defendants filed a motion before Magistrate Thomas Coffin
to certify an order for an interlocutory appeal. Memorandum in Support of Federal
Defendants’ Motion to Certify Order For Interlocutory Appeal, Juliana, 217 F. Supp.
3d 1224 (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC), ECF No. 121-1. On May 1, 2017, Magistrate Coffin
issued a thorough opinion recommending denial of the motion to certify and appeal.
See Juliana Findings II, supra note 30. He noted, “If anything, the plaintiffs’ due process
claim has been enhanced since the complaint was filed given the significant admissions
made by the federal defendants after the Order denying the motions to dismiss.” Id.
at 10. As to the public trust, Magistrate Coffin reiterated the strong basis of the federal
public trust obligation and added, “The implications of . . . forsaking of a federal
public trust doctrine by the Government are staggering.” Id. at 13.
142. Order at 4, Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC), ECF No. 172.
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with the Ninth Circuit, seeking an appeal.143 Multiple groups,
including some sixty-three law professors, submitted amicus briefs on
behalf of the youth plaintiffs urging the Ninth Circuit to deny the
government’s motion for a writ of mandamus and allow the trial to

143. See Chelsea Harvey, “We’re Still on Fast-Track to Trial”: Kids’ Climate Lawsuit
Against Trump Administration Stays Alive, WASH. POST (June 12, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/06/12/
were-still-on-fast-track-to-trial-kids-climate-lawsuit-against-trump-administration-staysalive. Professor Douglas Kyser analyzed the move in the following terms:
Writs of mandamus are reserved for the most extraordinary and
compelling situations in which ordinary rules of appellate procedure must be
overridden to avoid a manifest injustice. For the Trump Justice Department
to even seek a writ of mandamus in the current context is offensive to Judge
Aiken, to the entire federal judiciary, and, indeed, to the rule of law itself. The
writ should not be granted and we should all question why the Trump
Administration’s lawyers are willing to try such a trick rather than forthrightly
defend the case.
When the Framers divided power within the government, they did it so
that the branches could not only check and balance each other, but also poke
and prod when necessary. The Juliana litigation is a powerful poke and prod
to the entire federal government on the question of climate responsibility. In
that sense, Juliana might well be the most important lawsuit on the planet right
now and the government knows it. That’s why Trump’s lawyers are so
desperate to avoid an honest fight.
“Most
Important
Lawsuit
in
the
World,”
MERCURY
NEWS
INT’L,
http://www.mercurypress.com/most_important_lawsuit_in_the_world (last visited
Oct. 23, 2017). Invited by the Ninth Circuit motions panel to submit a letter in
response to the defendants’ motion seeking a writ of mandamus, Judge Aiken and
Magistrate Coffin recommended that the case should proceed to trial rather than
being interrupted by an interlocutory appeal. Letter from U.S. Dist. Court Judge Ann
Aiken & U.S. Magistrate Judge Thomas Coffin to the Ninth Circuit Motions Panel
(Aug. 25, 2017), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/571d109b04426270152febe0/
t/59a08038cd39c3292add0e79/1503690808950/US+District+Court+letter+to+Ninth
+Circuit.pdf (explaining that the appeals court should not grant the “extraordinary”
remedy of mandamus because (1) the youth plaintiffs have no other means to obtain
the desired relief; (2) the case raises new and important issues of the first impression;
and (3) the government will not be irrevocably damaged by proceeding to trial because
any error can be corrected through the normal appeals process following judgment;
Judge Aiken and Magistrate Coffin maintained that their discovery and trial
management plan would narrow the scope of the plaintiffs’ discovery requests, aided
by the intervenors’ exit from the litigation, and noted the apparent absence of any
allegedly objectionable discovery rulings thus far; they also pointed to their plan to
hold a bifurcated trial, first focusing on standing to sue and liability, and then
proceeding to a remedial phase).
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proceed.144 As of this writing, that motion was still pending.145 The
discussion below first explores the procedural defenses addressed in
the landmark Juliana opinion and then proceeds into a discussion of
the substantive legal issues.
III.

PROCEDURAL THRESHOLDS

As is often the case in climate lawsuits against the government, the
Juliana defendants raised procedural defenses involving the political
question doctrine and the doctrine of standing.146 Judge Aiken
rejected the government’s arguments that the case involved an
unreviewable political question, relying heavily on the Supreme
Court’s criteria for political questions established in Baker v. Carr,147 the
landmark redistricting case.148 Judge Aiken also dismissed the
government’s allegation that the youths lacked standing.149
We consider each of these preliminary matters in turn below, but we
first note a broader theme identified by Yale law professor Douglas
Kysar and R. Henry Weaver in a probing article on climate litigation.150
Kysar and Weaver recounted the early dismissal of nearly all tortious
climate cases brought before Juliana, based on procedural grounds.151
They wrote that “[w]hether through deference, displacement, or

144. See Juan Carlos Rodriguez, Enviros, Law Groups Urge 9th Circ. Not to Nix Climate
Suit LAW360 (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/960649/enviros-lawgroups-urge-9th-circ-not-to-nix-climate-suit; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Law
Professors in Support of Plaintiff-Appellants’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for
Writ of Mandamus, Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC),
http://delawarelaw.widener.edu/files/resources/amicusbriefinjuliana.pdf.
145. The Ninth Circuit panel issued a temporary stay in the district court
proceedings to allow for briefing. See Order Granting Temporary Stay, United States
v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Or., No. 17-71692, 2017 WL 2537433 (June 9, 2017).
146. See Memorandum in Support of Intervenor-Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at
17–27, Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC), ECF No. 20 (arguing that
the Complaint should be dismissed for lack of standing and contending that the issue
presents a non-justiciable political question).
147. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (articulating the modern version of the political question
doctrine and ruling that redistricting was not an unreviewable political question).
148. See Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1235–38 (applying the political question
standards articulated in Baker and concluding that the Juliana case did not present a
nonjusticiable political question).
149. Id. at 1242–47 (finding that the plaintiffs met the standing requirements of
injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability).
150. See Weaver & Kysar, supra note 45 (manuscript at 32–40) (detailing courts’
unwillingness to allow climate change to be addressed through tort law).
151. Id.
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deliberate sabotage, anxious courts have found ways to ignore the
climate change plaintiff.”152 These decisions represent, in aggregate, a
troubling mass “retreat” from the actual, imminent, and rapidly
worsening, context of climate change.153 Judicial inaction is hardly
neutral, for as Kysar and Weaver pointed out, “inaction can inflict a
symmetric violence.”154
A.

The Political Question Defense

The fossil-fuel industry intervenors and the government contended
that the court lacked jurisdiction because the case involved a nonjusticiable political question, an issue the government has successfully
invoked in other environmental cases.155 The political question
doctrine, first articulated by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v.

152. Id. (manuscript at 32).
153. Id. (manuscript at 35).
154. Id. (manuscript at 9). The authors drew upon the work of Linda Ross Meyer,
who described a judicial response of “nihilism” to broad catastrophe: “Rather than
expand the bounds of law to domesticate disaster, ‘the nihilist acknowledges the
normative challenge that the catastrophe represents and stays there. The normative
ground is gone, anomie reigns . . . .’” Id. at 9 (quoting Linda Ross Meyer, Catastrophe:
Plowing up the Ground of Reason, in LAW AND CATASTROPHE 19, 22 (Austin Sarat et al.
eds., 2007)). Kysar and Weaver brought this insight to the climate context, explaining:
The error of the nihilist judge is to . . . abdicate their duty to decide because
of the complex or dramatic nature of a harm and the remedy it seems to
necessitate. For instance, judges seem to believe that, short of ordering a
whole restructuring of the global economy, their only option in climate
change litigation is to avoid exercising jurisdiction in the first place. Again,
stuck in a binary choice between denial and nihilism, most courts opt for the latter.
Id. (manuscript at 67) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
155. See, e.g., Alex L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 16–17 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d sub
nom., Alex L. ex rel. Loorz, v. McCarthy, 561 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (per curiam)
(declaring that federal regulatory action is “best left to the federal agencies that are
better equipped, and that have a Congressional mandate”); Sanders-Reed v. Martinez,
350 P.3d 1221, 1225–27 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015) (noting that the New Mexico
constitution imposes a public trust duty on the state, but the state incorporated that
duty into the state’s Air Quality Act, which provides the exclusive scheme for reviewing
administrative decisions, in part because of separation of power grounds). But see
Kanuk ex rel. Kanuk v. State, Dep’t of Nat. Res., 335 P.3d 1088, 1097–103 (Alaska 2014)
(deciding that the public trust doctrine was not a political question, but dismissing
three of the plaintiffs’ claims because they involved a policy question falling within the
competency of political branches of government, and dismissing others because relief
was not prudential); Butler ex rel. Peshlakai v. Brewer, No. 1 CA-CV 12-0347, 2013 WL
1091209, at *5 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2013) (rejecting the state’s argument that “the
determinations of what resources are included in the [Public Trust] Doctrine and
whether the State has violated the Doctrine are non-justiciable”).
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Madison,156 forecloses judicial review of certain questions that courts
determine are more appropriate for resolution by the political
branches of government.157
In Baker v. Carr, which ruled that political redistricting was not
immune from judicial review under the political question doctrine,
Justice William Brennan identified several criteria by which courts may
identify political questions.158 The most important of these principles
are: (1) a demonstrable commitment to a non-judicial branch of
government; (2) a lack of judicially manageable standards for resolving
an issue; and (3) the impossibility of deciding the dispute without an
initial policy choice clearly appropriate for non-judicial discretion.159
Judge Aiken engaged in a searching inquiry of the political question
doctrine, noting its importance in assuring an appropriate balance of
power between the three branches of government.160 As Judge Aiken
observed, “[A] court cannot simply err on the side of declining to
exercise jurisdiction when it fears a political question may exist; it must
instead diligently map the precise limits of jurisdiction.”161
Judge Aiken determined that the first factor did not apply because
“climate change policy is not inherently, or even primarily, a foreign policy
decision.”162 Aiken proceeded to conclude that the other two factors
156. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
157. Id. at 170 (“Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the
constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.”).
See generally Tara Leigh Grove, The Lost History of the Political Question Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1908 (2015) (discussing the political question doctrine’s origins in Marbury and
its subsequent evolution).
158. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
159. Id. Other criteria Justice Brennan identified were (1) the impossibility of a court’s
resolving an issue without expressing a lack of respect to coordinate branches; (2) an
unusual need to adhere to a political decision already made; and (3) the potential of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various branches to the same issue.
Id. The intervenor-defendants in Juliana argued only the first three of the Baker factors.
160. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1235 (D. Or. 2016) (“The
political question doctrine is ‘primarily a function of the separation of powers.’”
(quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 210)). This discussion focuses only on the three Baker
factors that the intervenor-defendants argued. However, Judge Aiken’s detailed and
careful analysis addressed all six of the Baker factors, concluding that the case
implicated none of them.
161. Id. at 1236.
162. Id. at 1238. Moreover, as Magistrate Coffin later concluded in recommending
denial of the motion to certify an appeal, the fact that climate change is subject to
political debate does not mean it is a political question for jurisprudential purposes:
“To the extent Intervenors are suggesting that the topic of ‘climate change’ is formed
and determined by political values and is thus a non-justiciable political question, such
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were likewise inapplicable because the plaintiffs did indeed present a
dispute within the court’s competence. Remarking on the plaintiffs’
charge that the government’s “aggregate actions violate[d] their substantive
due process rights and the government’s public trust obligations,”163
Judge Aiken emphasized, “At its heart, this lawsuit asks this Court to
determine whether defendants have violated plaintiffs’ constitutional
rights. That question is squarely within the purview of the judiciary.”164
The defendants complained that, by not identifying violations of
statutory or regulatory law, the plaintiffs left the court without
standards to apply. But Judge Aiken responded that “[p]laintiffs could
have brought a lawsuit predicated on technical regulatory violations,
but they chose a different path. . . . Every day, federal courts apply the
legal standards governing due process claims to new sets of facts.”165
The court recognized that the plaintiffs sought broad-based relief in
the form of a national remedial plan, and that the “[c]ourt could issue
the requested declaration without directing any individual agency to
take any particular action.”166 Judge Aiken acknowledged that the
court would have to “exercise great care” in fashioning a remedy that
would “avoid separation-of-powers problems,” perhaps by declaring
that the government must “ameliorate plaintiffs’ injuries” but not
“specify[ing] precisely how to do so.”167

an argument must be emphatically rejected.” Juliana Findings II, supra note 30, at 8;
see also id. at 7 (“Nowhere in the Constitution is there a textual commitment of climate
change related issues to a specific branch of government.”).
163. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1240. The court stated that the “plaintiffs do not
ask this Court to pinpoint the ‘best’ emissions level; they ask this Court to determine
what emissions level would be sufficient to redress their injuries. That question can be
answered without any consideration of competing interests.” Id. at 1239. The court
also dismissed the other Baker factors, noting that these factors should only rarely make
a case nonjusticiable. Id. at 1240. Judge Aiken explained that a judicial declaration of
the plaintiffs’ due process rights would be fully consistent with international
commitments, nor would it interfere with “a political decision already made” or
produce an “embarrassment” to the other branches of government. Id. at 1241.
164. Id. at 1241. The court noted that the youth plaintiffs shared “key features” with
the Baker plaintiffs because they are “minors who cannot vote and must depend on
others to protect their political interests;” thus, their claims are “rooted in a
‘debasement of their votes.’” Id. (citing Amicus Brief for the League of Women Voters
in the United States et al. at 19–20, Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (No. 6:15-cv-01517TC), ECF No. 79-1).
165. Id. at 1239.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1241. The court observed that “speculation about the difficulty of crafting a
remedy could not support dismissal at this early stage” of the litigation. Id. at 1242.
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The recent decision of the Ninth Circuit in Washington v. Trump,168
upholding a district court injunction of the initial Trump executive
order on immigration, may be a harbinger of how the Ninth Circuit
could react to Judge Aiken’s opinion. A unanimous panel of the court
rejected the federal government’s argument that the President’s
immigration decisions, especially when motivated by national security,
were not judicially reviewable, a position quite similar to the
government’s invocation of the political question doctrine in Juliana.169
The court had little difficulty in rejecting this allegation, explaining
that courts “routinely review the constitutionality of—and even
invalidate—actions taken by the executive to promote national
security.”170 The Ninth Circuit panel explained that a claim of
unreviewability of executive and legislative acts “runs contrary to the
fundamental structure of our constitutional democracy” and concluded
that it was “beyond question” that the federal judiciary may remedy
constitutional violations by the Executive.171 If alleged actions in defense
of national security are reviewable, the dangerous atmospheric
pollution at issue in Juliana should be equally subject to judicial scrutiny.
B.

Standing

The government and industry defendants also challenged the
standing of the twenty-one youth plaintiffs in the Juliana case. As a
threshold inquiry, standing requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that
the injury complained of is: (1) concrete, particularized, and actual or
imminent; (2) fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct; and (3)
likely to be redressed by a favorable court decision.172 With respect to
the first factor, requiring concrete harm, nearly thirty pages of the
youth plaintiffs’ complaint detailed specific harm already happening
to plaintiffs as a result of climate disruption in their regions.173 In the
opening oral argument of the Juliana case, plaintiffs’ attorney
introduced Jayden F., a thirteen-year-old Louisiana plaintiff sitting

168. 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
169. Id. at 1164; see supra notes 147–49 and accompanying text (discussing the
Juliana court’s rejection of the defendants’ arguments).
170. Trump, 847 F.3d at 1163 (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008)
(upholding federal habeas jurisdiction despite executive and congressional objection
over so-called “enemy combatants”)).
171. Id. at 1161, 1164 (quoting Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765 (noting that the
“political branches” lack the authority “to switch the Constitution on or off at will”)).
172. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1242 (D. Or. 2016).
173. Juliana Complaint, supra note 30, at 6–33.
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before the court, as a victim of extreme flooding just two weeks prior.174
The government contended that because climate harm affects
everyone on Earth, plaintiffs’ injuries amounted to a “nonjusticiable
generalized grievance” defeating the case or controversy requirement
of Article III of the Constitution.175 The court, however, thought
otherwise, citing a plethora of cases holding that a plaintiff asserting a
“concrete and particularized” injury does not lack standing, even if
many others experience harm from the same action.176 The opinion
highlighted the plight of Jayden, noting that she and her siblings woke
up in their house on August 13, 2016 to find floodwaters “pouring into
[their] home through every possible opening” and “a stream of sewage

174. See Declaration of Jayden F. in Support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’
Motions to Dismiss at 2, Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC), ECF No.
78. The flooding in Louisiana was a type of flood event that would normally happen
every 1000 years but is occurring more frequently now, arguably a result of climate
change. John Upton, Louisiana Floods Directly Linked to Climate Change, CLIMATE CENT.
(Sept. 7, 2016) (discussing how climate change increased the intensity of Louisiana
floods in 2016), http://www.climatecentral.org/news/louisiana-floods-directly-linkedto-climate-change-20671; see also Lauren Sommer, With Climate Change, California Is
Likely to See More Extreme Flooding, NPR (Feb. 28, 2017), http://www.npr.org/2017/
02/28/517495739/with-climate-change-california-is-likely-to-see-more-extremeflooding (noting that climate change is likely to cause more extreme flooding in
California); Ian Urbina, Perils of Climate Change Could Swamp Coastal Real Estate, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 24, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/24/science/global-warmingcoastal-real-estate.html (discussing how climate change and floods impact real estate).
175. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1243 (arguing that the plaintiffs’ injuries are not
particular because climate change affects the entire planet).
176. Id. at 1243–44; see also id. at 1247 (observing that “the possibility that some
other individual or entity might later cause the same injury does not defeat standing—
the question is whether the injury caused by the defendant can be redressed”). Later, in
recommending denial of the federal defendants’ motion to certify an appeal,
Magistrate Coffin forcefully reiterated the position, stating,
Plaintiffs have alleged, and federal defendants have since admitted, that
human induced climate change is harming the environment to the point
where it will relatively soon become increasingly less habitable causing an array
of severe deleterious effects to them which includes an increase in allergies,
asthma, cancer, cardiovascular disease, stroke, heat related morbidity and
mortality, food-borne disease, injuries, toxic exposures, mental health and
stress disorders, and neurological diseases and disorders. These are concrete,
particularized, actual or imminent injuries to the plaintiffs that are not
minimalized by the fact that vast numbers of the populace are exposed to the
same injuries. It would surely be an irrational limitation on standing which allowed
isolated incidents of deprivation of constitutional rights to be actionable, but not those
reaching pandemic proportions.
Juliana Findings II, supra note 30, at 14 (emphasis added).
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and water running through [their] house.”177 The court also found
“concrete and particularized” harm that is “actual or imminent” from
other harms alleged in the complaint, such as (1) drought that
damaged salmon harvests; (2) high temperatures that harmed orchards
and required new irrigation systems; (3) decreased snowpack that
inhibited recreational skiing; (4) forest fires that injured asthmatics; and
(5) algae blooms that harmed drinking water supplies.178
As to the second standing factor, the court determined that the
plaintiffs’ injuries were “fairly traceable” to the challenged government
actions and inactions because—at least at the motion to dismiss stage—
the judge was bound to accept the plaintiffs’ allegations as true.179
Judge Aiken also noted plaintiffs’ allegation that the federal
government had jurisdiction over “a substantial share of worldwide
[GHG] emissions,” as the second-largest producer and consumer of
global CO2 emissions.180 The court decided that, although causal
chains may be difficult to prove on the merits, at the pleading stage
they were sufficient to establish a satisfactory causal link between the
government’s conduct and the alleged injuries.181
Finally, as to the third standing factor, Judge Aiken decided that the
youths’ injuries could be redressed by judicial relief. Reasoning that,
because the federal government controlled a substantial amount of
global GHG emissions, a reduction of those emissions would reduce
atmospheric pollution and slow climate change.182 The fact that some
uncertainty remained was not disabling because all that the factors
required was a “substantial likelihood that the Court could provide
meaningful relief.”183 The plaintiffs’ request that the court order the

177. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1243 (noting also that “[w]ith no shelters available
and nowhere else to go, the family remained in the flooded house for weeks,” sleeping
together in the living room “because “the bedrooms [were] uninhabitable”).
178. See id. at 1242, 1244.
179. Id. at 1244–45 (observing that “at the motion to dismiss stage, a federal court
is in no position to say it is impossible to introduce evidence to support a well-pleaded
causal connection” and noting that “climate science is constantly evolving”).
180. Id. at 1245. The court observed the plaintiffs’ allegation that for 263 years, the
United States has produced over two-thirds of global CO2 emissions and that the
plaintiffs had articulated a plausible chain of causation: government agencies with
jurisdiction over 64% of U.S. CO2 emissions, or 14% of global emissions, “allow[ed] high
emissions levels by failing to set demanding standards; high emissions levels cause[d]
climate change; and climate change cause[d] plaintiffs’ injuries.” Id. at 1245–46.
181. Id. at 1246.
182. See id. at 1247–48.
183. Id. at 1247.
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government to “cease their permitting, authorizing, and subsidizing
fossil fuels” and “ensure that atmospheric [carbon pollution] is no
more concentrated than 350 ppm by 2100” through a national plan to
stabilize the climate was, according to Judge Aiken, adequate to
establish standing to sue.184
IV.

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT

Although the young plaintiffs set forth several distinct claims arising
from separate provisions of the Constitution, for simplicity’s sake the
court referred to those as “due process claims.”185 One of these claims
arose from the plaintiffs’ contention that the government tolerated or
caused GHG emissions “to rise to levels that dangerously interfere with
a stable climate system,” thereby knowingly endangering their health
and welfare.186 Further, even after recognizing the dangerous
situation, the government perpetuated the danger by continuing to
promote and allow dangerous levels of fossil fuel production,
consumption, and combustion.187
Addressing a subset of the plaintiffs’ due process and equal
protection claims, the court engaged in an inquiry as to whether the
right to a climate system capable of sustaining human life is a
fundamental constitutional right.188 Fundamental rights are examined
under strict scrutiny, meaning government action will be invalid unless
it demonstrates the action is narrowly tailored and serves a compelling
state interest.189 Without such close judicial review, Judge Aiken
thought that the government’s “affirmative actions would survive
rational basis review.”190

184. Id. at 1247–48.
185. Id. at 1248 & n.6 (noting that the plaintiffs alleged due process claims
encompass equal protection violations and violations of the Ninth Amendment).
186. Id. at 1248.
187. See id. at 1246. The complaint alleged three constitutional violations based on
the express clauses in the constitution: (1) due process; (2) equal protection; and
(3) unenumerated rights preserved by the Ninth Amendment. See Juliana Complaint,
supra note 30, at 84–93. The court failed to address all the claims in detail, but
distinctions among them may become pivotal in the fact-finding stage.
188. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1248–49, 1248 n.6. (stating that resolution of the
due process claim “therefore hinges on whether plaintiffs have alleged infringement
of a fundamental right”).
189. Id. at 1248–49 (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
190. Id. at 1249.
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A Fundamental Right to a “Climate System Capable of Sustaining
Human Life”

Fundamental liberty rights may be expressly enumerated in the
Constitution or “(1) ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition’ or (2) ‘fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty.’”191
Aware that the Supreme Court cautioned that such rights be
articulated only with the “utmost care,”192 Judge Aiken turned to recent
Supreme Court decisions announcing fundamental liberty rights to
privacy, procreation, and marriage for guidance.193 Quoting Justice
Kennedy’s admonition in Obergefell v. Hodges,194 the right-to-marry case,
to the effect that “the nature of injustice is that we might not always see
it in our own times,”195 Judge Aiken understood that a court must
exercise “reasoned judgment” when deciding on fundamental rights.196
She recognized that “identification and protection of fundamental rights
is an enduring part of the judicial duty to interpret the Constitution.”197
Judge Aiken also observed that the marriage right recognized by the
Court supported other vital liberties like family and social order.198
With these background principles in mind, Judge Aiken articulated
a fundamental liberty right to a “climate system capable of sustaining

191. Id. (quoting McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010)).
192. Id. (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)).
193. Id. at 1249–50 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973) (identifying
privacy and procreation, including the right to an abortion)); Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (marriage)).
194. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
195. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1249 (quoting Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598). In
Obergefell, Justice Kennedy poignantly wrote,
The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times.
The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights . . . did not
presume to know the extent of freedom in all its dimensions, and so they
entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the right of all
persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning. When new insight reveals
discord between the Constitution’s central protections and a received
legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.
135 S. Ct. at 2598.
196. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1249.
197. Id. (quoting Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598). Further quoting Obergefell, Judge
Aiken also stated that the responsibility to declare fundamental rights “has not been
reduced to any formula. . . . [H]istory and tradition guide and discipline this inquiry
but do not set its outer boundaries . . . [since] future generations [may] protect . . .
the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning.” Id. (quoting Obergefell,
135 S. Ct. at 2598).
198. Id. at 1250.
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human life,” saying that the court had “no doubt that the right . . . is
fundamental to a free and ordered society.”199 Aiken reasoned that
“[j]ust as marriage is the ‘foundation of the family,’ a stable climate
system is quite literally the foundation ‘of society, without which there
would be neither civilization nor progress.’”200 Judge Aiken described
plaintiffs’ claims as “[e]choing Obergefell’s reasoning” in their assertion
that “a stable climate is a necessary condition to exercising other rights to life,
liberty, and property.”201 She rejected the government’s characterization that
the youth plaintiffs sought freedom from all pollution, describing their
claim as one that argued only against GHG pollution that threatened
catastrophic results.202 Then, writing with a broader stroke, Judge
Aiken noted, “To hold otherwise would be to say that the Constitution
affords no protection against a government’s knowing decision to
poison the air its citizens breathe or the water its citizens drink.”203
Although the court relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s marriage
and procreation decisions,204 it could have cited several other
fundamental rights declared by the Supreme Court over the years.205
For example, the right of privacy is fundamental—even though it is

199. Id.
200. Id. (quoting Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598). The court also cited a case from the
Supreme Court of the Philippines, Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 224 S.C.R.A.
792, 804–05 (S.C. July 30, 1993) (Phil.), which stated that without “a balanced and
healthful ecology,” future generations “stand to inherit nothing but parched earth
incapable of sustaining life.”
201. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1250.
202. See id. (“Plaintiffs do not object to the government’s role in producing any
pollution or causing any climate change; rather, they assert the government has caused
pollution and climate change on a catastrophic level, and that if the government’s
actions continue unchecked, they will permanently and irreversibly damage plaintiffs’
property, their economic livelihood, their recreational opportunities, their health, and
ultimately their (and their children’s) ability to live long, healthy lives.”).
203. Id.
204. See supra notes 193–96 (discussing the application of Roe and Obergefell in the
Juliana case).
205. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.7 (7th
ed. 2004) (surveying Supreme Court cases establishing several fundamental rights,
including the freedom of association, right to vote, right to interstate travel, right to
fairness in the criminal process, and right to privacy); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 385 (2005) (listing fundamental rights that the Court has
interpreted as protected through the Fourteenth Amendment, such as freedom of
religion, a substantive right, and the right to a jury trial, a procedural right).
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implicit206—protecting marital, child-rearing, and private sexual
choices.207 Similarly, exercising the right to vote, to participate in the
political process, and to travel interstate are fundamental liberties.208
There are also fundamental rights to fair process in criminal cases and
in government deprivations of property and liberty.209 These decisions
make clear that the Supreme Court has a long history of finding
fundamental rights implicit in the Constitution, and the Juliana result
is consistent with the judicial approach to defining other fundamental
rights. If rights to privacy, procreation, marriage, and interstate travel
are fundamental liberty rights, the right to a healthful atmosphere that
can sustain human life and protect property would seem no less
fundamental. A healthful atmosphere forms the linchpin to survival
and, indeed, remains the precondition to exercising all other political
and civil fundamental rights.210
Judge Aiken did not suggest that the Due Process Clause protects all
environmental claims; she limited the decision to “the right to a
climate system capable of sustaining human life,” clarifying that such a
right would not transform “any minor or even moderate act that
contributes to the warming of the planet into a constitutional
violation.”211 But those acts that “affirmatively and substantially
206. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (stating that the right of
privacy is protected by the “penumbra[s]” of several constitutional provisions,
including due process).
207. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (striking down a state
statute forbidding sodomy); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382 (1971) (holding
that welfare recipients could not be denied the right to divorce because of high court
fees); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (invalidating a state law outlawing
mixed-race marriages); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925)
(declaring unconstitutional an initiative forbidding parochial schools); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (annulling a state statute that forbade teaching
German in public schools).
208. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969) (invalidating a state
law requiring a year of residency to collect welfare payments as an equal protection
violation); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (holding that a
state poll tax was unconstitutional because “the right to vote is too precious, too
fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned”); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96
(1965) (striking down a state law prohibiting members of the armed forces from
moving to Texas and voting while in the service).
209. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 205, § 11.7 (elaborating on “fairness in the
criminal process” and procedural due process as fundamental rights).
210. Judge Aiken reserved questions of whether the government actually violated
the plaintiffs’ due process and public trust rights for trial. See Juliana v. United States,
217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1269 (D. Or. 2016).
211. Id. at 1250.
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damag[e] the climate system in a way that will cause human deaths,
shorten human lifespans, result in widespread damage to property,
threaten human food sources, and dramatically alter the planet’s
ecosystem” would, according to Judge Aiken, violate due process.212
B.

Challenging Government Inaction: The “Danger Creation”
Exception

Judge Aiken recognized that, with limited exceptions, the due
process clause does not impose an affirmative obligation on the
government to act, even where necessary to protect due process
rights.213 One such exception—the “danger creation” exception—
arises when government conduct puts an individual in peril due to a
“deliberate indifference” to safety.214 This indifference must be the
product of a “culpable mental state more than gross negligence.”215
The Juliana plaintiffs maintained that, “with full appreciation of the
consequences,” the government defendants knowingly caused—and
continue to cause—“dangerous interference with our atmosphere and
climate system.”216 They cited the government’s “longstanding, actual
knowledge of the serious risks of harm” posed by its failure to confront
climate change.217 Further, they alleged that the government had “a
unique and central role” in creating the climate crisis “with full
knowledge of the significant and unreasonable risks” involved.218
Judge Aiken decided that the youth plaintiffs stated a valid claim in
their assertion that the government’s actions and inactions put the
public “in peril in deliberate indifference to their safety.”219 She
agreed that if the plaintiffs could prove their allegations at trial, which

212. Id.
213. Id. at 1250–51 (citing Deshaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489
U.S. 189, 196 (1989)).
214. Id. (citing Penilla v. City of Huntington Park, 115 F.3d 707, 709 (9th Cir. 1997)).
215. Id. at 1251 (citing Pauluk v. Savage, 836 F.3d 1117, 1125 (9th Cir. 2016)).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1250–51 (quoting Penilla v. City of Huntington Park, 115 F.3d 707, 709
(9th Cir. 1997). Judge Aiken emphasized that, at trial, the plaintiffs must show that
the government knew its acts caused that danger; and [that] . . . the
government with deliberate indifference failed to act to prevent the alleged harm.
These stringent standards are sufficient safeguards against the flood of
litigation concerns raised by [the government]—indeed, they pose a
significant challenge to plaintiffs in this very lawsuit.
Id. at 1252.
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Judge Aiken stated would require “rigorous proof,” due process would
require government action to reduce emissions under the dangercreation exception.220
V.

THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND THE ATMOSPHERE

The Juliana case summons an ancient principle for a decidedly
modern—indeed unprecedented—global threat. Some have accused
the PTD of being irrelevant in a statutory era,221 potentially
undermining democracy and the separation of powers.222 Government
defendants characteristically describe the public trust principle as a
mere common law doctrine limited to submerged lands and applicable
only to the states.223 None of those criticisms and perceived limitations
are well-founded. In Juliana, Judge Aiken gave an accurate interpretation
of the PTD’s origin, scope, and effect and contributed a trailblazing
recognition that the PTD is implicit in constitutional due process. The
court’s opinion decisively brings the PTD into the twenty-first century.

220. Id. at 1252 (“A plaintiff asserting a danger-creation due process claim must
show (1) the government’s acts created the danger to the plaintiff; (2) the government
knew its acts caused the danger; and (3) the government with deliberate indifference failed
to act to prevent the alleged harm.”). The court rejected the government’s claim that
the danger-creation exception did not apply to the federal government. Id.
221. See Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural
Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 658 (1986) (arguing
that the public trust doctrine is outdated, irrelevant, and “theoretically inconsistent
with new notions of property and sovereignty”). But see Michael C. Blumm, Two
Wrongs?: Correcting Professor Lazarus’s Misunderstanding of the Public Trust Doctrine, 46
ENVTL. L. 481, 487–88 (2016) (countering Professor Lazarus’s criticism of the PTD and
explaining that the doctrine may be invoked both as a governmental defense in
regulatory taking cases and as an affirmative means of protecting public resources
from monopolization).
222. James L. Huffman, A Fish out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a Constitutional
Democracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527, 533 (1989) (claiming that the modern implementation of the
PTD by courts threatens individual liberties and the basic values of constitutional democracy).
223. See, e.g., Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 13 (D.D.C. 2012) (explaining
that the PTD traditionally functioned as a restraint on a state’s ability to “alienate
submerged lands in favor of public access to . . . those lands”), aff’d sub nom., Alec L. ex
rel. Loorz, v. McCarthy, 561 F. App’x 7, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (per curiam).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2954661

2017]

NO ORDINARY LAWSUIT
A.

43

The PTD as Implicit in Sovereignty

A clarion aspect of Juliana was its recognition that the PTD is an
inherent constitutional limit on sovereignty.224 As Judge Aiken aptly
noted, by limiting the ability of the legislature to dispose of essential
natural resources, the principle protects the power of future
legislatures to “provide for the well-being and survival of its citizens.”225
Like the police power and the right of condemnation, the PTD is an
inherent “attribute of sovereignty”—recognized, but not created by the
Constitution.226 As Aiken noted, the PTD is an ancient doctrine,
originating in Roman law and finding its way to the United States
through England.227 The doctrine therefore applies equally to the
federal as well as state governments, as discussed below.228 Moreover,
the PTD should raise no separation of power concerns when the courts
merely pronounce the law and require the political branches to
exercise their discretion within those bounds.229 The Juliana decision

224. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1252–53; see, e.g., Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth,
83 A.3d 901, 948–49 (Pa. 2013) (deciding that the PTD is a pre-existing right, inherent
in the state of Pennsylvania’s Constitution but not created by it).
225. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1253 (quoting Brief for Global Catholic Climate
Movement et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs at 3, Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d
1224 (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC), ECF No. 51-1).
226. The Tenth Amendment recognized state police powers, but it did not create
them. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people.”). Likewise, the right to condemn private property was not created
by the Fifth Amendment, but merely subjected to “public use” and “just compensation”
requirements. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public
use without payment of just compensation.”).
227. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1253 (explaining that the PTD’s application to
natural resources predates the United States, having roots in Roman law, the
foundation for modern civil law systems) (citation omitted). For background on the
origins of the PTD, see BLUMM & WOOD, supra note 108, at 10–51.
228. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & Lynn S. Schaffer, The Federal Public Trust Doctrine:
Misinterpreting Justice Kennedy and Illinois Central Railroad, 45 ENVTL. L. 399, 412–13
(2015) (discussing how the Illinois Central Court invoked the reserved powers doctrine,
applicable to both state and federal governments); Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public
Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 269, 277–78 (1980) (noting that
even though state governments and the federal government have different obligations,
case law increasingly suggests that the PTD applies to public lands controlled by both).
229. Nor does the PTD threaten private property rights, despite much commentary
to the contrary. See Michael C. Blumm, The Public Trust Doctrine and Private Property:
The Accommodation Principle, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 649, 655 (2010) (explaining how
the PTD functions to mediate public and private rights).
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is certainly one in which the court aimed to invigorate, not intrude
upon, the political branches of government.
In deciding that the PTD was an inherent aspect of sovereignty,
Judge Aiken quoted Justice Kennedy’s language in Idaho v. Coeur
d’Alene Tribe of Idaho,230 which declared that the PTD developed as “a
natural outgrowth of the perceived public character of submerged
lands, a perception which underlies and informs the principle that
these lands are tied in a unique way to sovereignty.”231 As an inherent
limit on sovereignty, the PTD applies to all sovereigns, not just the
states.232
This limit—preserved by but not created by the
Constitution233—is an “obligation [that] cannot be legislated away.”234
Recognition of the inalienable nature of the PTD would prove
dispositive as to the plaintiffs’ PTD claims in Juliana.
B.

The Scope of the PTD and the Duty of Protection

Judge Aiken framed the scope of the PTD by noting that public trust
assets have long been part of a “taxonomy of property” recognizing the
division of natural wealth into private and public property.235 The
sovereign cannot abdicate control over public trust property, as made
clear in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois236 when the Supreme Court
said the Illinois legislature could not grant the shoreline of Lake

230. 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
231. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1257 (quoting Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 286).
232. Id. at 1257–58 (arguing the federal government is subject to the PTD
concerning land it condemned). Judge Aiken cited two cases supporting the notion
that the PTD applies to the federal government. See id. at 1258–59 (citing City of
Alameda v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 635 F. Supp. 1447, 1450 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (holding
that the federal government is subject to the PTD concerning land it condemned);
United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 124 (D. Mass. 1981) (same)); see
also Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1257 (citing United States v. 32.42 Acres of Land, 683
F.3d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir. 2012)) (declining to reject a federal PTD concerning state
lands that the federal government condemned). Judge Aiken thought the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals’s cursory unpublished opinion rejecting a federal PTD was
unpersuasive. Id. at 1258 (citing Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 F. App’x 7, 8
(D.C. Cir. 2014)); see also Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 228, at 400–01, 430 (arguing
that the Alec L. court misinterpreted the PTD).
233. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1260.
234. Id. at 1260–61 (“Governments, in turn, possess certain powers that permit
them to safeguard the rights of the people; these powers are inherent in the authority
to govern and cannot be sold or bargained away.”).
235. Id. at 1253.
236. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
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Michigan to a private railroad company.237 Judge Aiken broadly
referred to the “natural resources trust,” noting that “[i]n natural
resources cases, the trust property consists of a set of resources
important enough to the people to warrant public trust protection.”238
Although Aiken cited considerable authority for the proposition that
air and atmosphere fall within the scope of the public trust,239 the court
found it unnecessary to decide the question,240 anchoring the plaintiff’s
trust claims instead in the territorial seas.241 Observing that the federal
government owns most of the submerged land in the territorial seas,242
and recognizing the long-settled public trust over “lands beneath tidal
waters,” Aiken found a viable PTD claim because a number of
plaintiff’s injuries were caused by GHG pollution of the atmosphere
that produced ocean acidification and rising ocean temperatures.243
Juliana was not the only decision to interpret the scope of the PTD
to reach the atmosphere because of its effects on navigable waters. In
237. Id. at 453–56.
238. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1254.
239. See id. at 1255 n.10 (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946)
(holding that private airspace rights are unfounded because the public has a claim to
the atmosphere); Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J.
1984) (concerning the capacity of the PTD to evolve to meet changing conditions);
Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L 1, 71 (1821) (describing air as “common property”);
Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 955 (Pa. 2013) (stating that the
“ambient air” was a PTD resource because it was a “public natural resource” that
implicated the public interest and was “outside the scope of purely private property”);
Foster v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA, 2015 WL 7721362, at *4 (Wash.
Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2015) (concerning the close relationship of navigable waters and
the atmosphere); J. INST. 2.1.1 (J.B. Moyle trans., Oxford Clarendon Press 1913)
(treating air and atmosphere as public trust assets through reference to Justinian’s
description of air as “by natural law common to all”); Mary C. Wood, Atmospheric Trust
Litigation Across the World, in FIDUCIARY DUTY AND THE ATMOSPHERIC TRUST 113 (Ken
Cogill et al. eds., 2012) (explaining that air was long thought to be incapable of
privatization and thus did not appear in historic early PTD common law)).
240. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1255 & n.10 (“I conclude that it is not necessary at
this stage to determine whether the atmosphere is a public trust asset . . . [,] but today’s
opinion should not be taken to suggest that the atmosphere is not a public trust asset.”).
241. Id. at 1255.
242. Id. at 1255–56 (“The federal government holds the title to the submerged
lands between three and twelve miles from the coastlines of the United
States.” (citation omitted)).
243. Id. at 1256. Ocean acidification is the ongoing increase in the acidity of the
Earth’s oceans, caused by the uptake of CO2 from the atmosphere. See, e.g., Ken
Caldeira & Michael E. Wickett, Oceanography: Anthropogenic Carbon and Ocean pH, 425
NATURE 365 (2003) (explaining that as CO2 levels increase in the ocean, pH levels
decrease, resulting in acidification).
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Foster v. Washington Department of Ecology,244 a Washington Superior
Court stated that “[the youths’] very survival depends upon the will of
their elders to act now, decisively and unequivocally, to stem the tide
of global warming,” emphasizing the inextricable relationship between
navigable waters and the atmosphere and deciding that separating the
two was “nonsensical.”245 The Alaska Supreme Court also suggested
that the close relationship between the pollution of the atmosphere
and the pollution of the oceans raised a PTD issue.246 Although there
is growing precedent that the atmosphere is a PTD resource,247 even
courts that do not expressly acknowledge the doctrine as a trust asset
recognize a PTD claim when atmospheric pollution adversely affects
traditional trust resources.
The Juliana court made clear the affirmative sovereign duty to
protect assets in the trust, declaring that “[t]he natural resources trust
operates according to basic trust principles, which impose upon the
trustee a fiduciary duty to ‘protect the trust property against damage
or destruction.’”248 This duty, Judge Aiken emphasized, inures “equally
to both current and future beneficiaries of the trust.”249 As Aiken
explained, “The government, as trustee, has a fiduciary duty to protect
the trust assets from damage so that current and future trust
beneficiaries will be able to enjoy the benefits of the trust.”250 The
244. No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA, 2015 WL 7721362 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2015).
245. See id. at *2, *4. The court used the link between navigable waters and the
atmosphere to announce that “the State has a constitutional obligation to protect the
public’s interest in natural resources held in trust for the common benefit of the
people of the State.” Id. at *3.
246. Kanuk ex rel. Kanuk v. State, Dep’t of Nat. Res., 335 P.3d 1088, 1101–02 (Alaska
2014) (recognizing that plaintiffs “do make a good case” when alleging that the
atmosphere is inextricable linked to the entire ecosystem, and observing that climate
change is already having an impact on well-recognized public trust resources like
water, shorelines, and wildlife, suggesting that a potential trust violation exists where
atmospheric pollution adversely affects trust resources like navigable and tidal waters).
247. See infra notes 377–89 and accompanying text (discussing the growing
acceptance off foundational ATL principles by courts).
248. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1254 (citing GEORGE G. BOGERT ET AL., BOGERT’S
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 582 (2016)). The courts’ reliance on “basic trust principles”
is important because trust law imposes basic duties to which statutory law, with narrow
commands, may not speak. One example is the duty of loyalty. See Pa. Envtl. Rights
Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 932 (Pa. 2017) (discussing the duty of loyalty
imposed by the PTD); WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 114, at 189–91 (explaining
the duty of loyalty in the PTD as a trust for the benefit of all people, not for any one
distinct beneficiary); see also infra notes 292–96 and accompanying text.
249. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1254.
250. Id.
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court ruled that this trust duty was non-discretionary: “no government
can legitimately abdicate its core sovereign powers.”251 Judge Aiken
announced that the youth plaintiffs stated a valid PTD claim by
asserting that the government “nominally retain[ed] control over trust
assets while actually allowing their depletion and destruction” through
marine acidification and rising sea levels and temperatures.252 As
explained below, if proved at trial, neglect of the affirmative duty to
protect trust assets would be a PTD violation, and therefore a
constitutional violation as well.253
C.

The PTD as an Implicit Constitutional Right

Judge Aiken described the public trust, with origins antedating the
Constitution, as part of the “inalienable [r]ights” that the people
secured through the creation of government.254 Explaining the social
contract theory that influenced the founding generation, the court
observed that “the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution
did not create the rights to life, liberty, or the pursuit of happiness—the
documents are, instead, vehicles for protecting and promoting those
already-existing rights.”255 One of the powers that government cannot
bargain away, she noted, is the “status of trustee pursuant to the public trust
doctrine.”256 This public right was neither waivable nor conveyable.257
The court’s recognition of the public trust as protecting inalienable,
inherent rights reserved by citizens in the original creation of
government paralleled the approach forged in two important public
trust decisions, both cited by the Juliana court. The first was Robinson
Township v. Commonwealth,258 a 2013 plurality opinion of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court that defined public trust rights as
“inherent and indefeasible” rights impliedly reserved by the citizens

251. Id. at 1252.
252. Id. at 1254.
253. For discussion of the upcoming trial, see infra Part VI.
254. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d. at 1260.
255. Id. at 1260–61.
256. Id. at 1261.
257. See id. (“Governments . . . possess certain powers that permit them to safeguard
the rights of the people; these powers are inherent in the authority to govern and
cannot be sold or bargained away. One example is the police power. Another is the
status as trustee pursuant to the public trust doctrine.”(citation omitted)).
258. 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013).
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when forming government.259 The second was Oposa v. Factoran,260 a
1993 opinion of the Philippines Supreme Court, declaring that “these
basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind.”261
Building on the inalienable rights frame that preceded the Juliana
case, Judge Aiken broke new ground by deciding that the PTD—
although antedating the Constitution—was secured by and
enforceable through the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment
of the Constitution, which protects against the deprivation of life,
liberty, and property from arbitrary federal or state governmental
action.262 Deciding that “public trust claims are properly categorized
as substantive due process claims,” the court looked to tests defining
the scope of fundamental rights under the due process clause: such
rights must be “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” or “deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”263 The court concluded
that “public trust rights, related as they are to inherent aspects of
sovereignty and the consent of the governed from which the United
States’ authority derives, satisfy both tests.”264 Thus, the right to a stable
climate system, implicit in due process, is a constitutionally protected
right, a consequence of the government’s dominion over trust
resources like submerged lands and oceans.265 Although the Fifth
259. See id. at 947–48 (describing such rights as “of such ‘general, great and
essential’ quality as to be ensconced as ‘inviolate’”); see also Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d. at
1261 (citing id. at 948). This approach was recently affirmed by a majority of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911,
930–31 (Pa. 2017).
260. G.R. No. 101083, 224 S.C.R.A. 792, 804–05 (S.C. July 30, 1993) (Phil.).
261. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1261 (citing Oposa, 224 S.C.R.A. at 804–05).
262. See id. at 1248, 1261 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V). The Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process clause, directed at the states, would presumably produce a
similar result if a state’s action threatened the youths’ right to a healthful atmosphere.
See Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002) (noting that Fourteenth and Fifth
Amendments’ due process tests are parallel). Therefore, the Juliana opinion’s analysis
should be useful to the state courts considering ATL claims. See infra Section VII.A
(explaining state ATL litigation). The Juliana court recognized the case as part of a “wave
of recent environmental cases asserting state and national governments have abdicated
their responsibilities under the public trust doctrine.” Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1254.
263. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1261 (citing McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742,
761, 767 (2010)).
264. Id.
265. In this sense, the right to a stable climate system is similar to the public’s right
to use the New Jersey and Oregon beaches that are subject to public recreational use
easements due to the public’s ownership of tidelands. See Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v.
Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 121 (N.J. 2005); State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay,
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Amendment provided the plaintiffs’ cause of action, Judge Aiken
declared that since the PTD was not explicit in the due process clause,
it fell within the scope of Ninth Amendment protection as well.266
D.

The Federal Public Trust Doctrine

Because the public trust is an attribute of sovereignty, Judge Aiken
concluded that the PTD burdened the federal government.267 In
doing so, she disagreed with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, which ruled to the contrary in an unpublished
and unreflective opinion rendered in an earlier federal ATL case,
Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy.268 Judge Aiken found the D.C. Circuit’s
reasoning unpersuasive, and for good reason. That decision seemed
to over-read Justice Kennedy’s statements about the PTD from a
decision having nothing to do with the federal government.269
As Judge Aiken recognized, PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana270 was not
about the PTD at all.271 Instead, it concerned the application of the
equal footing doctrine to waterways in Montana.272 In describing the
equal footing doctrine, in a passing statement, Justice Kennedy
distinguished it from the PTD, referring to the latter as a state-law
doctrine.273 Kennedy’s dictum was not inaccurate, since the PTD has
been largely interpreted by state courts. But the D.C. Circuit in its

462 P.2d 671, 678 (Or. 1969). In both cases, the courts recognized ancillary public
access rights necessary to protect the public’s use of publicly owned tidelands.
266. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1261 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IX) (stating that
the enumeration of rights express in the Constitution’s text “shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people”).
267. Id. at 1259.
268. Alex L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (per curiam);
see Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1258.
269. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1256, 1258 (describing the D.C. Circuit’s reliance
on a “passing statement” of Justice Kennedy in PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565
U.S. 576 (2012), which Judge Aiken knew “was not a public trust case”). In a
subsequent ruling in the Juliana case, Magistrate Coffin again analyzed the PPL
Montana case, stating it had “no relevance to the issue presented in this action.” Juliana
Findings II, supra note 30, at 11; see PPL Mont., LLC, 565 U.S. at 604 (ruling that the
Montana Supreme Court failed to employ the proper federal test for navigable waters
implicitly conveyed at statehood from the federal to state governments under the equal
footing doctrine because it did not employ the river segment test); see also Blumm &
Schaffer, supra note 228, at 407–09) (discussing the PPL Montana decision).
270. 565 U.S. 576 (2012).
271. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1256, 1258.
272. Id. at 1256 (citing PPL Mont., LLC, 565 U.S. at 580).
273. PPL Mont., LLC, 576 U.S. at 604.
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Alec L. decision invoked Kennedy’s statement in a context not remotely
similar to the riverbed ownership question at issue in PPL Montana,
stretching it beyond bounds to address the federal government’s
obligations under the PTD. As Judge Aiken explained, the Alec L.
court’s unpublished approach was “not a plausible interpretation”
because “PPL Montana said nothing at all about the viability of federal
public trust claims with respect to federally-owned trust assets.”274
Further, the Alec L. court’s reliance on PPL Montana, unsupported
by any reasoning, was flatly inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s
landmark PTD decision in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois. In Illinois
Central, the Court recognized the PTD as an inherent limitation on the
sovereignty of Illinois, deciding that the state legislature could not
privatize the inner-harbor of Chicago to a railroad company.275 Illinois
Central is widely considered binding on the states (and therefore a
reflection of federal law),276 foreclosing wholesale privatization of
public resources.277 Illinois Central was not based on state law, despite
274. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1257. In a later decision by Magistrate Coffin
recognizing the federal public trust, the court aptly noted: “[T]his public trust over
the navigable waters and riverbeds passed to the States to hold as the new sovereigns
from the previous sovereign, the United States. The United States could not pass what
it did not have. The public trust doctrine is rooted in our common law heritage and
can be traced back millennia to ancient Roman times.” Juliana Findings II, supra
note 30, at 12. Moreover, as Magistrate Coffin noted, “The federal public trust
doctrine may have been relatively dormant in federal courts since the [nineteenth]
Century, but it has hardly been extinguished.” Id. at 13.
275. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452–53 (1892) (explaining that the
conveyance from the state to the railroad “would sanction the abdication of the
general control of the state over lands under the navigable waters of an entire harbor
or bay, or of a sea or a lake. Such abdication is not consistent with the exercise of that
trust which requires the government of the state to preserve such waters for the use of
the public. . . . The control of the state for the purposes of the trust can never be lost,
except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interest of the public therein,
or can be disposed of without any substantial impairment of the public interest in the
lands and waters remaining.”).
276. Most states have interpreted Illinois Central to be binding on them, belying the
claim that the decision was a product of state law. See Crystal S. Chase, The Illinois
Central Public Trust Doctrine and Federal Common Law: An Unconventional View, 16
HASTINGS W. NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 113, 150–53 (2010) (noting that of thirty-five
state courts citing Illinois Central, twenty-nine considered it to be binding).
277. Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453 (“A grant of all the lands under navigable waters
of a State has never been adjudged to be within the legislative power; and any
attempted grant of the kind would be held, if not absolutely void on its face, as subject
to revocation. The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the
whole people are interested, like navigable waters and the soils under them, so as to
leave them entirely under the use and control of private parties . . . than it can abdicate
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erroneous dicta in some subsequent cases; it was instead a
pronouncement of federal law.278
Judge Aiken recognized that no Supreme Court decision had denied
the existence of the federal PTD, and, in fact, well-reasoned lower
court opinions recognized a federal PTD.279 Aiken explained that
although the Supreme Court stated in its Coeur d’Alene Tribe decision
that Illinois Central involved an interpretation of state law, that decision
also recognized that the PTD’s “central tenets . . . applied broadly.”280
Moreover, Judge Aiken pointed out that, despite the PPL Montana
Court’s statement that “the public trust doctrine remains a matter of
state law,” the Court proceeded to describe how the American PTD
diverged from the English PTD.281 This led Judge Aiken to state, “I can
think of no reason why the public trust doctrine, which came to this
country through the Roman and English roots of our civil law system,
would apply to the states but not to the federal government.”282 Judge
Aiken decided that, because the PTD is an inherent attribute of
sovereignty, the federal sovereign is just as subject to the PTD as are
the state sovereigns.283
E.

The PTD and Congressional Displacement

The government argued in Juliana that the Clean Air Act (“CAA”)
displaced the federal public trust claim, relying on an earlier Supreme
Court case, American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut.284 That decision
concluded that the Clean Air Act displaced a federal common law
its police powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the
peace.”).
278. The Illinois Central decision was, for example, later mischaracterized as a
statement of Illinois law in Appleby v. City of N.Y., 271 U.S. 364, 393–95 (1926). The
erroneous statement was dictum, as explained in Chase, supra note 276, at 147.
279. See Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1258 (citing City of Alameda v. Todd Shipyards
Corp., 635 F. Supp. 1447, 1450 (N.D. Cal. 1986); United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land,
523 F. Supp. 120, 124 (D. Mass. 1981)); see also Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 228, at
421–22 (explaining that the Supreme Court first recognized a federal PTD in the use
of public coal fields in Colorado).
280. See Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d, at 1257 (citing Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521
U.S. 261, 285 (1997)).
281. Id. at 1259 (quoting PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 603 (2012)).
282. Id. at 1257, 1259 (“There is no reason why the central tenets of Illinois Central
should apply to another state, but not to the federal government.”).
283. Id. at 1257; see supra note 276 and accompanying text (noting that most states
have interpreted Illinois Central to be binding on them, thus contradicting the claim
that the decision was a product of state law).
284. 564 U.S. 410 (2011).
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nuisance claim brought against coal-fired plants for greenhouse gas
pollution.285 In the earlier federal ATL case, Alec L., the government
convinced the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia that the
CAA displaced the PTD under the American Electric Power holding.286
But the Alec L. court made no inquiry into the differences between a
common law nuisance claim against polluters that could be regulated
under the CAA and a public trust claim brought by citizens against
government actors which failed to fulfill their constitutional fiduciary
duty to protect the trust resource.
In an extensive analysis, Judge Aiken contrasted the two types of
claims and determined that the inalienable aspect of the PTD,
established long ago in the Supreme Court’s Illinois Central decision,
was decisive.287 Aiken recognized that the PTD—as an inherent limit
on sovereignty and implicit in the Constitution’s due process clause—
imposed a non-displaceable obligation different from a federal
common law nuisance claim.288 Judge Aiken declared that “[p]ublic
trust claims are unique because they concern inherent attributes of
sovereignty. . . . A defining feature . . . is that it cannot be legislated
away. Because of the nature of public trust claims, a displacement
analysis simply does not apply.”289
However prominent the displacement issue will be in the decision’s
appeal, if the Ninth Circuit recognizes the constitutional force of the
public trust, the appeals court should categorically reject the
displacement argument raised by the government. As the American
Electric Power Court noted, displacement analysis applies to common
law: “The test for whether congressional legislation excludes the
declaration of federal common law is simply whether the statute
‘speak[s] directly to [the] question’ at issue.”290 However, the trust
represents a constitutional limit on sovereign authority. Thus, the
American Electric Power inquiry, which looked simply to what the statutes

285. Id. at 424.
286. Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 16 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Am. Elec. Power
Co., 564 U.S. at 424), aff’d sub nom., Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 F App’x 7
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
287. Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453 (declaring that a state may not “abdicate its trust
over property in which the whole people are interested”); see also Juliana, 217 F. Supp.
3d at 1259–60.
288. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1261.
289. Id. at 1260.
290. Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 424 (alteration in original) (quoting Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)).
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address, is inappropriate in a constitutional context. For even when a
government enacts laws to prevent harm to the assets held in trust, the
basic trust question remains as to whether the laws are adequate, as
implemented, to protect the natural asset for present and
future generations.291
F.

The PTD and the Federal Property Clause

The Juliana decision rejected the government’s claim that a federal
PTD was inconsistent with federal authority under the Constitution’s
Property Clause.292 The Supreme Court has ruled numerous times that
the scope of federal authority under that provision is “without
limitations.”293 But, as Judge Aiken noted that the Court has qualified its
broad pronouncement, stating that “the furthest reaches of the power
granted by the Property Clause have not yet been definitively resolved.”294
Judge Aiken characterized the “defining feature” of the PTD as the
duty to protect the corpus of the trust, a duty which “cannot be

291. It is nearly inconceivable that pollution regulation limiting emissions under
the CAA could suffice to meet the public trust obligation. A sovereign would
necessarily have to implement other types of policy to make the full transition from
fossil fuels to renewable energy and to thereby achieve the de-carbonization necessary
to stabilize the atmosphere, much less achieve the carbon drawdown called for by
scientists. See Hansen et al., Climate Prescription, supra note 67, at 1 (advocating for
policies that would spur technology development and create economic incentives for
consumers and businesses toward energy conservation).
292. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1259; see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“Congress
shall have Power to Dispose of and make all needful Rules respecting the Territory or
other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall
be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular
State.”).
293. See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976) (quoting United
States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940) (rejecting New Mexico’s attempt to limit
federal authority over wildlife on public lands)). Decisions dating back to 1840 uphold
federal authority to manage and protect public lands and characterize the role of
government in administering those lands as a public trustee. See Michael C. Blumm &
Olivier Jamin, The Property Clause and Its Discontents: Lessons from the Malheur Occupation,
43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 781, 800 (2016) (noting that federal power over public lands is
unaffected by statehood and explaining that Congress has near plenary authority to
manage federal public lands). Decisions expressing broad, nearly unfettered federal
power over public lands were typically in the context of challenges to the federal
government’s authority to protect such lands. See WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 114,
at 135 (explaining that judicial deference to Congress in the public lands arena “does
not at all sanction private use that destroys public assets,” but instead recognizes the
prerogative of Congress to choose between legitimate public uses of public land).
294. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1259 (quoting Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 539).
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legislated away.”295 Thus, Aiken observed that the Court has never
ruled that the federal government had authority under the Property
Clause to “violate individual constitutional rights or run afoul of public
trust obligations.”296 In other words, while the Property Clause may
provide broad discretion for the federal trustee to choose between
appropriate trust uses to benefit the public, it may not breach the trust
by allowing wholesale impairment or destruction of the national
wealth. Doing so would contravene the very purpose of the trust: to
protect an endowment for present and future generations of the
nation. The Property Clause authority—while expansive—is thus
subject to constitutional rights, including the PTD.
VI.

JULIANA AND THE ROAD AHEAD

Judge Aiken denied the federal government’s and the industry
intervenors’ motions to dismiss. After discovery, the plaintiffs must
prove that the federal government’s past and ongoing actions and
inactions violated their constitutional rights as articulated by Judge
Aiken. The discussion below provides a roadmap of the steps ahead.
A.

The Ongoing Case: “The Trial of the Millennium”

Judge Aiken’s November 2016 decision set the stage for a trial on
the merits as to whether the federal government’s energy policies
breached its constitutional duty to protect the due process, equal
protection, and public trust rights of the youth plaintiffs to a stable
climate system. A trial presenting such broad evidence—geared
towards ascertaining whether there have been violations of
fundamental rights—is quite unusual in federal environmental law,
which typically concerns judicial review of specific agency rules or
enforcement actions under statutory authority. Environmental law is
largely about administrative law.297 Environmental attorneys typically
engage more in administrative and appellate practice, rather than
lawyering in trial courts.298

295. Id. at 1260.
296. Id. at 1259.
297. See WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 114, at 231 (describing how litigation
of statutory claims focuses on the “administrative record”).
298. Id. at 231–32. One exception concerns the alleged “take” of endangered
species without authority granted by permits or take statements authorized by the
Endangered Species Act (ESA). 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (2012). Proving an ESA “take” can
require a fact-intensive trial.
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The trial stage of the Juliana case will—for the first time—put U.S.
federal fossil-fuel policy on trial and subject it to broad public scrutiny.
This attention prompted the youths’ attorneys to call this the “trial of the
millennium.”299 Fossil-fuel practices have never been comprehensively
assessed in terms of climate reality by the judiciary. Although some
congressional hearings and media investigative reports have focused
on discrete aspects of the government’s fossil fuel policy,300 a forum has
never evaluated how U.S. fossil fuel policy in its totality measures up to
the imperative of CO2 reduction as illuminated by climate science.301
The Juliana case provides the first opportunity to do so in a court of
law. As Magistrate Coffin noted in his order recommending denial of
the defendants’ motion to certify an appeal in the case,
Whether or not climate change is occurring, whether or not it is
human-induced, and the degree of its severity and impact on the
global climate, natural environment, and human health is
quintessentially a subject of scientific study and methodology, not
solely political debate. The judicial forum is particularly well-suited
for the resolution of factual and expert scientific disputes. . . .302

Moreover, since Juliana was grounded in the Constitution, Congress
may not—as it has done in the past with disputes based on statutes—
make the case disappear by dictating the result.303
During the forthcoming trial, federal lawyers may try to downplay
climate dangers and obfuscate climate science. But unlike political
forums, a court offers a deliberative fact-finding forum subject to the
rules of evidence, so strategies of “manufacturing doubt” (or facts) may
be less effective in the courtroom.304 Government evidence will not
299. See Coco McPherson, Why Young Americans Are Suing Obama over Climate Change,
ROLLING STONE (Mar. 12, 2016), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/whyyoung-americans-are-suing-obama-over-climate-change-20160312 (quoting attorney
Julia Olson) (explaining that at trial experts will testify to the true nature of climate
change outside of the political fray).
300. See WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 114, at 12–23.
301. Maria L. Banda & Scott Fulton, Litigating Climate Change in National Courts:
Recent Trends and Developments in Global Climate Law, 47 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS
10121, 10126 (2017) (explaining that Juliana represents the most complete treatment
of climate change litigation in the United States).
302. Juliana Findings II, supra note 30, at 8–9 (citation omitted).
303. See WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 114, at 106–07 (discussing the use of
appropriation riders waiving statutory obligations of environmental laws).
304. For a discussion of the fossil-fuel industry’s campaign of “manufacturing
doubt” within the political sphere, see generally NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY,
MERCHANTS OF DOUBT (2010), comparing the fossil-fuel industry’s efforts to those of
the tobacco industry’s denial of the risks of smoking.
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receive the kind of judicial deference that it enjoys in administrative
law cases challenging rules that are subject to notice-and-comment
rulemaking.305 Instead, the government must carry the same burden
of persuasion imposed on all civil litigants.306
1.

The Focus of Discovery in Juliana

At the time of this Article’s publication, a temporary stay issued
by a Ninth Circuit motions panel delayed the discovery process. The
focus of discovery and trial in the Juliana case will mirror the
elements of the plaintiffs’ claims. The public trust claim is rather
straightforward, requiring evidence that the government, as trustee,
allowed “substantial impairment” of crucial trust resources.307 A
plethora of existing climate studies likely satisfy that basic
threshold.308 Because the Juliana opinion focused on the ocean and
shoreline environment as a trust resource, fact-finding will
undoubtedly explore, at the least, the relationship between GHG
emissions and ocean acidification, the effects of ocean acidification
and rising temperatures on marine life, and the effect of rising global
temperatures on sea levels.
The district court distilled the constitutional claims into one
question: whether the government’s fossil fuel policies violated the
youth’s fundamental due process rights to life, liberty, and property.309
The plaintiffs will certainly present evidence showing that government
305. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44
(1984) (explaining that administrative authority necessarily requires agencies to formulate
policy by interpreting enabling statutes, and that courts should defer to an agency’s
reasonable interpretation when authority is implicitly or explicitly delegated to the agency).
306. That burden generally requires a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g.,
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 253 (1989) (plurality opinion) (explaining
that “parties to civil litigation need only prove their case by a preponderance of the
evidence”), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat.
1075, as recognized in Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014).
307. See supra note 275 and accompanying text; see also Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146
U.S. 387, 435 (1892) (explaining that the government can use or dispose of lands held
in trust for the public “when that can be done without substantial impairment of [the
public’s] interest”). For discussion of “substantial impairment” in the Juliana case, see
Juliana Findings I, supra note 117, at 1.
308. See, e.g., Juliana Complaint, supra note 30, at 51–56 (summarizing several
federal government and private studies as early as the 1960’s that found CO2 increases
to be damaging to the environment); Hansen et al., Climate Prescription, supra note 67,
at 17 (studying the connection between fossil fuel CO2 emissions and global warming).
309. See supra note 185–89 and accompanying text.
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actors placed them (and their generation) in danger, or enhanced a
position of danger, acting with “deliberate indifference to their
safety.”310 As Judge Aiken wrote, “Deliberate indifference requires
creation of a dangerous situation with actual knowledge or willful
ignorance of impending harm.”311
The evidence concerning the constitutional claims will focus on (1)
the government’s knowledge of the climate danger and (2) its
response to and perpetuation of that danger by continuing to promote
fossil fuels.312 As to the first, numerous public reports referenced in
the plaintiffs’ complaint and subsequent briefing show consistent
warnings from climate scientists and agency staff to government
leaders over the past several decades.313 This climate-science inquiry is
likely to explore the gravity and extent of the risk to young people and
future generations, the tipping points and climate thresholds, and
projections for the future.
As to the second issue, there are two aspects of the government’s
fossil fuel policy to be addressed at trial, described by plaintiffs’ counsel
in oral argument as two sides of the same coin: (1) the regulation side
and (2) the production side.314 The regulation side involves the failure
to regulate CO2 emissions.315 The production side involves affirmative
government steps to authorize and promote fossil fuel production and
consumption. The complaint detailed a myriad of actions taken over
the decades “in the areas of fossil fuel extraction, production,
transportation, importation and exportation, and consumption” that
310. See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1251 (D. Or. 2016) (quoting
Penilla v. City of Huntington Park, 115 F.3d 707, 709 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam)).
311. Id. at 1271–72 (“Plaintiffs’ allege that the defendants’ action in this case has
created a life-threatening situation and that defendants have willfully ignored longstanding and overwhelming scientific evidence of that impending harm to the young
and future generations.”).
312. Magistrate Coffin highlighted some of the numerous factual questions to be
addressed at trial in his opinion recommending denial of the motion to certify the
appeal. Juliana Findings II, supra note 30, at 15. Two of several questions he
articulated were: (1) “Have the federal defendants deliberately chosen to encourage
and promote fossil fuel production with knowledge of the dangers created by those
policies?” and (2) “Are the federal defendants’ actions a substantial cause of the
alleged injuries to plaintiffs?” Id.
313. See Juliana Complaint, supra note 30, at 51–56.
314. Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings at 44–45, Juliana, 217 F. Supp. at 1224
(No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC), ECF No. 82.
315. See Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 510 (2007) (discussing
the government’s initial resistance to making an endangerment finding from CO2
emissions that would trigger Clean Air Act regulation).
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cause dangerous cumulative atmospheric CO2 concentrations.316
Those accumulations disrupt the climate system, threatening
“irreversible harm to the natural systems critical to Plaintiffs’ rights to
life, liberty, and property.”317
Days before President Obama left office, and over a year after the
case was filed, the federal defendants submitted an answer to the
plaintiffs’ complaint.318 The answer included several significant
admissions that may make it difficult for Trump Administration lawyers
to contest many of the factual assertions in the complaint. The
government acknowledged that the use of fossil fuels contributes CO2
emissions,319 “placing our nation on an increasingly costly, insecure
and environmentally dangerous path.”320 The government also
admitted that, for over fifty years, some officials in the federal
government were aware of the growing body of climate research
showing the potential danger from rising CO2 levels.321 Further, the
government conceded that federal policies have contributed to
present CO2 levels, which “threaten the public health and welfare of
current and future generations.”322 The Trump Administration
lawyers could offer an amended answer disputing the climate science
but, as Professor Michael Burger has observed, “The last thing a Trump
Administration [D]epartment of [J]ustice actually wants is to have the
science of climate change go on trial.”323

316. Juliana Complaint, supra note 30, at 93.
317. See id. at 91, 93 (“After placing Plaintiffs in a position of climate danger,
Defendants have continued to act with deliberate indifference to the known danger
they helped create and enhance.”).
318. See Federal Defendants’ Answer to First Amended Complaint for Declaratory
and Injunctive Relief, Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC),
ECF No. 98 [hereinafter Federal Defendants’ Answer].
319. Id. at 35. The federal defendants’ answer to paragraph 150 of the Juliana
Complaint stated: “Federal Defendants admit the allegations in this paragraph.” Id.
320. Juliana Complaint, supra note 30, para. 150, at 60.
321. Federal Defendants’ Answer at 2, supra note 318.
322. Id. at 47; see Megan Darby, Obama Ties Trump Admin into Accepting CO2 Dangers,
CLIMATE
CHANGE
NEWS
(Jan.
19,
2017,
4:04
PM),
http://www.climatechangenews.com/2017/01/19/obama-ties-trump-admin-intoaccepting-co2-dangers (reporting that the Obama administration endorsed the Juliana
plaintiffs’ scientific claims); Emily Hoard, Federal Defendants Admit to Several Allegations
of Youth Climate Lawsuit, NEWS-REV. (Jan. 19, 2017), http://www.nrtoday.com/
news/environment/federal-defendants-admit-to-several-allegations-of-youth-climatelawsuit/article_55fe66da-6d35-5394-9081-398d19cbf0ea.html (opining that the
government’s Answer may serve as validation of the Juliana case merits).
323. See Darby, supra note 322.
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In addition to evidence supporting the substantive due process,
equal protection, and public trust claims, the plaintiffs must present
facts supporting standing, showing causation between the
government’s conduct and their injuries.324 Judge Aiken noted that,
although “[e]ach link in these causal chains may be difficult to prove,”
that difficulty did not make the case non-justiciable at the pleading
stage of the litigation.325 The plaintiffs must also demonstrate
redressability, namely, a “substantial likelihood” that a court remedy
would address their injuries.326 The questions framed by the court
included: (1) what part of the youth plaintiffs’ injuries are attributable
to emissions beyond the government’s control; (2) despite such
emissions, would the plaintiffs’ injuries be reduced if they obtained
judicial relief; and (3) when will the world reach the climate-change
tipping point of no return when irreversible consequences are
inevitable, and could the defendants avoid that tipping point without
cooperation from third parties?327
2.

The Industry on Trial
Although the federal government’s answer to the plaintiffs’
complaint contained potentially significant admissions, certain aspects
of the climate science and government response to climate change will
proceed to trial. A judicially-supervised fact-finding process could have
important ramifications outside of the case.328 The prospect of
discovery in Juliana was intriguing from the outset because of the status
of the fossil-fuel industry as an intervenor-defendant party.329 This
intervenor status subjected the industry to discovery requests,330 creating
opportunities for the plaintiffs’ attorneys to explore the longstanding,
but largely surreptitious, relationship between the government and the

324. See supra notes 181–83 and accompanying text.
325. See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1246 (D. Or. 2016).
326. Id. at 1247. (“If plaintiffs can show, as they have alleged, that defendants have
control over a quarter of the planet’s greenhouse gas emission, and that a reduction
in those emissions would reduce atmospheric CO2 and slow climate change, then
plaintiffs’ requested relief would redress their injuries.”).
327. See id. (noting that none of these questions could be answered at the motion
to dismiss stage).
328. See infra Section VI.B.
329. See Motion to Intervene, at 2, Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (No. 6:15-cv-01517TC), ECF No. 14.
330. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16, 26(b) (stating that under the federal rules of civil
procedure, an intervenor becomes a party to the case, and thus becomes subject to
rule 16 governing discovery among parties).
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fossil fuel industry.331 When the industry intervenors moved to
withdraw from the case in May 2017 they were facing the prospect of
probing requests for admissions and other discovery requests.332
Although the scope of discovery may narrow in light of the interveners’
exit from the case,333 the process still leaves the industry exposed to the
possibility of damaging evidence coming to light.
One aspect of discovery will concern the relationship between the
industry and government officials, and whether those officials and
their agencies acted in a self-serving manner to extend favoritism to
the industry’s goal of fossil-fuel promotion over the public they are
constitutionally bound to represent. The answer to that question
could have enormous implications not only as evidence for the
constitutional claims—perhaps by explaining the intent of
government officials to pursue what they seemingly knew was a
dangerous energy policy—but it also may enhance the public trust
claim. Any trust requires a fiduciary trustee to exercise a duty of loyalty
towards the beneficiaries, which, in the case of a public trust, are

331. Notably, just after a pre-trial conference with Magistrate Coffin, the plaintiffs’
attorneys gave notice of a deposition for Rex Tillerson, the former CEO of ExxonMobil
who became Secretary of State for the Trump Administration. See Plaintiffs’ Notice of
Deposition of Rex Tillerson, Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/571d109b04426270152febe0/t/58645e359f7
4562190fa14f2/1482972726374/2016-12-28+Notice+of+Depo+Tillerson.pdf
(requesting testimony of Rex Tillerson, Secretary of State-designate and former CEO
of ExxonMobil). At the time of the filing of the Juliana case, Tillerson was president
of the board of directors of the American Petroleum Institute, an industry intervenor
in the case. His appointment as Secretary of State (a defendant agency in the Juliana
case) carried the highly unusual consequence of a prominent intervenor figure
becoming a lead government agency defendant. See Dana Varinsky, Trump’s Secretary
of State Nominee May Have to Testify in a Landmark Climate Lawsuit the Day Before
Inauguration, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 13, 2017, 11:15 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
tillerson-kids-climate-lawsuit-deposition-2017-1.
Julia Olson, plaintiffs’ attorney,
claimed that the Tillerson appointment “very clearly demonstrates . . . that the United
States government and the fossil fuel industry have worked together to keep a fossilfuel-based energy system in place, and that has caused climate change and has
threatened the lives of these plaintiffs and future generations and resulted in
constitutional violations.” Id.
332. See supra note 139 (discussing the intervenors’ desire to withdraw from the
Juliana case).
333. See Letter from U.S. Dist. Court Judge Ann Aiken & U.S. Magistrate Judge
Thomas Coffin, supra note 143 (noting, “The intervenors’ exit from the case should
pave the way for plaintiffs to winnow their discovery requests substantially”). Even
absent the intervenors, the plaintiffs’ attorneys may examine government documents
for evidence of government-industry collusion.
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present and future citizens.334 The trust requires avoidance of any
conflict of interest—indeed, in Justice Cardozo’s famous words, “the
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.”335
Policies favoring the industry while harming the citizen beneficiaries
would not augur well for the government defendants. Although
breach of the duty of loyalty is not a necessary element of plaintiff’s
public trust claim,336 a breach would fall within the complaint’s
allegation that “[d]efendants have failed in their duty of care to
safeguard the interests of Plaintiffs as the present and future
beneficiaries of the public trust.”337 The broad sweep of that claim
appears to warrant a probing inquiry as to whether industry influence
over government decision makers tainted the decision making process.
Thus, although the industry interveners withdrew from the case, the
relationship between the fossil-fuel industry and government may be

334. See Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 957 (Pa. 2013) (explaining
that the fiduciary duties of the state of Pennsylvania under the public trust include a
duty to protect natural resources). A recent decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court underscored the duty of loyalty in the public trust context, making clear that
this basic fiduciary duty applies to all governmental officials managing public trust
property. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 932 (Pa. 2017)
(“The duty of loyalty imposes an obligation to manage the corpus of the trust so as to
accomplish the trust’s purposes for the benefit of the trust’s beneficiaries.”). The
Pennsylvania court made clear that the duty applies to all three branches of
government. See id. at 932 n.23 (“Trustee obligations are not vested exclusively in any
single branch of Pennsylvania’s government, and instead all agencies and entities of
the Commonwealth government, both statewide and local, have a fiduciary duty to act
toward the corpus with prudence, loyalty, and impartiality.”).
335. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
336. The public trust principle gives rise to both substantive and procedural
fiduciary duties. See DOUGLAS QUIRKE, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE: A PRIMER 12
(2016),
https://law.uoregon.edu/images/uploads/entries/PTD_primer_7-2715_EK_revision.pdf (discussing the government trustees’ five substantive duties and
five procedural duties); see also Mary Christina Wood & Gordon Levitt, The Public Trust
Doctrine in Environmental Decision Making, in ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION MAKING IN
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 73 (2016) (explaining substantive and procedural fiduciary
duties of trustees). Plaintiffs’ substantive public trust claim rests on the government’s
fiduciary duty to protect and restore the atmosphere, a contention that does not
depend on willfulness, intent, or bias. Instead, it rests on the evidence that the
atmosphere has been “substantially impaired,” partially as a result of government’s
actions in promoting fossil fuel production. However, the Juliana complaint was
crafted broadly enough to allow evidence of a violation of the trustees’ procedural duty
of loyalty to citizens. This duty requires avoidance of conflicts that could create bias
in decision making.
337. Juliana Complaint, supra note 30, at 94.
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subject to discovery, making the industry vulnerable in a number of
ways discussed below.
B.

Ripple Effects Across the Legal and Social Landscape

Although there will likely be an appellate stage to the Juliana litigation
in the Ninth Circuit, and perhaps the U.S. Supreme Court, the more
immediate discovery and fact-finding stage of the case at trial could have
dramatic ramifications both within and outside the legal field. Within
the legal field, the climate science-fact finding may influence other
ATL cases in other jurisdictions, both in the United States and abroad.
Because Juliana is part of a coordinated litigation campaign, with a
number of cases pending throughout the nation and the world,338 facts
established at trial and reflected in a Juliana opinion could be accepted
by other ATL courts without duplicative fact-finding proceedings.
The case could have far-reaching effects on other non-ATL litigation
as well. Potential evidence indicating that fossil-fuel companies knew
of the mounting climate danger and continued their operations
despite this knowledge—and any evidence that they in fact tried to
obfuscate the climate danger in various fora339—could affect pending
investigations launched by state attorneys general in New York and
California that probe potential violations of securities laws.340
Moreover, the Massachusetts Attorney General recently sued
ExxonMobil, alleging violations of state consumer protection law.341
338. See infra Part VII.
339. A rich platform for this kind of evidence has already been developed. See generally
ORESKES & CONWAY, supra note 304 (telling the story of scientists and scientific advisors
who misled the public and denied well-established scientific knowledge for four decades).
340. See Diane Cardwell & John Schwartz, Exxon Emissions Costs Accounting “May Be
TIMES
(June
2,
2017),
a
Sham,”
New
York
State
Says,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/02/business/energy-environment/exxon-mobilclimate-change-lawsuit.html (discussing charges brought by the New York attorney
general, alleging that Exxon Mobil defrauded investors and overstated its value by
claiming, but failing, to take into account carbon pollution costs in investment
decisions); Ivan Penn, California to Investigate Whether Exxon Mobil Lied about ClimateChange Risks, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2016, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/
business/la-fi-exxon-global-warming-20160120-story.html
(reporting
that
the
California attorney general began investigating Exxon Mobil for lying to shareholders
and the public about the link between climate change and its products).
341. For discussion of the Massachusetts litigation, see Marilyn Schairer, Mass.
Scored a Victory in its Exxon Lawsuit. What’s Next?, WGBH NEWS (Jan. 18, 2017),
http://news.wgbh.org/2017/01/18/local-news/mass-scored-victory-its-exxon-lawsuitwhats-next (alleging that the company failed to disclose relevant information on the
effect its products would have on the planet’s climate system).
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Possible evidence of fossil-fuel industry collusion with the government
could spur new criminal investigations on the state level, even at the
federal level, and perhaps in other nations as well. As Denis Binder
has explained, “Criminal liability has become a global reality,”
particularly in response to disasters such as oil spills, explosions, and
other pollution disasters.342
Moreover, evidence of an industry-government alliance could fortify
a necessity defense raised by citizen defendants facing charges of nonviolent civil disobedience after taking direct action to stop the flow of
oil. The necessity defense requires a showing that the defendants
lacked recourse to stop the climate harm using traditional legal
avenues343—a showing that would be advanced through any evidence
of government-industry collusion. The defense is being used in the
“Delta Five” case now pending in the Washington Court of Appeals.
That case arose out of a citizen blockade on train tracks used by oil
trains. An amicus party, the Climate Defense Project, submitted a brief
in support of the necessity defense, arguing that the citizens’ civil
disobedience was a necessary response to the state of Washington’s
alleged violation of its constitutional public trust duty to protect the
atmosphere and a healthy climate system.344
Beyond its legal ramifications, the Juliana case could spur greater
and more widespread climate awareness among the public. At a time
when the Trump Administration promotes climate denial,345 the case
has galvanized national and international press attention, and the trial
is likely to be widely covered by the press. If the plaintiffs present
342. See Denis Binder, Criminal Law—The Increasing Application of Criminal Law in
Disasters and Tragedies: A Global Phenomenon, 38 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 313, 313 (2016)
(discussing the emergence of criminal liability for environmental law and its
applicability to corporations).
343. See United States v. Meraz-Valeta, 26 F.3d 992, 995 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating
that the necessity defense requires a showing that no other reasonable, legal
alternatives were available), rev’d on other grounds by United States v. Aguirre-Tello, 353
F.3d 1199, 1207–08 (10th Cir. 2004).
344. Amicus Curiae Brief of Climate Defense Project in Support of Defendants’
Motion for Discretionary Review, State v. Brockway, No. 16-1-00005-8 (Wash. Ct. App.
Feb. 14, 2017), https://climatedefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/
CDP-Amicus-Brief-State-v.-Brockway.pdf.
345. On March 9, 2017, EPA head Scott Pruitt questioned the human role in climate
change, sparking widespread citizen criticism. See, e.g., EPA’s Scott Pruitt Denies Climate
Change Science and Angry Americans are Flooding Him with Phone Calls, CHI. TRIB. (Mar.
10, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/politics/ct-scottpruitt-climate-chancge20170310-story.html (detailing the negative public reaction to
Pruitt’s comments on climate change).
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evidence of collusion between the fossil fuel industry and government
in the face of knowledge of mounting danger to children, the court of
public opinion could react in a way that deters fossil-fuel investors,
increases the hostility of consumers to energy companies, and inspires
widespread resistance to continued fossil-fuel development worldwide.
As columnist Dan Kahle wrote about the case, “When the future speaks
for itself, we can’t bear not to listen.”346
C.

The Remedy

In their complaint, the Juliana plaintiffs asked for a plan to (1)
decarbonize the United States infrastructure at a rate that meets the
pace set by the best available science, as currently captured in the
Hansen prescription described in Part I347 and (2) a plan to achieve
drawdown of excess atmospheric carbon.348 These measures, necessary
to restore the planet’s CO2 levels to below 350 ppm, are characteristic
of “structural injunctions” that other courts ordered in various
instances of institutional malfeasance or recalcitrance.349 In his denial
of the federal defendants’ motion to certify an appeal, Magistrate
Coffin emphasized the remedial power of the court, noting that “the
court has broad discretion in fashioning equitable relief (if
appropriate) in this lawsuit that are manageable and within the judicial
role envisioned by Article III of the Constitution.”350 Structural
remedies require, at their core, an enforceable, judicially supervised
plan. Citing precedents from the prison and civil rights institutional
litigation, Magistrate Coffin stated:
Thus, the court, in fashioning equitable relief in this action should
the plaintiffs prevail, need not micro manage federal agencies or
make policy judgments that the Constitution leaves to the other
branches. The court may make findings that define the contours of
346. Don Kahle, Youths’ Climate Lawsuit Could Have Lasting Impact, REGISTER-GUARD
(Jan. 20, 2017), http://registerguard.com/rg/opinion/35194101-78/youths-climatelawsuit-could-have-lasting-impact.html.csp.
347. See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text.
348. Juliana Complaint, supra note 30, at 80–81, 96.
349. See infra note 351.
350. Juliana Findings II, supra note 30, at 7. In their letter to the Ninth Circuit
motions panel, Judge Aiken and Magistrate Coffin noted their intention to bifurcate
the liability and remedy portions of the trial. See Letter from U.S. Dist. Court Judge
Ann Aiken & U.S. Magistrate Judge Thomas Coffin, supra note 143 (“This bifurcated
approach will permit counsel and the Court to first concentrate on the factual
complexity of the liability phase, then turn to the difficult separation of powers
questions that would be posed should this case proceed to the remedy phase.”).
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plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to life and a habitable atmosphere
and climate, declare the levels of atmospheric CO2s which will violate
their rights, determine whether certain government actions in the
past and now have and are contributing to or causing the
constitutional harm to plaintiffs, and direct the federal defendants to
prepare and implement a national plan which would stabilize the climate
system and remedy the violation of plaintiff’s rights.351

Even as discovery and trial proceed, the Trump Administration is
likely to approve extraction and development of American fossil fuels
as rapidly as necessary. For example, on February 7, 2017, the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers abruptly terminated the environmental
review process for the controversial Dakota Access Pipeline and
granted the easement, allowing completion of the oil pipeline.352
Because analysts project that continued production from currently
operating oil and gas fields around the world will push the planet to
1.5 degrees Celsius over preindustrial temperatures353—beyond the
aspirational limit set by the global Paris climate agreement354—there
appears to be an immediate need for so-called “backstop injunctions”
to protect the status quo for the duration of the lawsuit. Such an
injunction could restrict fossil-fuel development in new areas or limit

351. Juliana Findings II, supra note 30, at 8 (emphasis added); see also id. at 9 (noting
the “trial court[] [has the] ability to fashion reasonable remedies based on the
evidence and findings after trial”). These defined parameters of the court’s role are
important in overcoming judicial inertia and in proscribing a definitive benchmark
for the political branches to achieve. A court-ordered directive to the government
seems a necessity, especially considering the increasing doubts as to just how compliant
the Trump Administration would be in developing a national remedial plan for the
climate system. Recalcitrance that would cause delay and further damage to the
climate system may foreclose options of recovery altogether, leaving the world to slide
beyond tipping points. Courts can rely on and take guidance from plans prepared by
independent experts. See MARY CHRISTIAN WOOD ET AL., PROSPECTUS FOR AN
ATMOSPHERIC RECOVERY INSTITUTE 1 (Apr. 25, 2017), https://law.uoregon.edu/
images/uploads/entries/Prospectus_for_an_Atmospheric_Recovery_Institute_.pdf
(providing a plan for an Atmospheric Recovery Institute to restore the Earth’s
atmosphere to a stable equilibrium of 350 ppm).
352. Army Corps of Engineers Grants Easement for Dakota Access Pipeline, NPR (Feb. 7,
2017, 4:29 PM), http://www.npr.org/2017/02/07/513957885/army-corps-ofengineers-grants-easement-for-dakota-access-pipeline.
353. See MUTTITT, supra note 97, at 5 (examining the implications of further fossil
fuel production on climate and exploring solutions).
354. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing the goals of the Paris
climate agreement).
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the expansion of existing projects.355 A court’s role in this regard
might be similar to the role of district courts responding to the Trump
immigration order, which was challenged as unconstitutional.356 In
Darweesh v. Trump,357 for example, the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York issued a nationwide injunction against
enforcement of the Trump order only days after its issuance.358
Clearly, the Juliana case has enormous freight to carry. But given the
Trump Administration’s declared intentions to ramp up fossil-fuel
production and consumption,359 there appears to be little in the way of
viable alternatives to force rapid reduction of greenhouse gas
pollution.360 Part VII below positions the Juliana case in the context of
355. After President Trump was elected, but before he took office, President
Obama had a unique opportunity to solidify some of his late-term actions disapproving
fossil-fuel production by entering into a partial consent decree in the Juliana case. See
Wood, Woodward, & Blumm, supra note 34. Despite persistent requests to do so by
youth plaintiffs, the Obama Justice Department refused to pursue settlement options.
See Alliance for Climate Education/Our Children’s Trust, President Obama: Our Future
Is on the Line, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2016, 12:00 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
video/national/president-obama-our-future-is-on-the-line/2016/12/02/8765535eb8b1-11e6-939c-91749443c5e5_video.html (displaying the children plaintiffs lobbying
the President to “stand with youth”). The lack of transparency shrouding the Justice
Department makes it is difficult to know whether the highest officials in the Obama
administration were ever even appraised of the opportunity to enter into a partial
consent decree, or whether Justice attorneys were acting on their own without
direction from the Obama White House—a problematic possibility. The attorney
ethics surrounding Department of Justice decisions on settlement opportunities is
worthy of examination but are beyond the scope of this Article.
356. See supra notes 168–71 and accompanying text.
357. No. 17 Civ. 480 (AMD), 2017 WL 388504 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2017).
358. Id. at *2; Michael D. Shear et al., Judge Blocks Trump Order on Refugees amid Chaos
and Outcry Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/01/28/us/refugees-detained-at-us-airports-prompting-legal-challenges-totrumps-immigration-order.html.
359. See supra notes 8–13 and accompanying text.
360. As the court in the Washington ATL case, Foster v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, recently
noted in a procedural order, “This Court takes judicial notice of the fact that federal
mechanisms designed to protect the environment are now under siege, more than
ever leaving to the States the obligation to protect their citizens under the Public Trust
Doctrine.” Order Granting Petitioners’ Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Brief
and Amended Pleading and Granting RAP 7.2(e) Leave to Seek Permission of Court
of Appeals for Formal Entry of this Order at 4, Foster v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, No.
14-2-25295-1 SEA, 2015 WL 7721362 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2015). As noted earlier
in this Article, climate recovery will also require massive drawdown of excess CO2 in
the atmosphere. See supra notes 67–71. A litigation approach to recover natural
resource damages (“NRD”) from the carbon majors (fossil-fuel companies) to fund a
global restoration effort aimed towards natural drawdown was suggested in Mary

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2954661

2017]

NO ORDINARY LAWSUIT

67

the atmospheric trust litigation campaign advancing steadily in the
United States and abroad.
VII.

ATMOSPHERIC TRUST AND PTD LITIGATION WORLDWIDE

Juliana is part of a series of cases being filed by youth plaintiffs
worldwide against governments, collectively referred to as atmospheric
trust litigation.361 ATL cases seek to apply the fundamental public trust
duty of protection to the atmosphere to abate continued damage from
GHG pollution and restore climate balance.362 This Part first considers
the state litigation. Second, it examines some of the cases abroad.
A.

State Atmospheric Trust Litigation

ATL cases must progress through three stages to prove effective.
First, the court must recognize its role in upholding the rights of the
plaintiffs and rule against the government’s procedural defenses
designed to keep the case out of court—defenses such as standing,
political question, and displacement.363 Second, the court must issue
declarations of principle providing a guide for government action and
a framework for the remedy.364 Third, the court must manage the
remedy so that it offers a practical means to enforce the rights of the
plaintiffs.365 Although state court ATL decisions are not binding on
other states, they can be influential.

Christina Wood & Dan Galpern, Atmospheric Recovery Litigation: Making the Fossil Fuel
Industry Pay to Restore a Viable Climate System, 45 ENVTL. L. 259, 260 (2015). This NRD
litigation would be brought by sovereign trustees (states, tribes, or foreign nations)
against fossil-fuel defendants.
361. See Wood & Galpern, supra note 360, at 263 (discussing the atmospheric trust
litigation campaign); see also WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 114, at 220–21.
Atmospheric Trust Litigation is an approach to the climate crisis conceived and
described in Atmospheric Trust Litigation Around the World by Mary Christina Wood. See
Wood, ATL chapter, supra note 100, at 220.
362. See WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 114, at 220–29.
363. Compare Juliana Findings II, supra note 30, at 14 (underscoring Magistrate
Coffin’s reiteration that it would be irrational not to find that the plaintiffs have
standing) with Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 15 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding that
the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue an atmospheric trust claim against the federal
government because the public trust doctrine was only a state-law doctrine), aff’d, 561
F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
364. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
365. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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1.

Overcoming judicial inertia
Public trust cases call on the judiciary to evaluate the performance
of other branches of government in fulfilling the fiduciary obligations
they owe to the people. As the Hawaii Supreme Court stated in a
leading public trust case, “The check and balance of judicial review
provides a level of protection against improvident dissipation of an
irreplaceable res.”366 In the context of the ATL campaign, the early
cases demonstrated that some courts were uncomfortable with a role
in the climate crisis, particularly in light of the complex regulatory
schemes available to the agencies to regulate greenhouse gas
pollution. As a result, several earlier decisions were dismissed on
displacement, preemption, or political question grounds.367 As the Alec
L. court claimed, agencies are allegedly “better equipped” than courts
to handle GHG pollution.368
These early decisions placed unwarranted confidence in the political
branches of government to prevent runaway planetary heating.369
They succumbed—as did several notable climate tort cases before
them—to the so-called judicial “nihilism” identified by Professor
Douglas Kysar: “[d]enying [their] own expansive power, [these
courts] cowered before catastrophe.”370 Perhaps spurred by growing
366. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 455 (Haw. 2000); see also Lake
Mich. Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 742 F. Supp. 441, 446 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (“The
very purpose of the public trust doctrine is to police the legislature’s disposition of
public lands. If courts were to rubber stamp legislative decisions, . . . the doctrine
would have no teeth.”); Ariz. Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158,
169 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (“Just as private trustees are judicially accountable to their
beneficiaries for dispositions of the res, so the legislative and executive branches are
judicially accountable for their dispositions of the public trust.”).
367. See, e.g., Alec L., 863 F. Supp. 2d at 17 (dismissing ATL federal suit on the basis
of displacement by Clean Air Act); Chernaik v. Kitzhaber, 328 P.3d 799, 808 (Or. Ct.
App. 2014) (reversing lower court’s dismissal based on the political question doctrine,
separation of powers doctrine, sovereign immunity, and the court’s perceived lack of
authority to grant requested relief).
368. See Alec L., 863 F. Supp. 2d at 17; see also Chernaik v. Brown, No. 16-11-09273,
2015 WL 12591229, at *9 (Or. Cir. Ct. May 11, 2015) (stating that the climate recovery
plan sought by plaintiffs would ask the “[c]ourt to substitute its judgment for that of
the Legislature”). The case is on appeal to the Oregon Court of Appeals.
369. For discussion of judicial avoidance in the environmental context, see LISA A.
KLOPPENBERG, PLAYING IT SAFE: HOW THE SUPREME COURT SIDESTEPS HARD CASES AND
STUNTS THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW 39–43, 46, 66 (2001), which elaborates on the
Court’s use of standing in cases such as Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992),
to keep environmental claims out of federal court.
370. See Weaver & Kysar, supra note 45, (manuscript at 39) (“[J]udges have gone to
extraordinary lengths to avoid jurisdiction over climate change suits. Although tort
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evidence of the severity of the climate crisis and the government’s clear
lack of appropriate response, courts have begun to discard the
displacement, preemption, and political question arguments.
In Kanuk ex rel. Kanuk v. State, Department of Natural Resources371 for
example, the Alaska Supreme Court decided that the political question
did not foreclose plaintiff’s suit, although it rejected the particular
declaratory relief sought by the plaintiffs, finding that it would not be
dispositive.372 In Oregon, a trial judge dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit
because the court thought the question was more appropriate for the
legislative branch,373 but that decision was ultimately reversed on
appeal.374 The Oregon Court of Appeals held that the “plaintiffs are
entitled to a judicial declaration of whether, as they allege, the
atmosphere ‘is a trust resource’ that ‘the State of Oregon, as a trustee,
has a fiduciary obligation to protect [from] the impacts of climate
change.’”375 In a summary of ATL cases, Professor Abate concluded
that “several state courts have embraced the concept of ATL as a
potential strategy to address climate change regulation in the courts,
and it is rapidly gaining support.”376 Although courts have started to
accept a judicial role in addressing climate change, they must go
further and address fundamental rights as well.

law could accommodate catastrophe, many courts have preferred to respond with
nihilism.”); see also supra notes 150–54.
371. 335 P.3d 1088 (Alaska 2014).
372. Id. at 1102. On August 28, 2017, fifteen Alaska youth re-initiated legal
proceedings to force climate action in their state, filing a petition for rulemaking with
the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation. The petition sought
greenhouse gas emissions reduction and a climate action plan. Petition of Youth
Petitioners and Alaska Youth for Envtl. Action to the Alaska Dep’t of Envtl.
Conservation 1–2 (August 28, 2017), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/
571d109b04426270152febe0/t/59a491ee3e00beb9e2449170/1503957493116/ALAS
KA+PETITION.08-28-17_Redacted.pdf.
373. Ignoring the purpose of the trust claim to hold the legislature accountable,
the court stated, “One of the functions of the legislature is to decide politically—based
on whatever facts it deems relevant to the determination—whether or not global
warming is a problem and what, if anything, ought to be done about it.” Chernaik v.
Kitzhaber, No. 16-11-09273, 2012 WL 10205018, at *12–13 (Or. Cir. Ct. Apr. 5, 2012),
rev’d, 328 P.3d 799 (Or. App. 2014).
374. Chernaik, 328 P.3d at 800.
375. Id. at 808. The case was remanded, and a further appeal is pending. See infra
note 384.
376. See Abate, supra note 102, at 557.
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2.

Judicial recognition of ATL’s foundational legal principles
Beyond recognizing a role for the judiciary, the courts must declare
rights to climate stability and underscore the constitutional nature of
those rights. Even early cases made considerable headway on both scores.
For instance, in 2012, the court in Bonser-Lain v. Texas Commission on
Environmental Quality377 upheld the Texas Commission on
Environmental Quality’s denial of the plaintiffs’ rulemaking petition,
but not without addressing several of the agency’s incorrect assumptions
about the case.378
The court explicitly discarded the agency’s
determination that the PTD applied only to water, stating that “the [PTD]
includes all natural resources of the State,” and the federal Clean Air Act
provides “a floor, not a ceiling, for the protection of air quality.”379
In a 2015 case, the New Mexico Court of Appeals determined that
the atmosphere was a trust asset; however, the court upheld dismissal
of the case on grounds that existing statutes provided the appropriate
framework for relief.380 In Butler ex rel. Peshlakai v. Brewer,381 the Arizona
Court of Appeals stated: “[W]e assume without deciding that the
atmosphere is a part of the public trust subject to the [PTD].”382 In
Oregon, a lower court rejected air as part of the public trust, but
amicus law professors roundly criticized the decision, and the case is
now on appeal.383 In Kanuk the Alaska Supreme Court stated that the
plaintiffs made a “good case” that the atmosphere is a public trust asset, but
the court declined to issue declaratory relief to that effect, on prudential
grounds.384 The Alaska court noted that, even absent a declaration that
377. No. D-1-GN-11-002194, 2012 WL 2946041 (Tex. Dist. Ct. July 9, 2012), vacated,
438 S.W.3d 887 (Tex. App. 2014).
378. Id. The Texas Court of Appeals would later hold that the Texas Legislature
had not given Texas courts jurisdiction over cases involving agencies’ decisions
regarding rule making petitions, invalidating the district court decision without
addressing the court’s findings on the public trust doctrine. See Proceedings in all 50
States:
Texas,
OUR
CHILDREN’S
TRUST
(July
23,
2014),
https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/texas.
379. Bonser-Lain, 2012 WL 2946041, at *1–2.
380. See Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, 350 P.3d 1221, 1225 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015)
(holding that the New Mexico constitution recognizes public trust protection of the
atmosphere but concluded that citizens’ claims for protection of the atmosphere must
be based on existing constitutional or statutory processes).
381. No. 1 CA-CV 12-0347, 2013 WL 1091209 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2013).
382. Id. at *6 (affirming dismissal for lack of remedy).
383. See Chernaik v. Brown, No. 16-11-09273, at *15, *16 (Or. Cir. Ct. May 11, 2015);
see also Active State Legal Actions: Oregon, OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST (Dec. 9, 2016),
https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/oregon.
384. Kanuk ex rel. Kanuk v. State, Dep’t of Nat. Res., 335 P.3d 1088, 1102 (Alaska 2014).
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air is a public trust asset, the trust could include climate change
because of its “detrimental impact on already-recognized public trust
resources such as water, shorelines, wildlife, and fish.”385
In Washington’s ATL case, Foster v. Washington Department of Ecology,
the court expressly ruled that the public trust includes air and
atmosphere.386 Judge Hill stated, “The navigable waters and the
atmosphere are intertwined and to argue a separation of the two, or to
argue that GHG emissions do not affect navigable waters, is
nonsensical.”387 The court also decided that the public trust held
constitutional force, both as a reserved right and as a right corollary to
the state’s ownership of submerged lands under the equal footing
doctrine.388 The court declared,
[T]he State has a constitutional obligation to protect the public’s
interest in natural resources held in trust for the common benefit of
the people of the State. . . . If ever there were a time to recognize
through action this right to preservation of a healthful and pleasant
atmosphere, the time is now.389

3.

Judicial management of the remedy
When courts turn to managing the remedy in stage three of ATL
cases, their role is no different than in other public trust cases: courts
do not exercise direct management over the trust res, but instead aim
to ensure that the political branches fulfill their trust obligation to
avoid destruction or substantial impairment of the res. A critical

385. Id. at 1103.
386. See Foster v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA, 2015 WL 7721362,
at *4 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2015).
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id. at *3–4; see Wood & Woodward, supra note 106, at 671 (discussing the
constitutional grounds of ruling). Framing the right to a healthy atmosphere as a
constitutional right, the Washington court underscored the urgency of climate crisis
by citing a December 2014 Washington Department of Ecology report that stated,
Climate change is not a far off risk. It is happening now globally and the
impacts are worse than previously predicted, and are forecast to worsen . . . .
If we delay action by even a few years, the rate of reduction needed to stabilize
the global climate would be beyond anything achieved historically.
Id. at 670 (alteration in original) (quoting WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, WASHINGTON
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION REDUCTION LIMITS vi, 18 (2014)). The court recognized
that the climate protection duty is also grounded in the Clean Air Act. See id. at 676
n.173 (“This mandatory duty must be understood in the context not just of the Clean
Air Act itself but in recognition of the Washington State Constitution and the Public
Trust Doctrine.”).
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difference arises, however, with respect to the urgency with which
government must undertake remedial measures. In a tipping-point
world, effective relief depends on close judicial supervision to ensure
implementation of effective climate recovery plans within applicable
time frames. The past approach of deferring to the agencies no will
longer suffice in the face of an unforgiving climate reality, coupled
with demonstrated agency recalcitrance to take action. Close
supervision by the courts involves two tasks: (1) requiring a plan that
includes measurable steps and (2) imposing continued oversight to
ensure proper execution.
Judicial oversight of remedies was
characteristic of desegregation, treaty rights, land use, prison reform,
and educational funding cases.390
Because most states already have some air regulation, and many have
climate goals, the problem faced by some ATL courts is not the
wholesale lack of agency authority to address climate goals, but instead
a lack of effective action to match the scale of what scientists now say is
needed to avert irrevocable harm. In some states, the mere existence
of a statutory or regulatory scheme for GHG reduction masks serious
neglect by the state agencies to implement the charge—not unlike the
federal government’s
longstanding failure to undertake
comprehensive GHG regulation under the Clean Air Act.391 Oregon,
for example, set statewide climate targets in 2007, but they were nonbinding, never implemented, and are now outdated.392
To provide an effective remedy, a court must sometimes undertake
the challenging task of comparing the regulatory progress underway
with the progress needed as called for by expert testimony (or, as in
the case of Washington, as informed by reports issued by the same
agency that the youth have sued). Typically, government defendants
allege that their regulatory processes will address the problem, and
early ATL courts deferred to those processes, even though the
plaintiffs alleged that the climate response was breathtakingly

390. See WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 114, at 250–53 (describing remedial
structures judges use to enforce fundamental rights in contexts of longstanding
institutional recalcitrance or dysfunction).
391. For the saga of failure to regulate under the Clean Air Act, see id. ch. 1.
392. See Plaintiff-Appellants’ Opening Brief and Excerpts on Record at 11–12,
Chernaik v. State, No. A1519826 (Or. Ct. App.
Feb. 25, 2016),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/571d109b04426270152febe0/t/5760c4951d0
7c0ae9834f858/1465959583677/16.02.25.OpeningBriefAppeal.pdf (citing findings of
Global Warming Commission that “Oregon is likely to fall well short of the targets set
by its greenhouse gas reduction and mitigation plan”).
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insufficient. The Massachusetts and Washington ATL cases, however,
serve as path-breaking examples of courts addressing deficiencies of
regulatory action, with the Washington case taking notice of the
contemporaneous Juliana decision.393
a. ATL in Massachusetts: Kain v. Massachusetts Department of
Environmental Protection
The Massachusetts ATL case started as a petition for rulemaking to
the state’s environmental agency in 2012, requesting the state agency
to prepare a plan to reduce carbon emissions, as required by the
Massachusetts’s Global Warming Solutions Act.394 In a dystopian
coincidence, Hurricane Sandy, one of the largest storms ever to hit the
East Coast, delayed the youth petitioners in filing their petition.395
Although the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection
(DEP) denied the petition in June 2013, citing ongoing and upcoming
efforts to address carbon emissions, the DEP’s decision agreed with the
petitioners that it was the state’s responsibility “to protect the integrity
of Massachusetts’s atmospheric resource, climate system, and
shorelines by adequately protecting our atmosphere.”396 However, the
DEP’s decision also maintained that state positive law supplanted the

393. See Foster Order of Contempt Denial, supra note 118, at 4–5 (discussing the role
of courts in protecting the atmospheric public trust). Notably, too, a court in the
Netherlands has found government action deficient in comparison to the action
scientists emphasize is necessary, as explained below in Section VII.B.
394. See Rulemaking Petition from Eshe Sherley et al. on Regulating CO2 Emissions
to the Mass. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Nov. 1, 2012), https://static1.squarespace.com/
static/571d109b04426270152febe0/t/57609324356fb0f59a89b317/1465946918296/
2012.10.31-FINAL+MA+Petition_0.pdf
(requesting
that
the
Massachusetts
Department of Environmental Protection promulgate rules to protect the atmosphere,
climate, and shorelines).
395. See Press Release, Our Children’s Trust et al., In the Wake of Hurricane Sandy,
Boston Students Deliver Climate Change Petition to the Massachusetts Department of
Environmental Protection (Nov. 1, 2012), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/
571d109b04426270152febe0/t/576d695fb8a79bb6a90c3517/1466788195645/2012.1
1.1-PressRelease+MA+%281%29.pdf (stating that the children were delayed from
hand-delivering their Petition for Rulemaking on a Monday due to Hurricane Sandy,
which shut down Boston public schools).
396. The Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection’s Action on the Kids vs.
Global Warming Petition 2, MASS. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT. (June 24, 2013),
http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/dep/air/community/kvgwrtp.pdf.
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state’s public trust doctrine.397 In response, the petitioners filed an
appeal with the district court.398
The district court affirmed DEP’s denial in 2015, and the youth
plaintiffs appealed.399 Just six months later, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court decided to take the case on direct review,
skipping the lower appellate court.400 In May 2016, the Massachusetts
court handed a resounding victory to the youth, deciding that the DEP
failed to satisfy its legal obligation to reduce the state’s GHG emissions
pursuant to legislative goals.401 The state’s existing schemes, it
determined, “fall short.”402 The court ordered the agency to
“promulgate regulations that address multiple sources or categories of
sources of emissions, impose a limit on emissions that may be
released . . . and establish limits that decline on an annual basis.”403
The Massachusetts high court did not order the lower court to retain
jurisdiction over the remedy, but the decision prompted a concerted
and direct response from the state’s political branches.404 On
September 2016, Governor Charles Baker issued Executive Order No.
569: “Establishing an Integrated Climate Change Strategy for the
Commonwealth.”405 The order required the DEP to promulgate a
regulatory scheme by August 11, 2017, that would establish annual
reductions in the state’s GHG emissions.406
Although the outcome of Kain is a promising sign of progress,
tangible emissions reductions do not result from a signature on an
executive order. The importance of continued judicial oversight was
evident in the Washington ATL case described below.

397. Id. at 10.
398. See Complaint 1–2, Kain v. Mass. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. SUCV201402551,
2015 WL 3540828 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2014) (No. 14-2551), 2014 WL 3924998.
399. See Kain, No. SUCV201402551, 2015 WL 3540828, at *10 (denying Plaintiffs’
Motion for Summary Judgment); Active State Legal Actions: Massachusetts, OUR
CHILDREN’S TRUST (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/massachusetts
(discussing the filing of the youths’ appeal).
400. See Active State Legal Actions: Massachusetts, supra note 399.
401. See Kain v. Mass. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 49 N.E.3d 1124, 1128 (Mass. 2016).
402. Id.
403. Id. at 1136.
404. See Active State Legal Actions: Massachusetts, supra note 399.
405. See Exec. Order No. 569, Establishing an Integrated Climate Change Strategy
for the Commonwealth, Gov. Charles D. Baker, Sept. 16, 2016.
406. Id. § 2.
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b. ATL in Washington:
Foster v. Washington Department of Ecology
In the Washington ATL case, the Department of Ecology (DOE)
denied the youth plaintiffs’ petition for science-based rulemaking, and
the plaintiffs appealed to the Washington Superior Court. In Foster v.
Washington Department of Ecology, Judge Hollis Hill issued her first
opinion in June 2015, ordering DOE to reconsider its denial of the
youths’ petition.407 While DOE was reconsidering its decision, the
plaintiffs met with Governor Jay Inslee. After the meeting, Governor
Inslee issued a directive to the DOE to engage in the science-based
rulemaking the youths sought.408 Subsequently, the DOE again denied
the youths’ petition on the ground that the executive directive initiated
the rulemaking that the plaintiffs requested.409
The youths appealed again. In the ensuing decision, Judge Hill
upheld the DOE’s denial of the rulemaking petition, conceding that
the court lacked the power to dictate how the DOE can fulfill its duty
to promulgate directives, but not without declaring that the DOE is still
statutorily and constitutionally compelled to fulfill its trust duty to
protect the atmosphere.410 The court’s approach to interpreting the
plaintiffs’ public trust rights was undoubtedly influenced by the
dilatory climate response from the other branches of government.
Judge Hill had to look no further than the DOE’s own December 2014
report to find that the DOE itself acknowledged that the amount of
emissions reduction required by Washington law was wholly
407. See Order Remanding Dep’t of Ecology’s Denial of Petition for Rule Making at
4, Foster v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA, 2015 WL 7721362 (Wash.
Super.
Ct.
Nov.
19,
2015),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/
571d109b04426270152febe0/t/576080a91bbee08251f28287/1465942187394/Order
_Fosterv.Ecology.pdf. For a detailed discussion of Foster, see Wood & Woodward, supra
note 106, at 669–81.
408. See Press Release, Our Children’s Trust et al., In Advance of Paris Climate
Talks, Washington Court Recognizes Constitutional and Public Trust Rights and
Announces Agency’s Legal Duty to Protect Atmosphere for Present and Future
Generations
(Nov.
20,
2015),
http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/
default/files/15.11.20WADecisionPR.pdf (explaining the timeline of the youths’
efforts to ensure that the DOE promulgate a carbon emissions rule, including meeting
with Governor Inslee).
409. Id.
410. See Foster v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA, 2015 WL 7721362,
at *4 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2015). Judge Hill stated that the state has the duty to
establish a regime of air quality standards that “[p]reserves, protect[s] and enhance[s]
the air quality for the current and future generations.” Id. at *3 (alteration in original)
(quoting WASH. REV. CODE. 70.94.011).
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inadequate.411 Judge Hill consequently found that the existing
requirements “cannot achieve the GHG reductions necessary . . . to
ensure the survival of an environment in which Petitioners can grow to
adulthood safely.”412
Three months after the court’s dismissal, DOE dropped its
rulemaking procedure, leading to another appeal. This time Judge
Hill responded by stating:
This is an extraordinary circumstance that we are facing here. . . .
The reason I’m doing this is because this is an urgent situation. This
is not a situation [in which] these children can wait. . . . Polar bears
can’t wait, the people of Bangladesh can’t wait. I don’t have
jurisdiction over their needs in this matter, but I do have jurisdiction
in this court, and for that reason, I’m taking this action.413

Judge Hill ordered DOE to promulgate an emissions reduction rule by
the end of 2016 and to submit recommendations to the legislature
concerning science-based reductions for the 2017 legislative session.414
She also directed DOE to consult with the plaintiffs before making
those legislative recommendations.415
Governor Inslee appealed the decision, rolling out a proposed clean
air rule supported by the fossil-fuel industry that fell short of the court’s
orders.416 The plaintiffs responded with a motion for contempt of
court.417 Although Judge Hill denied the contempt motion, she did
411. Id. at *2. See generally WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, WASHINGTON GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSION REDUCTION LIMITS 2014), https://fortress.wa.gov/ecy/publications/
documents/1401006.pdf.
412. Foster, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA, 2015 WL 7721362, at *2.
413. Order on Petitioners’ Motion for Relief Under CR 60(b) at 20, Foster v. Wash.
Dep’t of Ecology, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA, 2015 WL 7721362 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 19,
2015)
[hereinafter
Order
on
Petitioners’
CR
60(b)
Motion],
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/571d109b04426270152febe0/t/57607f4901d
baec634f08166/1465941834691/16.05.16.Order_.pdf.
414. See Youths Secure Second Win in Washington State Climate Lawsuit: Judge Chastises
State, Rules from Bench Ordering State to Reduce Carbon Emissions, W. ENVTL. L. CTR. (Apr.
29, 2016), http://westernlaw.org/article/youths-secure-second-win-washington-stateclimate-lawsuit-press-release-42916 (citing the Department of Ecology’s admission that
“Washington’s existing statutory limits should be adjusted to better reflect the current
science”).
415. Order on Petitioners’ CR 60(b) Motion, supra note 413, at 3.
416. See Press Release, Our Children’s Trust et al., WA Gov. Doubles Down on
Betraying Youth (June 16, 2016), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/
571d109b04426270152febe0/t/576da0b8ff7c50a6aea2f349/1466802374364/2016.06
.16InsleeAppealPR.pdf (noting that the proposed rule was supported by fossil fuel
companies such as Chevron, Shell, and Duke Energy).
417. Order on Petitioners’ CR 60(b) Motion, supra note 413, at 3.
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grant the plaintiffs’ request to amend the original complaint to include
a constitutional climate rights claim “due to the emergent need for
coordinated science based action by the State of Washington to
address climate change before efforts to do so are too costly and too
late.”418 Judge Hill, citing the Juliana decision, decided that
where a complaint alleges governmental action is affirmatively and
substantially damaging the climate system in a way that will cause
human deaths, shorten human lifespans, result in widespread damage
to property, threaten human food sources, and dramatically alter the
planet’s ecosystem, it states a claim for a due process violation.419

Judge Hill made clear that the youths would have their day in court
to make their claims. Perhaps more importantly, Judge Hill embraced
a judicial role because of the magnitude of the issue: “Because this
court is fully advised in the matter thus far it retains jurisdiction to
implement this ruling and proceed as expeditiously as possible.”420
Thus, Foster became the first ATL action to progress to the remedial
stage of litigation.421
In addition to the cases mentioned above, a decision by the Colorado
Court of Appeals in March 2017 handed a victory to youth plaintiffs that
challenged hydraulic fracking practices.422 Ongoing state ATL actions
in Maine, Oregon, and Pennsylvania have potential for positive
outcomes as well.423 As mentioned earlier, although these decisions will
not be binding on other states, they may prove influential elsewhere.

418. See Foster Order of Contempt Denial, supra note 118, at 2.
419. Id. at 4 (quoting Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1250 (D. Or. 2016)).
420. Id. at 5.
421. For additional discussion of the decision, see Weaver & Kysar, supra note 45
(manuscript at 56–61). As the litigation continues, the court has emphatically
acknowledged the urgency. In an opinion on a procedural motion, the court noted
“the emergent need for coordinated science based action to address climate change
before efforts to do so are too costly and too late. . . . Time has marched on. . . . To
date, the legislature has not acted to establish binding requirements to meet statutory
emissions limits.” Foster Order of Contempt Denial, supra note 118, at 2–3.
422. Martinez v. Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, 2017 WL 1089556, at *8
(Colo. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2017). For coverage, see Corey Hutchins, Colorado Elected
Officials in a Letter to the Governor: Don’t Appeal This Court Case, COLO. INDEP. (May 16,
2017),
http://www.coloradoindependent.com/165471/hickenlooper-martinezappeal-colorado-oil-gas.
423. For information and links to each case, see State Judicial Actions Now Pending,
OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST, https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/pending-state-actions
(last visited Oct. 23, 2017).
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Meanwhile, Our Children’s Trust is formulating additional actions in
Hawaii, North Carolina, Alaska, New Mexico, Florida, and other states.424
B.

Worldwide Atomspheric Trust Litigation

The ATL campaign draws upon the public trust principle in large
part because it is a universal principle of ecological obligation, as the
doctrine has developed both in the United States and abroad.425 The
idea is that, in the wake of a failure of international treaty negotiations,
domestic courts across the world are positioned to enforce climate
obligations from a shared framework of fiduciary responsibility toward
the common atmosphere.426 ATL suits seek to accomplish, through
decentralized domestic litigation in other countries, what has thus far
eluded the centralized, international diplomatic treaty-making
process. The ATL campaign characterizes all nations as co-trustees of
the atmosphere, each holding a duty towards both their own citizens
and their co-trustees of protecting the shared atmospheric trust.427 If
the ATL approach succeeds, domestic actions would force sciencebased CO2 reduction and create tangible backing to the principles
declared in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), agreed to in 1992 by 192 nations of the world.428
Long before the ATL global litigation, many leading cases
established the public trust as a recognized principle in legal systems
throughout the world. In a path-breaking 1993 decision from the
Philippines, Oposa v. Factoran, the Philippines Supreme Court declared an
inherent right to ecological balance “exist[ing] from the inception of
humankind.”429 Children and their parents brought the lawsuit to prevent
the federal government from allowing private logging corporations to
cut down the last remaining old-growth forests in the country.430
Invoking the trust to enjoin any further logging, the Court declared:
424. See Other Proceedings in All 50 States, OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST,
https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/other-proceedings-in-all-50-states (last visited Oct.
23, 2017).
425. See infra note 429.
426. See Wood, ATL chapter, supra note 100, at 142 (outlining the framework of relief
that courts should utilize to holds states accountable for emissions reductions).
427. See id.
428. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992,
S. Treaty Doc No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
429. G.R. No. 101083, 224 S.C.R.A. 792, 805 (S.C. July 30, 1993) (Phil.) (rejecting the
government’s claim that the case raised political questions unsuited for judicial resolution).
430. Id. (alleging that twenty-five years prior, the Philippines had sixteen million
hectares of rainforests, roughly 53% of the country’s land mass, but the rate of tree
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Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next
to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a
balanced and healthful ecology.
....
. . . [T]he right to a balanced and healthful ecology . . . belongs to
a different category of rights [than civil and political rights]
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and
self-perpetuation . . . the advancement of which may even be said to
predate all governments and constitutions.
As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in
the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned . . . it is because of
the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state
policies by the Constitution itself . . . the day would not be too far
when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but
also for those to come—generations which stand to inherit nothing
but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.431

Indeed, the Oposa suit, brought on behalf of children, provided the
template for suits in the atmospheric trust context nearly two decades
later. The court in Juliana cited some of the reasoning in Oposa,
identifying as a basis for its decision the declaration that future
generations have an inherent constitutional right to a “balanced and
healthy ecology.”432
A subsequent case decided by the Philippines Supreme Court
invoked the PTD in issuing a comprehensive injunction requiring the
cleanup of pollution in Manila Bay.433 That case informed the remedy
sought in the atmospheric trust cases, as the Philippines Supreme
Court retained jurisdiction to supervise a number of agencies in
following a comprehensive plan to clean up the bay.434
International recognition of the PTD includes the India Supreme
Court’s 1997 landmark decision enjoining a resort development on

harvesting reduced the amount to 850,000 hectares of old-growth rainforests and three
million hectares of secondary growth forest, a mere 2.8% of the country’s land mass).
431. Id.
432. See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1250, 1261 (D. Or. 2016)
(citations omitted).
433. See Metro. Manila Dev. Auth. v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. No.
171947-48, 574 S.C.R.A. 661, 661 (S.C. Dec. 18, 2008) (Phil.).
434. See WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 114, at 246–51 (describing the judicial
remedy as “encompassing and aggressive” and noting that the court was responsible
for overseeing the cleanup).
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forest land adjacent to the Beas River.435 The court announced that
“[u]nlike our laws, nature cannot be changed by legislative fiat;
[natural law is] imposed on us by the natural world. An understanding
of the laws of nature must therefore inform all of our social
institutions.”436 Other courts affirming the PTD include those in Uganda,
Kenya, Indonesia, South Africa, and Canada;437 many jurisdictions have
located the PTD in their constitutions’ promise of a “right to life.”438
Several of these world-wide PTD cases reflect an awakening of the
judiciary as the key institution to address ecological crises. PTD actions
abroad have in fact produced some resounding victories, including in
the climate-change context. The most prominent recent example was
a 2015 Netherlands district court decision, which agreed with
environmentalists that the country had to take action to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 to levels at least 25% below those of
1990.439 Since the Dutch government already agreed to an emissions
reduction of 14% to 17%, the case was the first time a court intervened
to pronounce the government’s remedial efforts inadequate in light of
435. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1997) 1 S.C.C. 388 (India) (overturning approval for
the development, setting aside the lease granted to the developer, and requiring the
government to take control of and rehabilitate the area).
436. Id. (concluding that the PTD includes all natural resources, is enforceable by
public beneficiaries, and includes the “polluter pays” principle). Other India PTD
decisions, including those interpreting the PTD to reflect “time immemorial natural
law,” are discussed in BLUMM & WOOD, supra note 107, at 340.
437. See BLUMM & WOOD, supra note 107, at 346–64 (citing British Columbia v.
Canadian Forest Prods., Ltd., 2 S.C.R. 74 (Can. 2004); Wawaru v. Republic, 1 K.L.R.
677 (Kenya 2006) (discussing the Pakistani cases and concluding that the PTD is a
natural law right); Advocates Coal. for Dev. and Env’t v. Attorney General, Misc. Cause
No. 0100 (Uganda 2004) (interpreting the PTD to require local consent before
government approves public land leases or concessions)); id. at 352–53 (discussing
Indonesian cases); David Takacs, The Public Trust Doctrine, Environmental Human Rights, and
the Future of Private Property, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 711, 740–47 (2008) (discussing South
African cases). See generally Michael C. Blumm & Rachel D. Guthrie, Internationalizing
the Public Trust Doctrine: Natural Law and Constitutional and Statutory Approaches to
Fulfilling the Saxion Vision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 741, 745–46 (2012) (discussing the
internationalization of the public trust doctrine and how, despite its modern
emergence in the United States, the doctrine developed most significantly abroad).
438. For a discussion of the development of the PTD overseas through
constitutional mandates, see Blumm & Guthrie, supra note 437, at 762–85, discussing
the constitutions of India, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Brazil.
439. Urgenda Found. v. State of the Netherlands, Rechtbank Den Haag,
C/09/456689/HA
ZA
13-1396
(Neth.
June
24,
2015),
https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7196.
The Urgenda Foundation filed as a citizens’ organization whose purpose is to develop
measures to prevent climate change, and on behalf of 886 Dutch citizens.
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the best available science.440 Moved by the severity and scope of the
climate problem, the government’s knowledge and the foreseeability
of the damage, and the risk that hazardous changes in climate will
occur, the court decided that the government breached its duty of care
and ordered the government to use its authorities to further reduce
GHG emissions.441 The decision came at a crucial time, offering a
“well-spring of inspiration” to climate litigants worldwide.442
The Dutch court cited the quarter-century old 1992 U.N. Climate
Treaty as evidence that the Dutch government, in signing the treaty,
had accepted responsibility to reduce emissions as much as necessary
to avert climate catastrophe.443 The three-judge panel rejected the
government’s claim that judicial action was unwarranted because the
solution to the global climate problem could not be resolved solely by
Dutch efforts. But since the country’s per-capita emissions are among
of the highest in the world, any reduction of emissions will contribute
to the prevention of dangerous climate change.444 Moreover, the court
ruled that there was sufficient evidence to assume a causal link between
the Dutch greenhouse gas emissions, global climate change, and the
effects (now and in the future) on the Dutch climate.445 The court also
rejected the government’s claim that judicial intervention was an
unwarranted intrusion on the political branches of government.446
The decision was the first to invoke human rights as a basis to protect
individuals against climate change.447 In many significant respects, the

440. See Arthur Neslen, Dutch Government Ordered to Cut Carbon Emissions in Landmark
Ruling, GUARDIAN (June 24, 2015, 6:04 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2015/jun/24/dutch-government-ordered-cut-carbon-emissionslandmark-ruling (reporting that the court stated that “[t]he state should not hide
behind the argument that the solution to the global climate problem does not depend
solely on Dutch efforts . . . [because a]ny reduction of emissions contributes to the
prevention of dangerous climate change and as a developed country the Netherlands
should take the lead in this”).
441. See Urgenda Found., C/09/456689/HA ZA 13-1396, §§ 4.83–4.86, 5.1.
442. Weaver & Kysar, supra note 45, (manuscript at 40) (praising the decision for
offering “judicial leadership in the articulation of climate change norms”).
443. Urgenda Found., C/09/456689/HA ZA 13-1396, § 4.66.
444. Id. § 4.78–4.79.
445. Id. § 4.90.
446. Id. § 4.94–4.98. (“It is an essential feature of the rule of law that the actions of
(independent, democratic, legitimized[,] and controlled) political bodies, such as the
government and parliament can—and sometimes must—be assessed by an
independent court.”).
447. See Weaver & Kysar, supra note 45, (manuscript at 40–53) (discussing the
Urgenda judges’ use of tort-like reasoning in reaching the result as a way to “counteract
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Netherlands decision responded to the same arguments faced by the
Juliana court and the state courts in ATL cases.
Other international ATL cases have also met with success. In
Pakistan, a farmer brought a case alleging that climate inaction (both
with respect to emissions reduction and mitigation) violated the
fundamental constitutional rights to life and dignity and the public
trust doctrine.448 Underscoring these rights, the Lahore High Court
fashioned a classic structural injunction remedy, creating an
administrative judicial apparatus to supervise the undertaking of climate
actions, ordering the establishment of a Climate Change Commission
comprised of high cabinet officials.449 Directing the commission to
carry out the climate measures forged through a framework
formulated but never implemented by the government, the court’s
order contemplated ongoing reports and judicial supervision.450
Later, in the spring of 2016, a seven-year-old girl filed a separate
lawsuit in the Pakistan Supreme Court. She asserted that the
government, through the exploitation and promotion of fossil fuels,
had violated the PTD and the youngest generation’s constitutional rights
to life, liberty, property, human dignity, and equal protection of the
law.451 A few short months later, reversing a registrar’s earlier rejection
of the constitution petition, the court ruled that the youth plaintiff’s
climate change lawsuit could proceed to the merits of the case.452
In Ukraine, youth secured a swift partial ATL victory when the court
ordered the government to prepare an assessment of the country’s
progress toward realizing the reduction goals set by the Kyoto
Protocol.453 Other atmospheric trust petitions and lawsuits, tailored to

the intransigence of power” and to “respond creatively and dynamically to a world of
chaotic and unpredictable harm”).
448. Leghari v. State, (2016) W.P. No. 25501/2015, at *1–2, *4 (Pak.).
449. Id. at *6–7.
450. Id. at *8.
451. Ali v. State, Constitution Petition, at 4, 13 (Apr. 5, 2016),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/571d109b04426270152febe0/t/576c56ff6a49
63de8ddd5613/1466717953266/PakistanYouthClimatePetition.pdf.
452. See Naeem Sahoutara, Seven-Year-Old Girl Takes on Federal, Sindh Governments,
EXPRESS TRIB. (June 29, 2016), https://tribune.com.pk/story/1133023/seven-yearold-girl-takes-federal-sindh-governments (stating that Pakistan’s Supreme Court
reversed the registrar’s determination that seven-year-old Rabab Ali was barred from
filing a public interest petition).
453. Litigation in that country has been stymied by extreme political unrest. For
updates, see Global Legal Actions:
Ukraine, OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST
https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/ukraine (last visited Oct. 23, 2017).
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the laws and circumstances of the particular country, are pending. For
example, in India, a nine-year old filed a climate change petition
against her government in March 2017, asserting duties under the
public trust doctrine, intergenerational equity, and India’s
constitution.454 She asked the National Green Tribunal to order the
government of India to prepare a carbon budget and national climate
recovery plan designed to reduce India’s share of the global
atmospheric CO2 to below 350 ppm by 2100.455 The case is before the
court as of this writing.
In the Philippines, youth filed a broad petition asking the courts to
reconfigure the road system to allow non-fossil fuel transportation.456
In Norway, citizens sued to prevent the government from allowing oil
drilling in the Arctic Barents Sea, asserting rights declared in a
constitutional amendment that was passed just two years before.457
They also asserted a public trust right to a healthful environment “that
will be safeguarded for future generations as well.”458 Actions are
planned in other countries including Canada, France, Australia,
England, and Belgium.459 And, in September 2017, in the wake of
devastating wildfires that ravaged Portugal, a group of Portuguese
schoolchildren made a global crowd-funding bid to support a youth
lawsuit against all European nations in the European Court of Human
Rights to force carbon reduction.460 The strategy, building on the
successes of atmospheric trust litigation in the United States and
elsewhere,461 would be the first time in which multiple governments
454. See
Global
Legal
Actions:
India,
OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST,
https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/india (last visited Oct. 23, 2017).
455. See Press Release, Our Children’s Trust, Youth Files Climate Case with India’s
Environmental
Court
(Mar.
30,
2017),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/571d109b04426270152febe0/t/58dd78f5f7e
0abe149e9fb35/1490909429734/2017.03.30+India+Climate+Case+PR.pdf.
456. Global
Legal
Actions:
Philippines,
OUR
CHILDREN’S
TRUST,
https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/philippines (last visited Oct. 23, 2017).
457. See Global Legal Actions:
Norway, OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST,
https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/norway (last visited Oct. 23, 2017).
458. Id. (citing KONGERIKET NORGES GRUNNLOV [CONSTITUTION] May 17, 1814, art.
112 (Nor.)).
459. For updates on the global litigation, see Global Legal Actions, OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST
https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/global-legal-actions (last visited Oct. 23, 2017).
460. Sandra Laville, Portuguese Children to Crowdfund European Climate Change Case,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 24, 2017, 7:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/
25/portuguese-children-crowdfund-european-climate-change-case-sue-47-countries.
461. See Bobby Magill, Another Youth Climate Lawsuit Turns to Crowdfunding in
Portugal, CLIMATE LIABILITY NEWS (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.climateliabilitynews.org/
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are sued at once in the same proceeding. Clearly, the pace of ATL
litigation abroad is quickening.
CONCLUSION
The Juliana decision was a path-breaking one, finding the right to a
stable climate system protected by constitutional due process,
including the PTD.462 Key to the decision was a determination lodging
the right to a stable climate system in the due process clause of the
Constitution.463 Such a fundamental right imposes a standard of strict
judicial scrutiny concerning the government’s fossil fuel policies that
are the subject of the youths’ systemic challenge..464 Deciding that a
fundamental right to a healthy atmosphere existed, given the stakes
involved and the growing precedent in support, seemed no great reach
from previously recognized fundamental rights to privacy, procreation,
marriage, and interstate travel.465
The Juliana court’s determination that the Constitution proscribed
the government’s interference with the youths’ PTD rights was also in
keeping with considerable international precedent.466 The court
refrained from deciding whether the atmosphere was a public trust
resource—although it cited sufficient authority to do so467—but Judge
Aiken did rule that the close relationship between atmospheric GHG
pollution and adverse effects on trust resources like oceans and
navigable waters could produce a PTD violation.468 In short, the court
regarded the atmosphere as unquestionably ancillary to traditional
trust resources like the ocean and the territorial seas.
The Juliana approach paralleled other courts’ protection of
corollary resources and public access to them. For example, courts
have secured public access to dry sand beaches, finding such access
necessary to full enjoyment of the traditional public trust in tidelands.469

2017/09/27/youth-climate-lawsuit-portugal-wildfires (noting how the Portuguese
litigation was inspired by the Juliana case).
462. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1248, 1252 (D. Or. 2016).
463. Id.
464. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
465. See supra notes 177–83 and accompanying text.
466. See supra Section VII.B.
467. See Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d. at 1255 n.10.
468. Id.
469. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 360, 363–65 (N.J.
1984); Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 672–73 (Or. 1969); see supra note 245 and
accompanying text.
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In the same vein, courts have protected non-navigable tributaries to
navigable waters held in trust and have extended trust protection to
groundwater with a hydrological connection to surface trust waters.470
Judge Aiken closed her opinion by observing that federal courts
“have been . . . overly deferential in the area of environmental law, and
the world has suffered for it.”471 She paid tribute to Judge Alfred
Goodwin’s decision in the Oregon beach case,472 which found a public
right to access the beach based on customary rights,473 Judge Aiken
stated that the Juliana case had “strong echoes” of the public claims
affirmed in that landmark case.474 At a time in which the U.S. Supreme
Court seems prepared to reconsider its doctrine of judicial deference
to administrative decision making,475 the Juliana decision provided
path-breaking reasoning for the imposition of a judicial check on the
political branches—at least where the survival interests of young
people and future generations are at stake.
It should not surprise students of American legal history that the
climate crisis worsened steadily for decades and entered its “eleventh
hour” before a court declared a due process liberty and public trust

470. See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cty., 658 P.2d 709, 724
(Cal. 1983); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 445–47 (Haw. 2000)
(extending trust protection to “all water resources without exception or distinction,”
reasoning, “[m]odern science and technology have discredited the surface-ground
dichotomy”). For discussion of the judicial approach extending trust protection to
ancillary resources, see WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 114, at 160–61.
471. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1262 (citing Alfred T. Goodwin, A Wake-Up Call for
Judges, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 785, 785–86, 788 (2015)).
472. Hay, 462 P.2d at 672–73; see Michael C. Blumm & Eric A. Doot, Oregon’s Public
Trust Doctrine: Public Rights in Waters, Wildlife, and Beaches, 42 ENVTL. L. 375, 407–09
(2012) (discussing the Hay decision).
473. Hay, 462 P.2d at 672–73.
474. See Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1262. Judge Aiken noted that one member of
the Oregon Supreme Court thought that the state’s beaches should have been
declared subject to public use by virtue of the PTD. Id. at 1262, n.14 (citing Hay, 462
P.2d at 679 (Denecke, J., concurring)).
475. See Lisa Heinzerling, The Power Canons, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming
2017) (manuscript at 1), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2757770 (asserting that the
Supreme Court has embraced new canons of statutory interpretation and identifying
situations in which “the Court took interpretive power from an administrative agency,
power that would normally have been the agency’s due under Chevron, and kept it for
itself,” reflecting a basic distrust of an active administrative state); Amanda Reilly,
Chevron Doctrine on the Ropes as Trump Era Looms, GREENWIRE (Dec. 9, 2016),
http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060046945/search?keyword=Chevron+d
eference (explaining that the Trump administration has considered appointing antiChevron judges).
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right to something so fundamental as a stable climate system—the
necessity of which will become only more obvious as climate chaos
takes its toll on human survival and civilization. Rights today widely
recognized as fundamental—like First Amendment rights to religion
and speech—were not commonly recognized by the federal courts
until more than a century-and-a-half after the ratification of the First
Amendment.476
As Justice Kennedy acknowledged, sometimes
fundamental liberty rights are “not always see[n] . . . in our own
times . . . ,” but the Framers “did not presume to know the extent of
freedom in its all its dimensions, and so they entrusted to future
generations a charter of protecting the right of all persons to enjoy
liberty as we learn its meaning.”477
The right to a stable climate system, like the right to marry and the
right to racial non-discrimination, if not originally among those rights
the Framers thought were constitutionally protected, is certainly
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” and
“fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty.”478 And too, a stable
climate system remains the linchpin to the full ecological endowment
secured by the public trust principle.
In addition to its effect in other courts, decisions like Juliana can
serve broad educative functions in society, inspiring waves of change
beyond the courthouse doors, similar to the Supreme Court’s historic
decision in Brown v. Board of Education,479 ruling that racial
discrimination in public education is unconstitutional. Although it
took a decade, Brown led to the Civil Rights Act of 1964480 and the
Voting Rights of 1965,481 which effectively ended U.S. de jure racial
segregation that had persisted since before the nation’s inception.
Someday, Juliana may be seen in the same broad educative light as
Brown. At the moment, however, the Juliana decision, resting as it does
on constitutional rights, seems to represent a judicial bulwark against

476. See W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (overturning a
decision that was only three-years-old, Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586
(1940), and ruling, in an unprecedented decision, that the Free Speech Clause of the
First Amendment protected schoolchildren from being forced to salute the American
flag and say the Pledge of Allegiance in school).
477. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1249 (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584,
2589 (2015)).
478. Id. at 1249 (quoting McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010)).
479. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
480. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-h (2012).
481. 52 U.S.C. § 10101–10702 (2012).
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a reckless ramp-up of fossil-fuel production in the United States that
could push the planet past irreversible tipping points.
Perhaps the most important aspect of the Juliana decision is that it
took a courageous and historic step into what Professor Kysar has
identified as a gulf between normative law and climate catastrophe,482
turning a judicial tide of other climate cases—cases that evaded the
calls of justice through procedural maneuvers—to address the climate
reality unflinchingly and to accept the institutional “grace of
responsibility” with exacting jurisprudential care and considerable
doctrinal mooring.483
In this vein, the Juliana opinion “demonstrate[s] the more dynamic,
adaptive, and restless forms of jurisdictional assertion required in an
age of unlimited harm.”484 Against a reality where “[t]oday’s political
failures may foreclose possible natural worlds,” threatening damage
that is “irreversible on any conceivable human timescale,” Juliana paves
the way for courts faced with similar suits to require the political
branches to take remedial action before the crisis spirals completely
These cases are, indeed, the
out of humanity’s control.485
“jurisdictional struggles that define the boundary between legal order
and catastrophic overturning.”486 Such judicial intervention across the
globe cannot happen a moment too soon.487

482. See Weaver & Kysar, supra note 45, (manuscript at 7) (“Catastrophes . . . create
situations of misalignment, where a void opens between normative structure and
cognizable fact.”).
483. Id. (manuscript at 33) (describing climate tort cases and observing that
“evasiveness has characterized most judicial responses to climate change torts”).
484. Id. (manuscript at 40). We include, in this characterization, the opinions
written by Magistrate Coffin as well, for they broke ground in new constitutional
terrain and laid the foundation for Judge Aiken’s historic opinion.
485. Id. (manuscript at 14).
486. Id. (manuscript at 40).
487. See id. (manuscript at 1) (“Against the backdrop of a potentially existential
threat, judges redeem the very possibility of law when they forthrightly confront the
merits of climate lawsuits.”).
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